20 years to the Defensive Wall: Shaul Mofaz recalls the war over the house

From the dramatic decision in the cabinet to the mobilization of reserves and the siege of terrorist cities in the West Bank, the former chief of staff recounts in his book the great operation to eliminate the terrorist infrastructure in the West Bank. My Israeli "

Shaul Mofaz

11/03/2022

Friday, March 11, 2022, 8:50 p.m.

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Every military operation has a strategic purpose.

The purpose of Operation Defensive Shield was to severely damage the terrorist infrastructure and create a better security situation for the State of Israel.

We repeated over and over again the message that this is a war for the home.

There has never been another conflict like the one in which dozens of suicide bombers exploded in the heart of the civilian population in the State of Israel.

Operation Defensive Shield was a strategic turnaround, from which the reality changed from then on.

Suicide bombings accounted for less than one percent of all attacks (suicide, shooting, car bombings, bombings, trampling) we knew in those years, but their intensity was enormous: not only were they responsible for 50 percent of the deaths, they sowed panic and gave the feeling, justified, That death lurks in every corner, on the threshold of the doors of our house.

The Palestinian incitement, the poisoning of the heart and the brain and the desire for revenge produced human bombs, the precise and nuclear weapons of the Palestinians.

It was impossible to get out of my head the picture of the massacre on Seder night, the white of the holiday sanctity that suddenly turned red.

There are moments when a nation says "there is no choice" and acts solely according to its interests.

The massacre at the Park Hotel was such a moment.

What we did after him could have been done after each of the major attacks, such as at the Sbarro or Dolphinarium, but there are other circumstances, such as international legitimacy, the nature of the leaders and the composition of the coalition.

It was clear to everyone that the decision made on the night of the attack was a strategic decision on a fateful move to change the security reality, which required time and breathing space.

For a limited time the legitimacy was created that would allow us to make this move.

Former Chief of Staff Mofaz in Operation Defensive Shield (Photo: GettyImages)

Until then, and in fact even after that, we were in a trap, and it was double.

The Palestinians created brutal terrorism that had to be fought, but among some leaders and among the people, and certainly outside of Israel, there was a feeling that terrorism had erupted due to our unwillingness to reach a settlement, even if factually it was not true.

Three prime ministers jumped from summit to summit and negotiations for each other and nothing changed, even after the Americans set the cessation of terrorism as a condition for the continuation of the process following the "Karin I" seizure.

Almost a decade has passed since the signing of the Oslo Accords, which gave the Palestinians the tools to change reality.

During this time, Marwan Barghouti competed with Arafat and built the Tanzim, Arafat, for his part, built on his back, and Hamas and jihad also operated and intensified on the ground.

And all the while the Palestinian Authority has gained international legitimacy.

Arafat was and remains the leader.

Even after the Seder night attack, Colin Powell met with him and did not see him as a terrorist.

The Americans, who bombed with full force in Afghanistan, fought in the Tora Bora caves against the Taliban and al Qaeda fighters and did not consider recognizing bin Laden's leadership, still expected us to reach an agreement with Arafat.

We went out on Operation Defensive Shield because there was no other choice.

We knew we would not reach an agreement with Arafat, the Palestinian leader whose hands are covered in the blood of the people of Israel, who is negotiating peace at Camp David and at the same time making an alliance with the Iranians on smuggling a ship carrying 50 tons of ammunition. Bombing the Muqata and thus solving the problem, as some of us have suggested, but harming Arafat could have caused us damage, which would not allow us to operate within the Palestinian cities.

Neither the Americans, nor to some extent we, understood the intensity of the monstrous terrorism we were fighting against.

Even I was amazed at what was revealed to us during Operation Defensive Shield, the terrorist array hidden in the heart of the population and in the crowded area: HNM (smashing explosives) and laboratories inside residences, a multi-armed monster of suicide bombers, weapons and ammunition manufactured in the heart of the area or Women and children who had been recruited to prepare explosives were smuggled into it.

The greatest military achievement of the operation

The success of "Defensive Shield" was due to the preparations and experience gained in the days of "highs and lows", from the lessons learned and applied.

But even these were not enough.

We had to act surgically to minimize the harm to Palestinian civilians on the one hand and to IDF soldiers on the other. Make mistakes that will incur unforgivable damage to civilians and a red flag ordering us to leave Area A, which we had no international legitimacy to enter. At the UN headquarters in the village and brought to an end Operation Grapes of Wrath before its goals were achieved.

The day after "Defensive Shield" I wanted A to be equal to B. When I said that in the Cabinet, they thought I was joking about a mathematical formula, but I meant what I said.

In Area B, especially in the Palestinian villages in Judea and Samaria, the security responsibility lies with Israel. At the end of Operation Defensive Shield, we stripped the Palestinians of responsibility for security in Area A and in the future we will move to a new reality called "Security Coordination". It was the operation's biggest military achievement, beyond the removal of some 4,000 terrorists arrested by the IDF and imprisoned in Israeli prisons, and hundreds of terrorists killed, including senior Hamas, jihadist and Tanzim wanted.

The secondary effort was directed at the Gaza Strip.

We have created a reality of 'offensive defense' in attacking infrastructure and targets, from which terrorism emerges, and lathes that produce Qassam rockets.

I did not think it was necessary to occupy or take control of Gaza, an issue that would come up for discussion several times during the operation, because I did not want another arena and I knew very well that we had nothing to do in Gaza the day after.

Yasser Arafat during the siege of the Muqata (Photo: AP)

That evening, at 8:30 PM, a terrorist entered the house of the Gavish family in the A. neighborhood of Elon Moreh and opened fire.

Four members of the family were killed: the couple Rachel and David Gavish, their son Avraham, an officer in the General Staff patrol who was on study leave, and grandfather Yitzhak Kenner, Rachel's father. The rest of the family, including Naama, Avraham's wife, and baby Daria, Before

the

cabinet meeting, which began at 11:00 PM, I presented the plans to the prime minister and the defense minister. The equation. "To get to A equals B," I said, "I need 4 + 4," that is, four weeks as a start, for an operation to which reserve forces will be recruited the very next day, with the possibility of another four weeks. Shimon Peres and Matan Vilnai opposed the operation.

After I left the hearing, which ended at 1:30 a.m., the decision was made: Arafat is an enemy and should be isolated in the Muqata, but not to enter his office or harm him.

It was a modest start, made in the wake of cabinet disagreements.

There was no point in arguing at this time.

That night, winter time changed to daylight saving time.

We earned an extra hour of work on a sleepless night.

The Mitzpa, the High Command post, "The Pit" in the Kirya, was activated in an emergency format from the moment the operation began. In the dozens of designated rooms, hundreds of soldiers worked shifts, around the clock. , On the night's events and the plans expected for that day, and planning began for the next day.

In the evening I approved the plans for the next few days.

Reserve recruitment began on the morning of March 29, after cabinet approval, and was completed within 48 hours.

It was the first success of the operation, a success that did not depend on the army, but on the citizens of the country and their willingness to enlist.

About 30,000 reservists recruited in the first phase showed up without hesitation.

Subsequent surveys showed that the level of trust in the army and its commanders and the necessity of combat had risen to over 90 percent.

The procurement of weapons was finally completed a few hours before enlistment.

Regular soldiers were already equipped, and the weapons purchased with foreign currency funds were directed to the reservists.

We summoned brigades that trained this year, mainly infantry needed in a built-up area and armored and engineering forces, which belonged to the recruited divisions.

On Saturday, March 30, 2002, the Central Command's plans to enter Nablus, Tulkarm, Qalqilya and Bethlehem were approved. A zigzag report at the political level. From somewhere, requests for food, water, a generator and a telephone line came to Arafat. "Someone is trying to sabotage our efforts," Sharon was furious when he heard about it. A.

My Israeli journey to the front (Photo: Official website, Walla!)

We prepared with the best forces to take over the city of Nablus, which was considered the capital of terrorism.

Most of Hamas' headquarters, Islamic Jihad and the Popular Front, as well as most of the explosives laboratories, were concentrated in Nablus.

We had relatively good intelligence on what was going on in the city, though not enough.

The Casbah of Nablus, beyond being a refugee camp, is one of the most densely populated areas in the world.

Inside its walls, which rise to a height of about 18 meters, hides a system of underground tunnels, part of the traffic routes in medieval casbahs, then the casbah (fortress) served as the residence of the local ruler and the defensive stronghold.

Along with the two excellent infantry brigades, the paratroopers under the command of Aviv Kochavi and the Golani under the command of Chico Tamir, there was a reserve armored brigade in Nablus under the command of Colonel Oren Ben Joya, and a carob battalion that gained experience and trained for complex missions.

The workmanship was high quality and accurate.

The paratroopers initially took control of the western neighborhoods, pushing the enemy into the Casbah area, which attacked them simultaneously from four directions.

They went from house to house through the walls in order to bypass the hundreds of charges and barbed wire that bound the access roads.

Golani who operated in the eastern neighborhoods were equipped with "cruelty," protected tank tanks that allowed them to enter cities, ambushed terrorists in deputies and alleys.

Major Assaf Assulin, from the Paratroopers Brigade, who was pulled out of his studies in POM, was accidentally shot by a sniper of our forces who identified him as a terrorist.

About 1,200 terrorists were caught in the casbah, 80 of them "heavy", and about 80 terrorists were killed.

A bomb-making laboratory was seized at the home of the city's blue police chief.

Ambulances, we learned from the investigations, led terrorists from the city to their missions.

And all this has happened for years under the nose of Israel.

The battle for the capital of terror

Defensive wall achievements, even if they were a victory by points and not a knockout decision, led to severe damage to the terrorist infrastructure and a significant strengthening of Israel's deterrence.

What would have happened if the Iranians had managed, as they had planned, to drive a

stake in the territories of Judea and Samaria and add a floor to the level of terrorism?

Including those who were not read, a sign that the public in Israel understood well the reality and the magnitude of the hour.

Breathing length, which began as early as September 2000, has ended and Nasrallah's cobweb theory has been shattered.

Israeli society has proven that it mobilizes, fights and defends itself and does not compromise when it comes to its security.

We have set a precedent in the fight against monstrous terrorism and the arrest of suicide bombers.

We did this by combining determination and developing methods of warfare, such as a "pressure cooker" and "targeted counterterrorism," and producing rapid and immediate operational activity from intelligence that enabled harm to targets that had hitherto been known to disappear in the field.

On my first visit as Secretary of Defense to the United States, in December 2002, I will be able to impress Donald Rumsfeld, as I explain to him the methods by which we acted against terrorism in a built-up area.

The phenomenon of suicide bombers will gradually decrease and end by 2005.

If there was a surprise in the operation, it was the depth and scope of the terrorist infrastructure that was exposed and Arafat's involvement in it.

A "protective wall" created the equation I wanted and is arbitrary to this day: A equals B. We have taken away from the Palestinians the responsibility for security.

We do not need a permit to enter Ramallah or Nablus and act there against the monstrous terror.

We took the initiative and created the future freedom of action of the IDF to operate in Area A.

Another achievement of the operation was in sectors outside Israel.

The Americans finally understood what Israel was experiencing, and for a while allowed us to act, until they forced us in the name of their interests to stop.

Relations with our neighbors, Jordan and Egypt, and the resilience of the peace agreements with them, also stood the test.

They did not break the vessels.

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