Laurent Herblay has been leading the Free Gaullist blog since 2007. In 2021 he published
Neoliberalism is an oligarchism
(ed Librinova).
This crisis caused by the war in Ukraine is shaking the European Union.
Some will see it as a new moment to advance European integration, Ursula von der Leyen taking the right to ban media.
But a big grain of sand should paralyze this project: Germany, too happy with the current organization, which allows it to impose its agenda on its partners, without much challenge.
A reality well illustrated by the latest measures against Russia, which spare Berlin and will weigh on Paris...
In the jumble of “information” that is often too partial and one-sided, it is quite incredible that two points have not always been emphasized more.
If the EU willingly adopts a rather martial posture with regard to Russia, in reality, its positions are much less harsh.
From the beginning, Berlin obtained that energy exchanges are not affected by the sanctions.
Of course, Germany depends on Russian gas and probably couldn't maintain its electricity production without it, but this exception is really not technical.
As Le Figaro reminds us, in 2021, more than 60% of Russia's exports to the EU were energy.
Better, the total amount of exports of energy products exceeds all that Russia imports from the EU.
Clear,
While the EU supported the exclusion of part of the Russian banks from Swift, the main banks that finance the energy trade between Russia and the EU are excluded, due to strong pressure from the Germany.
Laurent Herblay
Moreover, if the EU supported the exclusion of part of the Russian banks from Swift, it should be noted that the main banks which finance energy trade between Russia and the EU are excluded, due to strong pressure from Germany, as Le Figaro reported on February 26.
Clearly, no constraints or restrictions have been put in place for this trade.
One could have imagined the EU announcing a 50% reduction in its imports from Russia, enough to punish it, while leaving it dependent enough not to cut off a critical supply to finance its economy.
But no.
In short, the postures of the EU are largely postures, partly meaningless, except when it comes to shutting down Russian-funded media,
a doubly questionable reaction: first, it is not the responsibility of the EU and creates a very worrying precedent.
Then, it is paradoxical to say the least to use the weapons of an authoritarian regime against such a regime...
The announcements made following Friday's European summit in Versailles are particularly illuminating: no restriction on imports of Russian oil or gas, which means that Moscow will retain a comfortable financial flow capable of financing many things.
The only new economic measure announced by the EU is an end to luxury goods exports to Russia!
The importance of the measure must be put into perspective, given that several luxury groups had already announced the closure of their point of sale.
But basically, France and Italy will bear the cost, while Germany has not announced the slightest restriction on the sale of its machine tools, which are much more linked to the war effort. Russian… And it
Read alsoFrançois d'Orcival: "Why German rearmament will benefit the United States"
Another point passed a little too quickly, even if it was not illegitimate: the announcement of a rearmament program by Germany, despite being led by a fairly pacifist coalition.
Of course, Russia's invasion of Ukraine clearly legitimizes Berlin's choice.
Nevertheless, the past should have pushed Berlin to official information a priori from other European leaders.
Germany's rearmament, even more than 75 years after the end of World War II, required less cavalier and one-sided behavior.
But, we have to believe that in this EU, Germany has just got used to being able to impose its will, without even bothering to consult its partners, as with the migration crisis of 2015 when it had, one after the other, wide open its borders,
Of course, Berlin knows how to compromise, having accepted treasury bond buyback programs, or the famous post-Covid-19 recovery plan.
Nevertheless, for those who look beyond the announcement effects and look into the details, it is clear that these concessions are much less important than they may seem.
The euro zone has conducted less ambitious public debt monetization programs than in most comparable countries.
And Germany has ensured that most of the purchases are made by the national central banks, the Bundesbank, or even the ECB, not being for example in the front line of the purchases of Italian debt, largely provided by the Central Bank of Italy.
Finally, the post-Covid-19 EU recovery plan is a pittance, in absolute terms,
It is striking how Germany has been able to influence the rules of the EU to a large extent in its favour.
Laurent Herblay
More generally, the entire economic agenda of the EU is today under strong German influence.
This is how European automobile pollution standards grant a compensatory bonus based on weight!
Clearly, the more a manufacturer sells heavy cars, the more its cars can emit CO2, a mechanism put in place to preserve premium German manufacturers, who would have been disadvantaged by a uniform rule.
And with the standards imposing catalytic converters, all small vehicles, specialties of French manufacturers, found themselves disadvantaged by European rules, when on the contrary they should have favored them, because they pollute less than large vehicles!
Fortunately, our builders have adapted.
Ditto on energy where, if nuclear power was fished out at the last minute, in the same way as gas, as an energy in which it would be possible to invest, it nevertheless remains in the second division of energies for the EU, once again, due to German lobbying.
On energy issues too, Berlin seems to have a formidable ability to push its ideas and interests, while France is struggling to defend its priorities.
However, nuclear power, while it is far from being exempt from real limits (waste, danger), does not pose the problems of emission of carbon dioxide or fine particles harmful to health which do not stop at borders, than gas or coal, widely used across the Rhine.
Finally, we could also mention the case of the new European combat aircraft,
While our country seems ready to make many sacrifices in the name of a European ideal, Germany is methodically defending its interests.
Laurent Herblay
The case of the SCAF is particularly emblematic today, when the Rafale has become a success.
France did not need a European initiative, necessarily dilutive.
Dassault did not seem very keen on this cooperation, which seems to come from a more political will, in particular from France.
Last week, Dassault denounced the claims of its partners, speaking of "
red lines
".
A typical configuration of the approach gap of the two parts of the Rhine.
While our country seems ready to make many sacrifices in the name of a European ideal, Germany methodically defends its interests, and only gives in to initiatives that come under a form of integration if it has obtained compensation often colossal.
The best example is the euro, designed as a new mark, with an ECB in Frankfurt, and seeking only to fight against inflation, unlike the Fed.
In short, Coralie Delaume was right to say that “
the Franco-German couple does not exist
”.
While Paris continues to defend a general European interest, sometimes to its detriment, as with this recovery plan which grants us 40 billion but for which we assume almost double the expenses, Berlin defends its interests, rationally, firmly.
And since the eurozone crisis, Germany has understood that its position of strength now allows it to impose its views unilaterally.
