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Krassucha-4 in training: The system can interfere with radar devices, drones or cruise missiles
Photo:
Donat Sorokin / ITAR-TASS / IMAGO
During the Cold War, the great powers were primarily concerned with heavy weapons.
Tanks, airplanes and nuclear missiles were purchased in an unprecedented armament spiral and later scrapped again.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the priorities were elsewhere, war became easier and more mobile.
Back then, Russia saw the future in invisible sound waves and invested heavily in electronic warfare.
In addition to jamming the opponent's signals, for example through electromagnetic radiation, this also includes listening to radio transmissions or feeding in false information.
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Moscow viewed electronic warfare as a key advantage over NATO to disrupt their precision strikes, drones or satellites.
Fighting with the sound waves almost blinds the opponent and can even prevent him from attacking without firing a shot.
The devices no longer work properly or simply fall out of the sky.
In Syria, it was most likely Russia that threw up problems with American communications and aircraft, prompting the adversary to focus more on its electronic forces.
Such successes actually suggest the idea of making use of electronic warfare in the invasion of Ukraine.
So far, however, only a few images of such systems have appeared.
However, the obviously functioning communication on the Ukrainian side and their successful drone campaign indicate that the procedure has been relatively undisturbed so far.
"Russia went into this war with a fairly advanced system of electronic warfare," said Samuel Bendett, an analyst at the Washington Center for Naval Analysis.
"But we don't necessarily see that much on social media or other sources because Russia doesn't use them everywhere and they're not evenly distributed."
According to the expert, electronic warfare is used to protect larger formations of Russian forces and not the tactical units attacking the Ukrainians.
“And it is precisely these small units that fall victim to Ukrainian drones, reconnaissance and other attacks,” he adds.
One reason for the absence of electronic systems is probably that they are better protected than other Russian units.
So far only one R-330ZH Zhitel jammer has been destroyed and the control unit of a Krassucha-4 has been found.
The latter is one of the most modern systems on the market and can interfere with radar devices, drones or cruise missiles, for example.
"Capturing such systems is very useful for learning more about Russian electronic warfare," explains Bendett.
This is probably also the reason why such systems are used far away from the fronts: the Russians want to prevent the US Army from obtaining valuable information about equipment captured in Ukraine.
The Americans had already adopted a Pantsir S1 air defense system in Libya.
However, it is unclear whether an incomplete Krassucha-4, the said control unit, can be of use.
After a bumpy start, however, the Russian side seems to have recently achieved some successes in electronic warfare: "The blows on Ukrainian units became more precise as the conflict went on," says Bendett.
"In addition, Russia claims to have shot down 300 drones, which indicates successful disruptive maneuvers."
However, many of these drones are probably commercial reconnaissance drones without an attack function.
Russia is struggling with the armed Turkish TB2 drones, so far only two of them have been confirmed as shot down.
At the beginning of the Libyan war, however, Turkish cheap drones were taken out of the sky in droves.
This only improved when additional anti-aircraft defenses and electronic warfare were deployed by the Turks, suggesting that the same could be the case in Ukraine.
“There are things we don't know about that are clearly having an effect.
I would also say that civilians are contributing a lot more than we know," said John Spencer, director of urban warfare studies at the New York think tank Madison Policy Forum.
"There are also reports of Ukrainian civilians intercepting Russian communications or blocking basic radio frequencies."
In addition, NATO reconnaissance aircraft and drones are not flying in Ukraine, but on its borders and should provide the Ukrainians with important information on targets for air and artillery strikes.
These are actually the perfect target for systems like the Krassucha-4, but they seem to have no effect here or are used elsewhere.
The Ukrainians themselves also have specially developed systems such as the Bukovel-AD or the Nota.
They are designed to jam smaller drones or eavesdrop on or interrupt enemy communications, which could explain problems on the part of Russia.
Again and again during the war, conversations were intercepted that provided information about logistical inadequacies in the army.
Electronic warfare is also likely to play a role as the invasion progresses.
If Russia really uses its advantage there, the issue could become a problem for the Ukrainians: the drones are an important part of their defense strategy.
They not only destroy Russian vehicles, but also coordinate artillery attacks.
In order to prevent this, Russia would have to make better use of its electronic capabilities.
Assistance: Fritz Schaap