Hugues Eudeline is an associate researcher at the Thomas More Institute. A former naval officer, Doctor in military history, defense and security from the Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes (EPHE, Paris) and certified in French and American higher military education, he devotes his research to the geopolitics and geostrategy of the world ocean.
The President of the United States, Joe Biden, is widely criticized for not wanting to directly involve the armed forces of NATO - first and foremost those of his country - in a high-intensity conflict alongside an attacked Ukraine. by Russia.
The contemptuous of the man who is sometimes called by his political enemies "Joe the blunder" or "the dodder" for his propensity to
use undiplomatic language such as when he calls the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, a "butcher" .
However, they would do well to think twice before making judgments that are too lapidary.
The accuracy and precision of the information President Biden provided regarding an impending Russian attack on Ukraine long
before it happened can no longer be disputed.
He had however been denigrated by many European political leaders, for having sounded the tocsin well before the start of the offensive.
The proof that the United States has an efficient and reliable intelligence system on a global scale is well established.
You should never engage in two major conflicts simultaneously.
Hugues Eudeline
So why not intervene directly to end the conflict and put an end to the abuses suffered by the Ukrainian people?
A first element of response, often put forward by media commentators, is that a direct conflict between two nuclear powers would be impossible, because it could degenerate and push the belligerents to an escalation to extremes.
Another reason, even more relevant, and on which all the strategists agree, is that one should never engage in two major conflicts simultaneously.
The Imminence of an Attack from Taiwan
by China, announced many times, was recently announced both by the Taiwanese Minister of Defense and, on March 13, by Admiral John C. Aquilino, Commander of the American Naval Forces for the Indo-Pacific to a commission of American parliamentarians.
As part of a very detailed presentation of his zone which covers the Pacific and Indian oceans as well as a large part of the Asian continent, Admiral John C. Aquilino thus declared: "
The People's Republic of China (PRC) is seeking to become a world military power and to acquire the capacity to seize Taiwan
”…
Read alsoRussia, China, Turkey: “When empires strike back”
Three times in the twentieth century (1954-1955, 1958 and 1995-1996), the PRC tried to take the island of Taiwan, where the defeated Kuomintang troops took refuge in 1949.
Three times she was
dissuaded from doing so by the presence of American carrier battle groups and by the inferiority of her navy and air force.
Today, due to its staggering economic growth, communist China has
been able to devote an ever-increasing budget to its military expenditure, mainly naval and air.
That of 2022 is up by 7.1% compared to 2021 to reach 230 billion dollars.
It is certainly lower than that of the United States ($752.9 billion in 2022), but it is still necessary to compare what is comparable.
To be exact, it is the purchasing power parity values that must be reconciled and not those resulting from the simple application of the exchange rate.
Today, the PRC has a navy superior to that of the US Navy in number of combat ships, although still inferior in tonnage.
Hugues Eudeline
Indeed, the cost of producing a weapon system is not the same in China, where the salaries of workers and managers are much lower than in the West and control of the design is less restrictive there.
Furthermore, technological developments are dual, ie military projects systematically benefit from civilian research in
similar fields.
Crew salaries, training and maintenance costs are also not of the same order of magnitude as in the West.
Finally, the operating costs are incomparable;
the United States is present and militarily engaged on all continents, its navy ensures freedom of navigation on the whole of the world ocean while China still only has
This concentration of resources for decades in favor of the development of numerous and balanced combat forces means that today the PRC has a navy superior to that of the US Navy in number of combat ships, although even lower in tonnage.
As part of the long term, it has the ambition to surpass it in all areas by 2035.
Read alsoWhy China and Russia now have a quasi-alliance
The economic development of China is mainly due to its maritime trade since Deng Xiaoping decided to open the country to world trade by sea, so as to avoid the geopolitical hazards resulting from its tense relations with its terrestrial neighbors.
Mastering the long term, it began by developing its coastline by building gigantic ports, among the most modern in the world.
They irrigate their hinterlands made up of special economic zones with raw materials and export their manufactured products which flood the world.
At the same time, the PRC has given itself the legal and maritime means to control its maritime approaches, which are the China Seas and the Sea of Japan.
For this, it has equipped itself with a coast guard unequaled in the world and an equally unequaled maritime militia.
These seas, delimited by a line of islands, none of which belongs to the PRC, constitute a straitjacket from which it would like to free itself by breaking the lock constituted by Taiwan, the most important of these islands.
This strategic objective also responds to a political goal, that of bringing the Republic of China (DRC) into the communist fold, which it considers to be a rebel province – although it has never governed it.
According to the American intelligence services – of which we have seen the quality of the information – and those of Taiwan, the attack could be launched within the next three years.
The need to play the nationalist rope could hasten operations to take Taiwan by force.
Hugues Eudeline
The very large-scale resumption of the Covid pandemic in China in April – which forced it to close some of these ports with a major economic impact – is glaring proof of the failure of the
“zero Covid” policy from which it is based. was proud.
Movements of rejection of the population put in difficulty Xi Jinping who needs a derivative.
The need to play the nationalist rope could hasten operations to take Taiwan by force.
This temptation is however tempered by the lessons from the war in Ukraine.
They show the difficulties encountered by the Russian forces in carrying out an invasion operation in a country that is nevertheless less well equipped militarily than Taiwan.
The analysis of this feedback can contribute to tempering the ardor of the most vindictive planners and to cast doubt on the capacity of the forces of the people's liberation army to take the island quickly.
The obstacle of crossing the Taiwan Strait which separates the island from the mainland – 65 nautical miles (120 km) wide – is an additional challenge.
The attack is further complicated by difficult geography and coastlines, many of which do not lend themselves to landing craft beaching.
The capricious weather in the area further complicates the operation.
Faced with a communist party where he does not only have support, Xi Jinping cannot afford to lose face by a failure during an attempted invasion of Taiwan.
The reaction of the United States - which remains available by avoiding engaging in Europe - is unknown to him.
The fact that they do not engage directly in the Ukrainian conflict leaves them fully available to provide significant support to Taiwan.
The demonstration of the effectiveness of Western high-tech weapons in the Ukrainian theater constitutes an additional reason for fear, while
many have been — and continue to be — supplied to Taiwan.
The United States Relations with Taiwan Act of 1979 does not oblige the United States to defend the DRC but states that it is American policy to maintain the ability to do so, which creates strategic ambiguity about American actions. in case of PRC attack.
What will be the choice of Xi Jinping between the existential need to break the Taiwanese lock to have free access to the world ocean or that of waiting a long time until his capacities of projection of forces and power give him an indisputable superiority? even if it means being confronted with troubles?
While Russia and China signed a joint statement on February 4, 2022 reaffirming that the “new interstate relations” between them are “superior” to the political and military alliances of the “Cold War era”, the refusal to Joe Biden to get directly involved in Ukraine is first and foremost an implicit message to Xi Jinping: don't attack Taiwan…