Olaf Scholz and Boris Johnson discussed the war behind closed doors at 10 Downing Street.
Now, they were to answer a few questions at the British prime minister's official residence in London.
The topic of their meeting on Friday, April 8: the delivery of heavy weapons to Ukraine.
And the role of the Russian president.
And a possible visit of the two leaders to Kyiv.
Scholz allowed his eyes to wander back and forth as he thought.
He then said: "The two of us, I believe, always speak of our travel plans upon departure," before then glancing over at Johnson as if to ask: Why can't they let go of the Kyiv question?
He seemed slightly annoyed.
The next day, Boris Johnson could be seen standing next to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in Kyiv – and Scholz was back in Germany.
Johnson didn't announce his trip to Kyiv, neither upon departure nor while he was en route.
He just showed up there.
Casually and fearlessly, he walked with Zelenskyy through central Kyiv, speaking with passersby and receiving a briefing on the situation.
It was a clear show of solidarity.
The German Chancellor stayed in Berlin.
It seemed he had been caught off guard.
Whereas Johnson was making a confident statement in Kyiv, Scholz was campaigning in Schleswig-Holstein, where state parliamentary elections are scheduled for May. It was the same old story since the beginning of the Russian invasion: The German chancellor is never the first and often even the last when it comes to responding in this war - and the reasons behind his actions or lack thereof remain a mystery.
He is an extremely reluctant communicator - whether publicly or within his government coalition.
He simply remains silent about many details, as if keeping quiet is good policy in an of itself.
Within the ranks of his coalition partners, the business-friendly Free Democrats (FDP) and the Green Party, there is growing frustration with Scholz's lack of elan when it comes to speaking or even making decisions.
And the first are beginning to raise their voices.
"The chancellor is the problem," says a critical Anton Hofreiter, a member of the Greens and chair of the European Affairs Committee in the German parliament, the Bundestag.
The reference was to Germany's notorious hesitation on arms deliveries and energy boycotts.
"Olaf Scholz must finally become visible in Europe," he says, adding: "No matter which European countries I'm traveling in at the moment, I always encounter the question: Where is Germany?"
Similar criticism of the chancellor's role comes from Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, a member of the FDP and head of the Defense Committee in parliament.
She, too, is calling for leadership in dealing with Ukraine and has called on Scholz to finally "take the baton in his hand and set the rhythm."
The message delivered by Hofreiter and Strack-Zimmermann is unusually firm for leading parliamentarians from parties that are in government.
If the course of the past few months has shown one thing, it's that Scholz doesn't make decisions until he has no other choice.
When it came to arms deliveries, other Europeans had to lead the way.
It was the same story when it came to cutting Russia off from the SWIFT international payments system. The chancellor's pattern of action in this war has been that he will finally make a decision when there is no other way around it.
It's also quite possible that he will travel to Kyiv at some point for the same reason.
Or send armored vehicles to Ukraine.
This seeming leadership vacuum has put Germany in a difficult situation.
Scholz has never really made clear what strategy Germany is pursuing.
Nevertheless, he has still managed to attract outrage over the course taken by the German government, while at the same time allowing Germany to slip deeper and deeper into this war without any major debate or explanation.
"The chancellor has major shortcomings in strategy and in his communication," criticizes opposition leader Friedrich Merz, the chair of the conservative Christian Democratic Union (CDU) party.
"Either he himself doesn't know what he wants or he can't explain his goals," he says.
Just how bad the relationship between Germany and Ukraine has become evident last week when German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier was forced to abort his trip to Ukraine.
The trip had been prepared under the strictest secrecy.
But then, Zelenskyy's government suddenly derailed the visit, just hours before Steinmeier was to board a night train to Kyiv.
After Steinmeier returned to Berlin, officials in Kyiv let it be known that another German was welcome in Ukraine: the chancellor.
Zelenskyy's government has also stated that Steinmeier had not been uninvited.
Scholz can hardly allow Zelenskyy to play him and Steinmeier off against each other, so for now, he can't travel to Kyiv.
If he continues to refuse to visit Kyiv, though, it will only serve to reinforce the impression that Berlin is failing as a leading nation.
Either way, Scholz will still be late to the game if he does visit.
European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has already been, as has Johnson and a whole host of heads of states and governments.
Then, last Tuesday, a delegation comprised of three committee chairs from the Bundestag suddenly popped up in western Ukraine.
They included Michael Roth, a foreign policy expert and member of parliament with Scholz's own SPD party, FDP politician Strack-Zimmermann and Green Party member Hofreiter.
They had planned the visit at their own initiative, despite warnings from Berlin.
The tenor of the group was that just because the chancellor isn't taking action, doesn't mean that everyone has to stand by and do nothing.
Enlarge image
German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier canceled his trip to Kyiv at the last minute after Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy signaled he wasn't interested.
Photo: IMAGO/Christian Spicker
From Warsaw, they traveled to the border, and from there, they continued in secure cars to Lviv.
No matter whom the three spoke with, weapons was the only thing people were interested in. There "finally needs to be a positive move," warned SPD politician Roth.
Some in Scholz's chancellery view Roth's role critically.
For weeks, he has been pushing for more heavy weapons to be sent to Ukraine.
SPD parliamentary group head Rolf Mützenich, who is notoriously hesitant when it comes to Ukraine, allegedly said recently in a meeting of the party leadership that it bothered him that a member of the party's national executive committee was constantly demanding more weapons deliveries.
It was an obvious reference to Roth, who promptly countered: "Our communication on the issue of Ukraine is a problem," he apparently said, according to meeting participants.
If a person says "no" on some issues for good reasons, then they also have to sometimes "passionately say yes" on others, the foreign policy expert said.
"Otherwise, the federal government risks looking like the brakeman."
"Yes" to arms deliveries, even of heavy equipment, that is what units the chairpersons of the committees in the Bundestag relevant to foreign policy - Roth, Strack-Zimmermann and Hofreiter.
It's also what separates them from their chancellor.
At the same time, the government had good intentions at the beginning, especially in the area of arms deliveries.
Two days after Scholz announced a "watershed moment" in the Bundestag, the head of procurement in the Defense Ministry requested a meeting with representatives from the defense industry.
He wanted to know which arms could be delivered very quickly.
For both Germany's armed forces, the Bundeswehr, and Ukraine.
The Bundeswehr's procurement office in Koblenz set up an email address for offers.
The search quickly yielded a long Excel spreadsheet with hundreds of items.
At the Defense Ministry in Berlin, the staff of the state secretary for armaments took a look at the list and quickly crossed off anything that couldn't be delivered to Ukraine within the shortest amount of time.
Heavy weapon systems, for example, like Marder infantry fighting vehicles that had been taken out of service by the Bundeswehr.
For years, large numbers of them have been rusting out in the open on property of the Rheinmetall defense company in the town of Unterlüss in Lower Saxony.
They would have to be extensively refurbished before they could be ready for war.
Experts at the Defense Ministry determined that wouldn't make sense for Ukraine.
The martens were quickly taken off the list.
As were the Gepard anti-aircraft tank and the self-propelled Panzerhaubitze 2000 howitzer.
Though well-intentioned, the decisions would later come back to haunt the ministry and Scholz's government.
Did the defense minister, a member of the SPD, deliberately mislead the public by omitting heavy weapons systems from the final list of 210 armaments it could supply to Ukraine?
That, at least, is the accusation that some have made.
By then, of course, Defense Minister Christine Lambrecht had probably long since lost track of the lists herself, given the sheer number of different spreadsheets that had begun circulating within a very short period of time.
No one seems to have had the overview for a long time.
Not the ministry, not the defense industry and certainly not the public.
The lists were created by Lambrecht's staff to make things easier, but they became a liability, used as they are to blame the ministry for slow arms deliveries.
Although the minister is a member of the Federal Security Council, the body which must ultimately decide on arms exports, it is Robert Habeck's Economics Ministry that has primary responsibility for arms exports.
And Annalena Baerbock's Foreign Ministry.
Baerbock is also now calling for the delivery of heavy weapons.
She has said it is "time for creativity and pragmatism."
The two ministries, led by Green Party politicians, reject all blame for the slow pace of arms deliveries.
They say that all requests are processed as quickly as possible.
The upshot is that the Defense Ministry, the Economy Ministry and the Foreign Ministry all insist that they are not to blame, which leaves the chancellery of Olaf Scholz.
FDP politician Strack-Zimmermann also believes Scholz is primarily responsible.
"One person is in charge," says the Defense Committee chair, "and that's the chancellor."
During the election campaign, Scholz promised: "If you order leadership from me, that's what you'll get."
Were that true, he should have delivered long ago.
But he hasn't.
Or at least he has only very slowly.
Is it because he is worried that Germany will be drawn further and further into the war?
Whatever the case, it has become clear that Scholz's people are applying the brakes wherever possible.
In December, Scholz appointed a Bundeswehr general to head the new coronavirus crisis unit in the Chancellery.
It sent the strong message that fighting the pandemic would be his top priority.
Why, then, has he not appointed a special envoy for arms deliveries to Ukraine?
Why isn't there a "crisis summit in the Chancellery," as demanded by Andriy Melnyk, Ukraine's rather undiplomatic ambassador to Germany?
Instead, eight weeks after his internationally celebrated speech in the Bundestag, the chancellor is proving to be a total failure in terms of communicating the issue of Ukraine.
This lists are strictly under lock and key.
If you want to see them as a member of parliament in the Secret Protection Unit in the Bundestag, you have to hand in your mobile phone and digital watch beforehand.
Publishing their contents is a punishable crime.
Other countries are much more open about their military aid, and Germany could also score points by being less opaque.
The Germans are supporting Ukraine with massive financial aid, and even if they aren't supplying heavy weapons to Kyiv so far, the other arms aid is not as skimpy as portrayed in public.
For example, Slovakia was only able to supply anti-aircraft equipment to Ukraine because the Bundeswehr redeployed Patriot systems there as compensation.
Inside the chancellery, no one wants to hear anything about putting on the brakes.
There is a fair amount of complacency, as if there were no complaints coming out of Eastern Europe, no negative newspaper editorials or no critical parliamentarians.
Those close to the chancellor give the impression that everything is going according to plan, that it has all been thought out strategically.
It's like being in a parallel universe.
Self-criticism?
Forget about it.
"I am impressed by many people have done a quick Google search and suddenly become weapons experts," Scholz has said, lightly brushing off calls for heavy weapons shipments.
The chancellor obviously feels he's on safe ground.
He is popular, and his party is holding stable in the polls.
And his calm style, as his supporters see it, can't be that wrong.
After all, it was precisely that approach that had secured the former Hamburg mayor victory as Germany's next chancellor.
The chancellor's team doesn't see any need to shift course or even to try and improve their communication to the public.
On the contrary, Chancellery officials believe the lack of transparency about arms deliveries is necessary to keep Putin in the dark.
They also see the growing criticism of Scholz almost as a good sign.
Because those who lead are always under pressure, they say.
But last week, it became clear that the chancellor isn't immune to the accusation that he is acting too passively.
On Wednesday, Scholz gave an interview to the Berlin public broadcaster RBB about Ukraine.
The usually calm Scholz suddenly changed his tone, showing announcement at accusations that he is stalling and not leading.
He said it is clear that "in such a situation, someone will always speak up and say: I want things to go in that direction, and that's leadership," Scholz said.
"But to some of these people, I have to say: The very fact that I'm not doing what you want shows that I am leading."
Enlarge image
FDP politicians Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann:
A broadside attack against the chancellor from within his own government coalition
Photo: IMAGO/Political Moments
It was a clear reference to the three Bundestag members who traveled to Lviv and whom he perceived to be working against him.
SPD parliamentary group leader Mützenich also lashed out at the three committee chairs.
"Getting a close up picture of the situation" might be a decent approach, he said.
But anyone who claims there are easy answers "is acting irresponsibly."
It's doubtful that uttering such a sentiment is helpful.
Strack-Zimmermann, Roth and Hofreiter had already coordinated closely among themselves before their trip, and after their return from Ukraine, they agreed to work even more closely together.
The counterattack against Mützenich followed promptly.
They said the SPD parliamentary group leader apparently "cannot accept that an old, rigid worldview has collapsed," Strack-Zimmermann wrote scathingly in a tweet directed at the Social Democrat.
In Brussels, too, the chancellor's dithering is causing annoyance even among politicians from the same parties that are part of his government.
"Instead of actively shaping things, Germany too often blocks things in relevant political areas, such as defense or budget policy," says Rasmus Andresen, the speaker for the German Greens in the European Parliament.
He says it is true that the German government doesn't have to give in to all the demands of its EU partners in the Ukraine crisis.
"Just putting the putting the pedal to the metal isn't a good political concept – braking is part of it," Andresen says.
"But then you also have to say how you are going to move forward."
Sergey Lagodinsky, a member of the European Parliament with the Green Party, says, "German leadership is still nowhere to be seen in the strategic advancement of the EU."
And when it comes to painful cuts in gas, coal and oil imports from Russia, especially for Germany, the German government is one of the most hesitant of all EU nations.
The impression created in the partner countries is "devastating," says Daniel Caspary, who heads the parliamentary group of Germany's conservatives, the CDU and its Bavarian sister party, the Christian Social Union, in the European Parliament.
"There will come a day when we, too, will want to be repaid for the solidarity we have shown by our partners and not be repaid for our current passivity."
In Eastern Europe, in particular, Scholz's hesitance is being met with growing incomprehension.
The most drastic words so far have come from former Lithuanian President Vytautas Landsbergis.
On Wednesday, he sent a letter to Scholz and Steinmeier in which he gave both of them a direct share of the blame for Putin's criminal war.
"Every single day when you pay for Russian oil and gas, you pay for Putin's tanks to rampage through Ukrainian land, you pay him to kill, maim, and destroy," he wrote.
"A new German course is needed," Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba wrote in an editorial in DER SPIEGEL last week.
In Berlin, people are annoyed by the increasing sharpness of the accusations.
"Why doesn't anyone actually ask when France or Italy will deliver tanks to Ukraine?"
asks one German official.
He argues that Germany is already doing more than other EU member states.
In any case, he says, there is no profound dissent in the EU.
The maximum demands for support for Ukraine are mostly coming from Poland and the Baltic states.
The official said that many other countries are also skeptical, "but they are hiding behind us."
That even applies to France, whose President Emmanuel Macron publicly supports an oil embargo against Russia, but also isn't unhappy about German opposition, according to diplomats.
The reason is that Macron is about to enter into a runoff election against right-wing populist Marine Le Pen, and at the moment, there is nothing he needs less that further increases in energy prices.
In Washington, there are still warm words for the Germans.
They have shown a "dramatic reaction" to the Russian invasion, says Jose Fernendez, undersecretary of state for economic affairs at the State Department.
He notes that the German government has put the Nord Stream 2 pipeline project on ice, it has announced a halt to Russian coal imports by the end of the year and it has announced it will change its energy suppliers.
We can only praise what Germany has done, Fernandez says.
What he doesn't mention is that Scholz and his people were not the driving force behind the Nord Stream decisions, the arms deliveries or the massive economic sanctions.
They only gave up there resistance when it was clear that there was no other option.