In the shadow of the (justified) fears of the spread of terrorism to other arenas, the main issue surrounding the confrontation with Israel's radical and violent enemies has been forgotten - the Temple Mount, Gaza, Beirut, Jenin, Umm al-Fahm and the Negev.
The confrontation is over the "rules of the game" of deterrence: who will impose his will on whom.
In this struggle there is sometimes room for a brief tactical compromise, provided it leads to a painful and humiliating dictate.
These enemies - Hamas, the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades in Jenin, the rioters on the Temple Mount, the leaders of the pogroms in the mixed and raging cities of Wadi Ara and the Negev roads - are aware of Israel's addiction to "peace" and its desire to reduce conflict.
In the shadow of this addiction, they seek to replicate Nasrallah's success in Lebanon in deterring Israel from harming its people and Lebanese soil, which allows its organization to intensify in a way that strengthens this deterrence.
Some of them are largely successful in choosing the outcome of the conflict and its timing according to their convenience, and even forcing Israel to help fund them and deepen their hold on their people while waging war against it.
They rely on manifestly unfounded hope, in the Kirya and in Jerusalem, as if necessarily and everywhere "a belly full of restraining violence."
Hamas manages to ignite riots on the Temple Mount and take all possible measures to encourage violent outbreaks in the West Bank and Israel, while calming down in Gaza.
Its status in the Gaza Strip population is maintained thanks to heavy funding encouraged by Israel: directly from Qatar and through tens of thousands of workers in Israel.
The other enemies of Israel also learn from Hamas' success.
Even in the rebellious Jenin district, Israel has not had economic support (through purchases by Israeli Arabs) for more than a few days, for fear that economic hardship in the terrorist capital will "exacerbate" the terrorists and supporters who control the camp and considerable parts of the city.
In Israel, not only the declared enemies of the northern faction of the Islamic Movement and Balad are agitating and threatening.
Israel is right in the direct fight against armed and violent terrorism in Judea and Samaria and the Gaza Strip - raids, arrests and violent friction with the violent elements themselves. Too hesitant in the painful and lingering negation of the "carrot," as an effective part of the heavy stick required as a deterrent punishment in the face of a violent outburst.
The threat in the heart of the country is the most serious of all.
After the disturbances in the mixed cities, which have been supported by senior Arab leaders, any expression of violence or a hint of violence or a hint of its activism or identification with it should be dictated out of the political "rules of the game."
When a violent culture nesting in the core of Arab society erupts simultaneously between their clans on the roads of the Negev, in the mixed cities and in rampant sympathy with the enemy, it requires treatment, differential but decisive, in all its foci: in Rahat and Umm al-Fahm, as in Gaza and Jenin.
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