Social media and the media filled the weekend with calls for the assassination of Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar.
This was a natural instinctive response to the shocking attack in Elad, and it probably also represents the opinion of most Israelis.
Sinwar is a bitter enemy, a tough ideological opponent, who says and does evil - hence he is a mortal.
But decisions about assassinations should not be made based on gut feelings and created revenge.
They must be accepted intelligently, and with the understanding that the elimination is not the last stage in the campaign, but the first stage in it.
A moment later, a military campaign must be launched - as Israel did when it eliminated Hamas chief of staff Ahmad Jabari in 2012 in an operation that led to Operation Pillar of Cloud - and when the campaign is over we will be left with the reality in Gaza that will not change.
Israel has a long history of assassinations.
Only a few of them have changed reality dramatically.
This happened to Islamic Jihad after the assassination of its leader Fathi Shakaki in Malta in 1995 (the organization became paralyzed, leaving it only in the second intifada), and it happened in part to Hamas in 2004 following the succession of its leaders, Sheikh Ahmad Yassin and 'Abd al-'Aziz Rantisi ( Which led to his request for a hudna, a long ceasefire with Israel).
Yahya Sinwar at a demonstration over the weekend, Photo: AFP
Hamas was not deterred
On the other hand, the assassination of Abbas Mousavi in 1992 replaced Hassan Nasrallah, who turned out to be a much more charismatic and dangerous leader than Hezbollah.
The assassination of Jabari, and some of his predecessors, did not change anything in Hamas' conduct, and certainly did not deter him from continuing the struggle.
This has taught the top political-security leaders in Israel an important lesson: Assassinations are an important tool that should be used occasionally, but they are not a panacea, and certainly not a substitute for strategy.
In recent years, Israel has had quite a few opportunities to eliminate Sinwar.
Several times it also came up on the negotiating table, especially on the part of former GSS chief Nadav Argaman. Argaman believed that Sinwar had gained exceptional power and influence, which necessitated his removal from the equation. Dialogue with Hamas in an attempt to lead to long-term calm.
The current government has so far chosen to continue along the same line.
This was due, among other things, to the fact that Hamas has managed to keep the Gaza Strip almost completely silent over the past year, and has conveyed messages in every way (mainly through Egypt) that it has no interest in escalation.
The idea on the Israeli side was that civic-economic investment - in projects, in the departure of workers to work in Israel, in the expansion of crossings and fishing permits - is the best brake on war, because it produces a loss price for the Gaza public, which urges Hamas to remain calm.
Hamas did do so, but at the same time Sinwar managed to become the mastermind of terrorism carried out outside Gaza.
This is an impressive achievement, given the fact that the organization has had no connection to any of the attacks carried out in recent weeks (one of the terrorists who carried out the attack in Ariel is the son of a former Hamas operative, but without organizational affiliation himself).
And yet, consciously, the achievement is recorded to his credit;
Sinwar became the hero of the Palestinian street, hence the immediate goal on which most Israelis focus their anger.
Hamas operatives in Gaza, Photo: Getty Images
The escalation will come
Sinwar is indeed an unusual figure, centered around significant power.
This is due to the fact that he is one of the "founding fathers" of Hamas, his time in the Israeli prison, his religious jealousy and his great charisma.
These are significant reasons for his assassination - a complicated operation during combat, and less complex during routine - but Hamas will not change after that, and if there are assassinations, there is at least one other senior member of the organization who should unite with his virgins - Saleh Aruri, the main driver of Hamas terrorism in Judea and Samaria. To (including responsibility for rocket fire from Lebanon last month).
Aruri divides his time between Turkey and Lebanon, and his neutralization will be a severe blow to Hamas' military activity outside Gaza, which has gained dangerous momentum in recent years.
As mentioned, assassinations at this level, certainly by Sinwar, require early preparation for the escalation that will follow, and also for the day after.
But at the same time, on the tactical side, Israel needs to address some issues that have surfaced and resurfaced in the wake of the Elad attack.
The first of these is the need to deepen activity in northern Samaria, which was once again a habitat for terrorists.
The second is loopholes in the seam space, which again allowed for too easy a transition of terrorists to the Green Line areas.
And the third is the need to address the "three waters" - drivers, lodgers, employers - that serve as a permanent dangerous platform for illegal residents.
Recent years have taught Palestinians working in Israel with a permit to stay away from terrorism, for fear that their livelihoods will be harmed, and their share in terrorist attacks has been minimal.
On the other hand, the share of GSS is much larger, and hence requires immediate treatment. Because Israel needs working hands (especially in the construction and catering industries), the way must be found to issue more work permits, while closing the loopholes that allow Palestinians to move and work illegally.
Elimination will lead to security escalation.
IDF soldiers arrive at the scene of the attack in Elad, Photo: AFP
A problem that requires root canal treatment
In the attack in Elad, although one of the murdered people paid with his life for driving the terrorists to the settlement, the problem requires root canal treatment.
Avoiding this, especially on the part of employers who prefer to work in "black", is a sure recipe for the next attack.
This has been known for years, but it is time to implement it, with the cooperation of all parties and the aggravation of the punishment of those who act in violation of the law and thereby endanger public safety.
And back to the strategic: the government must now decide if and how to respond to the attack on Elad.
It is required to do so in a complicated political reality and in the face of immense public pressure.
The temptation, as stated, is to send a missile to Sinwar, and be repaid from it.
Before the green light is given, the ground must be prepared for the day after: for the military campaign that may also require ground entry into the Strip (and casualties on its side), for the accompanying political and propaganda campaign, and especially for the day after - when we discover once again that Gaza is going nowhere.
"A problem that must be solved."
Police continue searches, Photo: Oren Cohen
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