Is a larger NATO safer?

In the heat of the war in Ukraine, Finland and Sweden have considered joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

The hypothetical advantages of their adherence to the Washington Treaty lie in extending to their territories the guarantee of collective security included therein in the event of an armed attack.

Legally and theoretically, such an assertion is irreproachable.

Whether this operation will increase their security and transatlantic security is another matter.

In this sense, it is necessary to point out several aspects.

The invitation to become a member of NATO can be made to any European State that is in a position to contribute to its aims and that effectively increases the security of the North Atlantic area.

Is Europe, and therefore the transatlantic area as a whole, safer by extending the Organization to new members at a time of maximum tension with Russia?

Objectively, no.

There are no reasons to think that the two Nordic countries are under threat of Russian aggression.

Their situation has nothing to do with that of the Ukraine, since they never belonged to the USSR, and they are members of the EU.

Although they regularly participate in NATO work, even in some of its operations, it is precisely their formal non-alignment that is their best guarantee of security.

If the main bone of contention for European security is Russia's perception of an enveloping threat from NATO on Russian territory, including Finland, one of the few countries bordering the Russian Federation that remains outside the Alliance, would only can be interpreted, at this time, as a provocation of the highest level.

Until now, Helsinki's official policy has been that its military strength and the difficulties of its territory constitute a sufficient deterrent against any attack.

This has allowed him to guarantee his security and, most importantly, not create a security dilemma for Moscow and avoid being seen as an enemy, something that will happen if he finally joins the Organization.

one of the few countries bordering the Russian Federation that remains outside the Alliance, can only be interpreted, at this time, as a top-level provocation.

Until now, Helsinki's official policy has been that its military strength and the difficulties of its territory constitute a sufficient deterrent against any attack.

This has allowed him to guarantee his security and, most importantly, not create a security dilemma for Moscow and avoid being seen as an enemy, something that will happen if he finally joins the Organization.

one of the few countries bordering the Russian Federation that remains outside the Alliance, can only be interpreted, at this time, as a top-level provocation.

Until now, Helsinki's official policy has been that its military strength and the difficulties of its territory constitute a sufficient deterrent against any attack.

This has allowed him to guarantee his security and, most importantly, not create a security dilemma for Moscow and avoid being seen as an enemy, something that will happen if he finally joins the Organization.

Helsinki's official policy has been that its military strength and the difficulties of its territory constitute a sufficient deterrent against any attack.

This has allowed him to guarantee his security and, most importantly, not create a security dilemma for Moscow and avoid being seen as an enemy, something that will happen if he finally joins the Organization.

Helsinki's official policy has been that its military strength and the difficulties of its territory constitute a sufficient deterrent against any attack.

This has allowed him to guarantee his security and, most importantly, not create a security dilemma for Moscow and avoid being seen as an enemy, something that will happen if he finally joins the Organization.

On the other hand, the accession of new members should bring additional security to NATO.

If it is going to excite a hitherto calm situation, the change looks more like a worsening of allied security than a strengthening of it.

Another issue to consider is that the States do not formally request their accession to NATO until the members of the Organization invite them to do so.

Turkey has just raised its voice to oppose this decision, which must be adopted unanimously.

It is doubtful if Ankara's will contains a firm opposition to the entry of the Nordic countries, or if it is simply a maneuver to obtain, in exchange for giving up, particular advantages;

for example, making forget certain behaviors interpreted by Washington as disloyal, its political evolution contrary to the principles of democracy, individual freedoms, or its internal and international action against the Kurds endangering international and allied peace and security, as happened In Syria.

If your veto remains,

The impulse and favorable decision to the membership of Sweden and Finland presents some inconvenience.

The first is its inconsistency with the recent position expressed by Jens Stoltenberg himself explaining the reasons why Ukraine could not become a member of the Alliance.

In this case, the Secretary General clearly explained, a confrontation between Ukraine and Russia would imply a direct confrontation between NATO and the Russian Federation by virtue of the collective security obligation of Article 5 of the Treaty.

This situation of direct confrontation between NATO and Russia would lead to a clear and probably irreversible escalation of violence between two contenders with nuclear weapons.

This risk would be multiplied if we think that Bosnia, Georgia and Ukraine expect to be accepted by the allies.

And it is not that the countries are not sovereign to want to enter a defensive Organization or to accept that others do so, it is about strategic convenience and, sovereignly, opting for the exit that most favors peace.

It should not be forgotten that the States that are part of NATO have undertaken not to use the threat or use of force, in accordance with the UN Charter.

The entry of new members into NATO surrounding Russia is easy to understand as a threat of use of force.

Just think how we would react if Finland, Ukraine, Moldova and even other former Warsaw Pact countries had decided to join the Collective Security Treaty Organization.

From a Spanish perspective, before or at the same time as proposing to extend the NATO umbrella to new countries, we should request and condition any decision that this protection explicitly covers our two autonomous cities.

Solidarity with non-members is mere rhetoric if we don't even guarantee that of who we are.

Natividad Fernández Sola

is a professor of Public International Law at the University of Zaragoza and a collaborator at Agenda Pública.