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Russian President Vladimir Putin
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Alexei Nikolsky / Pool Sputnik Kremlin / dpa
Since the Russian attack on Ukraine, German security policy has first hesitantly, then rapidly adapted to the changed framework conditions of the Euro-Atlantic security order: Berlin has decided within the framework of the EU to impose substantial sanctions on Russian individuals, companies and sectors.
The federal government has participated in NATO's reinsurance policy for the Eastern European allies by relocating troops and material.
After all, by announcing that it would deliver heavy weapons to Kyiv, it took a step that was unprecedented in German foreign policy.
And yet, despite this superficially impressive balance sheet, there remains an impression of being driven, almost of disorientation, which the German debate cannot shake off.
He is responsible for ensuring that Germany's allies do not have the feeling that Berlin is taking on responsibility for security policy forcefully and on its own.
The main reason for this impression - apart from communicative breakdowns and contradictions within the coalition - is that the federal government has so far not publicly stated its political goals, which are linked to its engagement in Ukraine and in particular its military dimension.
The security policy debate in Berlin mainly revolves around the question of means: the quantity and quality of military aid for Ukraine, the possible establishment of a no-fly zone in its airspace, the extent of economic sanctions against Russia and more.
On the other hand, little is discussed about what the strategic goals of German politics are or should be beyond the immediate end of hostilities: for example, what political or territorial concessions Germany expects from both sides in order to end the war, or whether an end to the conflict in the German perspective would have to be formalized by a treaty or simply accepted as a reality in the form of another »frozen conflict«.
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This blur takes revenge the longer the war lasts.
Because even if Germany does not take part directly in the combat operations, it also applies to forms of indirect military support that every war is an act of violence with the purpose "of forcing the enemy to do our will" (Clausewitz).
The purpose of every military engagement, i.e. the will to be fulfilled, must be determined by politics.
Without this clear determination or prioritization, the military engagement threatens to lack measure and direction.
In addition, there is another effect: What political decision-makers find attractive in everyday political life, namely not clearly defining themselves and thereby maintaining scope for action, causes political approval in the public to erode in the long term.
Chancellor Scholz recently stated his goal of German involvement in the Russo-Ukrainian war: "Russia must not win, and Ukraine must not lose."
Because what does that mean exactly, and what political and military steps arise from it?
The first goal that German politicians should indicate concerns the final territorial state to be striven for: Does the Scholz government support Ukraine in regaining all the territories it has lost since February 24?
Or will it demand that Russian forces also completely withdraw from Donbass and Crimea, which reflected Germany's position under international law.
But in view of the Russian annexation of Crimea, wouldn't that mean further escalating the conflict with Russia?
The second idea of order concerns the future internal constitution of Ukraine: Does the federal government support a negotiated autonomy status of individual areas within Ukraine and a possible strengthening of minority rights in a variation of the Minsk agreements?
And what role should the United Nations and the OSCE play in monitoring an intended ceasefire and as a framework for subsequent political negotiations?
The third target to reflect on is the future external constitution of Ukraine: President Zelenskyy has declared that Ukraine will no longer seek NATO membership.
At the same time, it remains a prominent partner country of the alliance.
Does the German government support joint military exercises with Kyiv, the storage of military material in the country and an upgrade of the NATO-Ukraine Commission, or does it consider this an unnecessary provocation by Moscow?
And what exactly does she mean by the German security guarantees for the country that Foreign Minister Baerbock promised?
Finally, fourthly, there is the role of Russia: even in the current situation, it is important to remember that Moscow also has a voice.
Precisely because President Putin started this war, it will take him to end it.
This means that German politics is also faced with the question that is currently still floating in the background: What role does German politics envisage for Russia in a post-war European order – partner, rival, adversary?
An answer to this question should also make it easier for German politicians to react to the recently announced new war goal of the USA: »We want to see Russia so weakened that it will no longer be able to do things like this who did it with the invasion of Ukraine«,
said US Secretary of Defense Austin just a few days ago.
Does the federal government share this goal, and what would be derived from it for Germany and Europe?
German political goals in this conflict will inevitably be influenced by political and military developments within Ukraine, but these should not alone determine German goals;
on the contrary, the political goals should guide the steps Germany is taking in and towards Ukraine.
Of course, Ukraine above all has the right to define its war aims, and it remains the privilege of Ukrainians to decide their political future.
But the opposite also applies to Germany.
Although West Germany's interests overlap with those of Ukraine, Germany's interests as a leader in Europe and a key partner of the US are more complex, subject to different constraints and requiring different considerations.
Germany must therefore also resolve the contradiction of not making decisions over the heads of the Ukrainians, but at the same time exercising its own sovereignty in terms of security policy.
Corresponding bilateral consultations already now are therefore essential in order to prevent major fault lines from opening up between Ukraine and Germany in the long term.