Dimitri Minic is a researcher at the Russia/NIS Center at Ifri. Doctor in history of international relations from Sorbonne University (2021), his thesis is entitled "
Bypassing the armed struggle: Russian strategic thinking in the face of the evolution of war, 1993-2016
".
FIGAROVOX.- The Georgian authorities have refused to condemn Russia's aggression against Ukraine and to join the European sanctions, which Prime Minister Irakli Garibachvili considers "useless". Should we see an alignment of the position of the Georgian government with the Kremlin?
Georgia's president and prime minister have a pro-Western orientation (this has been enshrined in the Constitution since the 2008 Russo-Georgian war) and Tbilisi has officially condemned the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
The Russian puppets in the country did not produce the expected effects despite a few communication blows.
However, the strategy adopted by Georgia is in itself balanced, which makes a pro-Russian subversion force less useful.
In fact, the government has criticized the "going to war", such as the party of Mikheil Saakashvili or even the Ukrainian leaders, who have encouraged Tbilisi to take advantage of the war in Ukraine to reintegrate South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
The Georgians said they did not want to provoke or irritate Moscow, and assured that they did not
Russia's sanctions and isolation benefit Georgia as Moscow feels compelled to show other ex-USSR countries that it is capable of negotiating and having a positive relationship with a docile partner .
Dimitri Minic
Do European sanctions against Russia benefit Georgia? What is the weight of Russia in the Georgian economy?
Russia is a key economic partner of Georgia.
Russian tourism, now at a standstill due to the restrictions introduced by Russia, was very important there for the Georgian economy, but also wine, whose imports Moscow had limited to reprimand Tbilisi in 2006. Moreover, and This is very telling, to reward Georgia for its balanced behavior towards Moscow since the start of the war in Ukraine, Russia began by lifting restrictions on land transit between the two countries in mid-May.
Russia also announced that it could reopen air communications between the two countries (cut since the 2019 protests organized by the “anti-Russian” opposition) a few days later.
The penalties and the
Georgia applied for membership of the European Union on March 2, 2022 following a petition signed by 50,000 Georgians. In addition, major demonstrations have taken place in Tbilisi in support of Ukraine since the start of the war. Is there a disconnect between Georgian public opinion and the country's government?
Georgia's early support for Ukraine was popular with the Georgian population, although half of Georgians did not want their government to impose sanctions on Russia, and only a third of Georgians wanted to limit economic ties with the Russia.
But the declarations of the Ukrainian officials to try to imply more Georgia probably cooled part of the supports among the Georgian population.
At the end of April the majority of Georgians said they were in favor of the way their government was managing support for Ukraine.
Russia can therefore activate secessionism as it pleases to influence the politico-strategic orientation of Georgia, even if the Georgian ruling elites have not given up their desire for rapprochement with the West.
Dimitri Minic
In August 2008, Russia and Georgia clashed for control of South Ossetia, a small pro-Russian Georgian separatist republic, whose independence Moscow has recognized. How does this war influence events today?
The existence of separatist provinces whose independence is recognized by Moscow was initially a powerful lever in the hands of Russia.
Indeed, since the start of the war in Ukraine, the puppets of the Kremlin in South Ossetia have announced that they would organize a referendum on the attachment of the secessionist entity to Russia.
To reward the prudent behavior of Georgia in this context of the Russian war in Ukraine, it is very revealing that beyond the lifting of economic restrictions against Georgia, Russia has also recently spoken out against this attachment.
Russia can therefore activate secessionism as it pleases to influence the political-strategic orientation of Georgia, even if the Georgian ruling elites do not
have not given up their desire for rapprochement with the West.
If Georgia does not receive clearer and more decisive support and perspectives from the Euro-Atlantic security and cooperation structures, this desire could become increasingly artificial, while the politico-economic dependence on Russia is more and more real.
