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The prime minister is dragged into the mud after the defense minister? 40 years later - back to the Lebanon War - Walla! news

2022-06-05T12:33:49.995Z


The entry into Lebanon has been controversial among the Israeli public and over the years the perception has been established that Begin was dragged into it by Ariel Sharon and Chief of Staff Raful. In a new book "1982, Lebanon - The Road to War", published by Yigal Kipnis, he claims that the Prime Minister is "not seduced" and that the goals of the war were derived from his worldview


The prime minister is dragged into the mud after the defense minister?

40 years later - back to the Lebanon War

The entry into Lebanon has been controversial among the Israeli public and over the years the perception has been established that Begin was dragged into it by Ariel Sharon and Chief of Staff Raful.

In a new book "1982, Lebanon - The Road to War", published by Yigal Kipnis, he claims that the Prime Minister is "not seduced" and that the goals of the war were derived from his worldview

Yigal Kipnis

02/06/2022

Thursday, 02 June 2022, 13:48 Updated: Sunday, 05 June 2022, 10:33

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Forty years have passed since the outbreak of the Lebanon War, or in its original name - the "Galilee Peace War".

It was a controversial war among the Israeli public and over the years the perception was established that it was a "war of deception" into which Prime Minister Menachem Begin was dragged, by Defense Minister Ariel Sharon and Chief of Staff Rafael (Raful) Eitan.



In a new book, 1982, Lebanon - The Road to War ", now published by Dr. Yigal Kipnis, who relies on archival documentation, claims that" Begin was not seduced "and that the goals of the war were derived from his worldview which, among other things, relied on" not 'be Treblinka', so he sought to eliminate the military infrastructure of The PLO and its headquarters in Lebanon. "



In the book, Kipnis presents the full coordination that existed between Begin and Sharon as well as the extreme fluctuations in the prime minister's mood, as documented by the US ambassador to Israel in reports he delivered after his meetings with Begin.

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False war?

PLO members in Lebanon (Photo: Government Press Office, Dalia Yankovich)

Excerpts from the introduction to the book "1982, Lebanon - The Road to War"

On Friday, June 4, 1982, before noon, several air crews were called to report for a routine attack mission in Lebanon.

They did not know that the heavy bombs dropped at 15:15 on the stadium stands in south Beirut would herald the coming of war two days later.

For more than a year, Israel has been planning this war, under the name "Pines" program.

The army on the entire avenue of command, the fighters and soldiers, was preparing for it, and in the months leading up to it it was so worn out that it was time to go out.



The script for going to war was ready in advance.

Since the ceasefire agreement of July 24, 1981, which was officially signed between Israel and Lebanon but was practical between Israel and the PLO, the PLO has refrained from firing at northern settlements.

In Israel, it was thought that attacking targets in Beirut would cause Arafat to violate the restraint policy, thus providing Israel with a reason to carry out its war plan.

Therefore, about six months before it was attacked, the stadium in Beirut was marked as a target whose injury would motivate the move.



Cabinet members were aware of the scenario of the start of the war.

When they gathered on the morning of that Friday, they were explained the essence of their decision to approve the attack on targets in Lebanon.

Those who opposed the move, which went beyond a powerful strike by PLO forces in southern Lebanon, knew that they were waging a mass battle against Begin, Sharon, Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir and Chief of Staff Rafael (Raful) Eitan.

Trailed after him to war?

Begin with Sharon (Photo: Government Press Office, Yaakov Saar)

The chief of staff and the defense minister wanted to start a war long before that, and before the evacuation of the settlements from Sinai was completed. By the end of April 1982, Begin knew how to withstand the pressure exerted by the two. The US administration will oppose Israel's widespread war in Lebanon, certainly at the time of the implementation of the peace agreement. For the selection of Bashir Jumail for the position.



Begin took care to update the US administration.

"We do not want to surprise you," he wrote to President Reagan about two weeks before the start of the war ... He did not hide from them, even if he did so in a convoluted language, that this would happen in the coming days


. The code name of "Oranim" for "Shalom Hagalil" and the IDF was on 72-hour standby for going to war.

The Chief of Staff is assessing the situation and updates on the intention to carry out a series of "quiet and secret" actions, which will lead the PLO to respond, and in response to the response "there will be a massive operation by the Air Force, neither against civilians nor in Beirut.

On the same side of the barricade.

Begin, Shamir and Sharon (Photo: Government Press Office, Yaakov Saar)

The assassination of Ambassador Shlomo Argov in London eliminated the need for quiet and covert operations.

Israel had a cause.

But the timing of her appearance was two days ahead of schedule for the war.

That is why Israel started it with improvised conduct.

"We did 'pines' for ten months and came to a conclusion on how to do it, and in the end do it differently," said in frustration Uri Sagi, head of the operations department, on the morning of June 5, 1982. His job was to translate the war goals into the combat program.



Begin is not seduced.

The four goals of the war were derived from his worldview.

"Peace of the Galilee," or the response to the PLO's security threat to northern settlements, was only one component of its motives. Terrorism against Israel and against Jewish targets in the world.

In order to remove the threat of Israeli control over all West Bank territories, he wanted to eradicate the PLO's political activity, the purpose of which was to establish a Palestinian state. Were intertwined: the goal of electing Bashir as a friendly president, who would sign a peace agreement with Israel, could not be achieved as long as the Syrians were present in Lebanon, and to keep their forces away the IDF had to reach Beirut and the Beirut-Damascus road.

Begin and Sharon saw the goals of the war eye to eye.

Begin was as well aware of his colleague's shortcomings as he was of his virtues.

He did not appoint Sharon as defense minister with Ezer Weizmann's resignation in May 1980, when the date of implementation of the Egyptian peace agreement was still far away, but he did not hesitate to do so about a year later, when it was clear to all that Israel was preparing for war.

In his diary of meetings, beginning in July 1981, are his many personal meetings with Sharon.

A few days before he was appointed to the post, he heard his position at a cabinet meeting: "Our goal should be the elimination of terrorism from Lebanon as a basis for its activities in Israel and the elimination of terrorist organizations in Lebanon, or its elimination as a political basis."



Their goals were far more far-reaching than those that the government was willing to approve when Begin brought them before it, and also than those that the opposition led by Shimon Peres, Yitzhak Rabin and Haim Bar-Lev were willing to support.

Begin was surprised by the proliferation of reservations when the Oranim program was presented to ministers on December 20, 1981. Half a year later, on June 5, at the special cabinet meeting he convened at his home, he said: "War - you always know how it begins but do not know how it ends. But I announce that nothing will be done without a government decision. "

He insisted.

It is possible that Begin hoped that the war would be limited and would end two days later, and that its goals would be achieved in a political process that would be conducted after it.

However, he also seems to have taken into account that an act that begins with setting common goals for him and Sharon ends in rolling war moves that will lead to the approval of the government and which the members of the government will have a hard time resisting.

You must "be prepared for the maximum," he told them on the eve of the war.

"The goals of the war were derived from Begin's worldview."

The siege of Beirut (Photo: Government Press Office, Yaakov Saar)

Conducting the war as a rolling move is also required of Begin for political reasons.

Thus it was possible to present this as a limited operation to the American administration and world public opinion and to ward off the pressures against continuing the fighting.

In this way, it was possible to disguise the preparations for a confrontation with Syria and also to demonstrate a semblance of a proportionate response to the reason for which Israel went to war.

From the beginning of the fighting, this conduct has created a visible gap between the decisions and the goals and plans for achieving them and the steps towards their implementation.

The resentment and criticism of it went beyond the political system.



One can agree with Begin on the goals he wanted to achieve in the war and one can criticize him for that.

His conduct at various times is also worthy of examination and criticism.

However, the new and fascinating archival documentation shows that Begin did well to maneuver between his principles and loyalty to a proper decision-making process and the degree of cunning and sophistication required of a leader leading a nation to military and political warfare.

He overcame the obstacles and obstacles that stood in the way of implementing the peace agreement with Egypt, and doing so before Israel turned to war in Lebanon.

Begin was attentive to others, but unique in seeing the overall and crucial picture.

He appreciated the army chiefs, but did not hesitate to act contrary to their position or advice.

He operated a "decision kitchen" and shared it with Sharon, Shamir and the chief of staff, but made the decisions himself, and knew how to get their approval from their government.

"Running the war as a rolling move is also required for a political reason."

Raphael coordinates with Bashir the continuation of the fighting (Photo: official website, private album)

In a decision on Operation Peace of the Galilee, the Israeli government ordered the IDF to "remove all Galilee settlements from the range of terrorists, whose headquarters and bases are in Lebanon." This decision soon led to the approval of the "additional decision" In order to fulfill this decision of the government, and in the process allow the additional goals to be achieved as well.

It was the one that approved the declaration of the ceasefire on June 11 and then the continuation of the fighting - the completion of the "crawl" to the Beirut-Damascus road, the arrival in Beirut, the siege of the west of the city and the crushing of the PLO-controlled part. , Begin and Sharon's order to occupy all of Beirut, and even the entry of the Christian militia into the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps.



Begin also did well to maneuver his moves against the US administration.

Thus he managed to provide the IDF with the time required to achieve military objectives: control of the Beirut-Damascus road, removal of the Syrians beyond the "40 kilometers" range from the Israeli border, occupation of East Beirut and siege to the west, and later removal of the PLO from Lebanon.

"The story of Lebanon is not the Mossad. The one who pushed is Raphael and I. For better or worse."

Avigdor (Janusz) Ben Gal, General of the Northern Command, told me in 1981-1978.

He sought to dispel the claim that the Mossad was the one that dragged Israel into the war in Lebanon.

Will be punished justice.

The institution did not push for contact with the Christians.



The Chief of Staff and Ben Gal saw a large-scale military move against the PLO in Lebanon as the answer to the security problem they were required to provide.

In Christians they saw "property," as Janusz defines it.

More than they wanted to help them, they wanted to use this assistance as an excuse to initiate a war move that would allow the IDF to act.



Like the head of the Armed Forces, the head of the Mossad, Yitzhak (Haka) Hofi, consistently opposed this. His deputy, Nahum Admoni, supported the connection. Lebanon is the Mossad "was established because of the position and activity of David (Dave) Kimchi, head of the" World "division at the Mossad who was a key figure in establishing and maintaining the relationship between Israel and the Christians. By Foreign Minister Shamir who appointed him as the director general of his ministry, and he continued to influence Israel's relations with the Christians.

While Begin and Haqa were aware that sometimes messages to Christians passed not as Begin asked them to pass, but "in the English of the Mossad" as Begin defines it.

Yasur helicopter delivers supplies to forces near Beirut-Damascus road (Photo: Government Press Office, Yoel Kantor)

Begin also had moments of sunset.

The Americans were aware of mood swings, and Ambassador Sam Lewis, who often met and talked with the prime minister, used to address this in his reports.

Lewis updated whether Begin is depressed and epic, or alternatively enjoys "psychosomatic health," then "he works 19 hours a day, non-stop ... showcasing all the old talent of sarcastic humor and political theater," or in other words, he is "unrivaled in controversy. political".



The way Begin conducted the events of the spring of 1981 - "Creep Crisis" and "Missile Crisis" - confirms and illustrates Lewis' impression.

Begin, then also the defense minister, was first required to decide whether to keep his promise to help the Christians and operate the air force in a crawl against the Syrians, and later - whether to attack the missile batteries placed by the Syrians in Baka.

Here, too, he maneuvers, this time between the Christians' calls for help and Janusz and Raful's support for them and the positions of the heads of the security services and the Mossad, which are contrary to the position of the chief of staff.

Although he expressed empathy for the cries of Israel's allies, Begin chose to exercise restraint.

Keeping the peace treaty with Egypt was only one reason for this.

The other reason was more important and secretive: he feared that the attack on the Syrians in Lebanon would not allow the execution of the emerging operation to destroy the nuclear reactor in Iraq.

In destroying the reactor he saw a historic mission and was determined to fulfill it.



The pressure exerted by the US administration to prevent an escalation helped Begin.

He could have presented his restraint as a tribute to the United States and made sure to maximize the credit he had received.

When his excuses for restraint policy ran out he initiated the launch of an American envoy to deal with the crisis.

Thus, in the mission of Philip Habib, he could justify the continued restraint against the Syrians, first until the destruction of the reactor on June 7, 1981, and then until the date of implementation of the peace agreement with Egypt.

Sharon and Begin led the IDF to Beirut to eliminate Arafat, severely damage the PLO's military infrastructure, keep the Syrians away from Lebanon and crown Bashir as a cooperating president.

After 11 weeks of fighting, PLO members, led by Arafat, were evacuated from Beirut according to an agreement reached by Habib's emissary



.

He was about to begin his term a month later.

Begin and Sharon assigned him two tasks for immediate implementation: signing a peace agreement with Israel and completing Israel's war move in taking over western Beirut.

The first task, which Begin vigorously demanded, in the song was first completely rejected.

The second task was answered after Sharon, with Begin's approval and backing of Shamir, promised to expand the IDF's action against the Syrians and allow the new administration to control all parts of the country, including southern Lebanon and the Syrian-controlled area.



On September 14, less than 48 hours after the summary, Bashir was assassinated by the Syrians.

Begin and Sharon were left without a partner in the understandings and ordered the IDF immediately, and as stated without the government's approval, to take over West Beirut as well. The next day Begin informed the Americans about it. Ambassador Arens, according to the administration, was misled by Israel, according to the transcript of the conversation recorded by Axis Benjamin Netanyahu.

The IDF, with the approval of the Minister of Defense, allowed the Phalanges to enter the refugee camps. The government reported this and did not find it appropriate to stop the operation. His circumstances. Sharon was fired following his recommendations. Begin remained in his place. A state commission of inquiry into Israel's conduct on the road to and during the Lebanon war.



Begin did not ignore the face of the war in the first place.

"It is clear to me that there will be casualties," he told ministers on the eve of the invasion of Lebanon, and even demonstrated awareness of the price and the reason why it should be paid: "More houses, God forbid, will be in mourning. ".

He added: "I guess I do not need to teach the chief of staff that we should strive for them to be minimal.



" For 18 years, IDF soldiers remained in Lebanon to continue to maintain peace in the Galilee.

This stay has over time become a war against Shiites under Hezbollah, which has supported Syria and is increasingly involved in Iran.

The price of war was paid by many.

Even its leaders.

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Source: walla

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