Fabrice Balanche is a lecturer in geography at Lyon 2 University and associate researcher at the Washington Institute (think-tank).
LE FIGARO. - For more than a week, Erdogan has been threatening a new offensive in Syria, which, according to the Turkish president, would target Kurdish fighters whom he describes as terrorists. How to interpret it?
Fabrice Balance. -
Turkey's main objective in Syria, since its rapprochement with Moscow in August 2016, is no longer the fall of Bashar al-Assad, but to destroy the Kurdish autonomy project.
Ankara sees a Kurdish proto-state in northern Syria as a threat to Turkey's territorial integrity, as Erdogan fears it will encourage separatism by Turkey's Kurds.
Moreover, the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) is protected by the YPG militia which has close links with the PKK.
These same YPG constitute the backbone of the Syrian Democratic Forces, the main ally of the International Coalition against Daesh in Syria, without whom the liberation of North-East Syria would not have been possible.
This ongoing war on terrorism
cost the lives of 11,000 Kurdish fighters, thus allowing the International Coalition to preserve its men.
In exchange the Kurds hoped to be supported in their national claim.
However, when Turkey invaded the Kurdish district of Afrin in 2018 and then those of Ras al-Ain and Tel Abyad in 2019, the West let it happen.
These two offensives were carried out in consultation with Russia, which in exchange obtained territorial compensation for the regime of Bashar al-Assad at the expense of the rebels in Idlib.
Afrin in 2018 and then those of Ras al-Ain and Tel Abyad in 2019, Westerners let it happen.
These two offensives were carried out in consultation with Russia, which in exchange obtained territorial compensation for the regime of Bashar al-Assad at the expense of the rebels in Idlib.
Afrin in 2018 and then those of Ras al-Ain and Tel Abyad in 2019, Westerners let it happen.
These two offensives were carried out in consultation with Russia, which in exchange obtained territorial compensation for the regime of Bashar al-Assad at the expense of the rebels in Idlib.
Read alsoIn Turkey, Erdogan's new turn of the screw threatens civil society with asphyxiation
Erdogan wants to create a security belt 30 km south of the Turkish border.
In the northeast, this means the elimination of the Kurdish population, and not just the YPG militia, replaced by Arab populations from Idlib.
In fact, Erdogan wants to build an Arab and Islamist belt in northern Syria, from the Mediterranean to the Tigris.
It is already constituted in the North-West, between Idleb and Jerablous, a region under Turkish protectorate.
Turkey draws mercenaries there at leisure to make the shot against the Syrian Kurds but also to support the Turkish interventions in Libya and that of its Azeri ally against the Armenians of Karabakh.
Erdogan's regime has thus reinstated the body of bashi-bouzouks of the Ottoman era, known for their indiscipline and their taste for looting.
They are the ones who constitute the Syrian National Army, with which Turkey controls the North-West of the country.
They and their families are the primary beneficiaries of land and buildings stolen from Kurds in Afrin and Ras al-Ain.
Turkey has also blocked Sweden's and Finland's candidacy for NATO. Should this be seen as a desire to rekindle tensions with the West?
Officially, Erdogan refuses their membership because these two countries would support the Kurdish cause.
It is a pretext to remind Americans and Europeans that we must choose between defending the Kurds in the Middle East or countering the expansion of Russia in Europe.
There are, of course, other interests, such as the lifting of American sanctions on arms destined for Turkey.
After acquiring Russian S 400 surface-to-air missiles, Turkey found itself banned from NATO.
She never agreed to give up on this purchase and persists in wanting to put them into action.
Therefore the United States has interrupted Turkey's participation in many military programs, such as that of the new F35 fighter plane.
Erdogan therefore hopes to take advantage of the need to strengthen the
Erdogan must face serious social discontent linked to his poor management of the health crisis and especially to the scale of the economic crisis.
Fabrice Balanche
One can also ask the question of a possible collusion with Russia in this Turkish veto.
Since 2016, the Turkish strategy has been to up the ante on both sides.
It can paralyze the functioning of NATO on behalf of Russia.
But it can also align itself with NATO to hinder Russia: the closure of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles to Russian military ships.
The Turkish President acts only in the selfish interest of Turkey.
He strives to take advantage of Westerners who are afraid to see him switch completely to the Eurasian alliance led by the China-Russia tandem.
What is the interest of the Turkish power?
Erdogan has his sights set on the parliamentary and presidential elections of June 2023, which promise to be complicated for the AKP, his party.
But can these elections take place freely?
The Turkish regime has become more authoritarian: the media are muzzled, journalists and opposition politicians are imprisoned on the pretext of intelligence with terrorism, thousands of judges and civil servants have been removed from their posts, etc
The election of an opposition candidate for mayor of Istanbul in 2020 is the tree that hides the forest.
However, for two years, Erdogan has had to face serious social discontent linked to his poor management of the health crisis and especially to the scale of the economic crisis.
However, galloping inflation is today
now accentuated by the Ukrainian crisis.
Energy security is threatened by its heavy dependence on Russia.
Finally, his dream of becoming an energy hub between Russia and Europe with South Stream has faded.
Therefore, Turkey is seeking financial compensation from NATO members.
It weighs the cost of its commitment to Ukraine, in addition to that of supporting the millions of Syrian, Afghan and Iraqi refugees who are waiting to be able to cross the Aegean Sea.
Although it is clear that Turkey will never enter the European Union, the accession process is still ongoing, which allows it to receive billions in subsidies from Brussels, in addition to aid for the reception of refugees.
Finally, Erdogan is demanding that EU entry visas for Turks be lifted, as Brussels promised in March 2016, when the migration agreement was signed, but which was ultimately rejected.
Erdogan will face the polls in a year, in June 2023, during presidential and legislative elections which promise to be risky for him.
Last February, six opposition parties formed an electoral alliance in view of the presidential and legislative elections of June 2023. This alliance goes from the Kemalist Party (CHP) to the dissidents of the AKP including Ahmet Davutoglu, the former Minister of foreigners of Erdogan.
However, the HDP, the pro-Kurdish party, remains on the sidelines.
The latest polls indicate that Erdogan would be beaten in the second round against an opposition candidate[1].
But it is still necessary that the elections can take place freely.
We must not forget that the media are now under the orders of power as well as justice.
The main opposition leaders are under threat of imprisonment for insults or links with terrorist organizations.
The HDP is particularly affected since many deputies and activists are in prison.
However, if the economic situation continues to deteriorate, the AKP could effectively lose power.
Is Ankara's foreign policy dictated by domestic policy, in a context of galloping inflation?
The Turkish lira (LT) continues to be devalued: last May the LT reached the symbolic threshold of 15 LT for 1 dollar, in five the value of the Turkish currency compared to the dollar was divided by five.
The devaluation is accelerating as Erdogan refuses to raise interest rates to safeguard economic growth and household borrowing capacity.
But in a context of rising prices for raw materials and energy, consumer prices are exploding.
Inflation exceeds 70% over one year and almost 100% for food products.
Rising energy prices led the government to recently increase gas and electricity tariffs by 40%.
Turkey is very dependent on Russia for its energy (45% of gas imports) and food (70% of wheat) needs.
It therefore did not vote for economic sanctions to spare its economy and of course its relationship with Moscow.
The Turkish opposition is very critical of a foreign policy deemed populist and adventurous.
Fabrice Balanche
According to official statistics the unemployment rate would be 12% in 2021, it would be down thanks to the return to normal after the pandemic which hit the Turkish economy hard.
However, voices are raised to denounce a truncated method of calculation which would only take into account less than half of the unemployed.
In this context, the reception of nearly 4 million Syrian refugees now appears to be a heavy burden for the country.
In the south-east of Turkey, where the refugees are concentrated, but also in Istanbul, the Syrians are victims of frequent attacks.
The population demands their return by force or to let them pass into Europe.
Erdogan thus justifies his safe zone strategy to send Syrian refugees back there.
In 2018, he even asked the
European Union to finance the construction of towns and villages in northern Syria for this purpose.
This is another reason why Erdogan must spare Russia.
If the latter decides to launch the offensive on the jihadist pocket of Idleb, at least two million additional people will be displaced and who will want to cross the Turkish border.
The wall it has built can deter individual crossings but not a flood of people frightened by the bombardments.
Turkey is also the victim of migration blackmail by Russia.
at least two million additional people will be displaced and will want to cross the Turkish border.
The wall it has built can deter individual crossings but not a flood of people frightened by the bombardments.
Turkey is also the victim of migration blackmail by Russia.
at least two million additional people will be displaced and will want to cross the Turkish border.
The wall it has built can deter individual crossings but not a flood of people frightened by the bombardments.
Turkey is also the victim of migration blackmail by Russia.
How does the opposition view Turkish foreign policy?
The Turkish opposition is very critical of a foreign policy deemed populist and adventurous.
She considers that Erdogan's absolutism is responsible for this drift.
Returning to a parliamentary regime would restore power to the institutions.
It promises better relations with neighboring countries.
Ahmet Davotoglu, when he was Minister of Foreign Affairs, was the champion of "zero problems with neighbors".
This also corresponds to the traditional Kemalist policy of caution vis-à-vis the Middle East.
However, the different parties have differences with regard to the Syrian crisis.
The Kemalist party wants to restore good relations with Bashar al-Assad.
He considers that the stabilization of the country is the best solution so that the Syrian refugees can return to their homes.
On the other hand, the Islamist parties, like that of Ahmet Davotoglu, are opposed to this normalization, considering that Bashar al-Assad betrayed the values of Islam by repressing its people.
As for the HDP, it supports the Kurdish autonomy project in Syria, unlike the other opposition parties.
The Turkish military interventions against the Kurds in Syria did not entail any reprobation on their part from the rest.
The Turks believe that the West is acting against Turkey, that it is trying to minimize its place in the world.
Fabrice Balanche
Regarding the relationship with Russia, the United States and Europe, we do not have a big difference between the opposition and the AKP.
A survey carried out by the American think tank The Center for American Progress shows that there is hardly any difference between sympathizers of the AKP and the CHP with regard to the relationship with NATO, confidence in the United States and joining the European Union.
Paradoxically, sympathizers of the AKP and the ultranationalist party (MHP) are more attached to NATO than those of the opposition
Is the feeling that the West is acting against Turkey running through Turkish society?
This is a feeling actually shared by a large part of the population.
Regarding the war in Ukraine, 33.7% of Turks believe that Russia is responsible for the conflict while 48.3% believe that the fault lies with the United States and NATO.
There is a real mistrust of the West that transcends political divides in Turkey.
The Turks believe that the West is acting against Turkey, that it is trying to minimize its place in the world.
This feeling has its roots in Turkish history since the decline of the Ottoman Empire in the 19th century, the syndrome of the Treaty of Sèvre in 1920, where after the Empire, it was the current Turkish territory which was almost completely dismembered. .
Erdogan regularly denounces the unequal treaties of which Turkey would have been a victim:
On the side of the AKP, we denounce the anti-Muslim policy in Europe.
While for the Kemalists and the HDP the West is responsible for having favored the coming to power of the Islamists in Turkey.
The Turks therefore feel victimized by the West.
Eurasism is progressing in society and a third of the population thinks that the priority is to turn to Russia and China.
Joining the European Union is no longer a priority for the majority of Turks.
It is the product of a mixture of disappointment in the face of constantly postponed accession, the maintenance of entry visas to the EU and a migration treaty deemed humiliating.
This rejection of