"The '77 revolution was a policy revolution."
These things are described in the book of my colleague Moshe Foxman, "Ladies and Gentlemen, a Revolution": a revolution in economic policy, which has become liberal;
A revolution in settlement policy, which for the first time began to populate Judea and Samaria; a revolution in public policy, in which the culture of party promotion was removed, and most importantly - a revolution in social policy.
The '77 revolution is a revolution, because it initiated social leadership for the communities that Mapai decided to leave behind: all those who are not "bishops", whom the previous government preferred to leave "fenced in their communities" without paving the way for Israeliness. , The main figure who won the Mizrahi integration project in politics was none other than Yitzhak Shamir (the Ashkenazi), who plowed Israel throughout and did his best to create the conditions for their inclusion in the political game.
During the rule of the right it was clear that it was possible to examine what was done and what was not, since the government had an "ideology and policy government": what was done in security, settlement, economy and immigration.
Some were quick to be disappointed - and so in '92 they overthrew the right-wing government too quickly.
It was always possible to be impressed by the consequences of the decisions made in the craft, regardless of their ethnic affiliation (fate wanted, and the "rehabilitation of the neighborhoods" and the "college revolution" were revolutions initiated by Ashkenazi-secularists).
And now, "the new Netanyahu" is asking for the voice of right-wingers not under the "policy discourse," but under the "identity discourse."
Not under the "discourse of ideology," but under the "discourse of psychology."
No longer under promises of "what shall I do" or "what I have done", but under declarations that 'I will not sit with Ram'.
Therefore no statement is found here that the settlement will be increased in areas c and to what extent;
Nor because the recruitment law will be promoted and in what formulations;
There will be no promise here that the Likud will refrain from budgeting and thickening educational institutions in the non-Zionist streams (the key reason for discrimination and inequality);
Nor is there a commitment to promote a law to split the ombudsman's role while its wording is presented to voters on election night; the campaign will focus on amorphous statements about "us and them," and that "others" who do not support "us" are racist or antagonistic to Judaism.
What does the culture war serve?
Exemption from deed, exemption from performance, exemption from promises and exemption from deeds.
Promoting settlement?
Deepening sovereignty?
Splitting the role of the ombudsman? Who is interested in it?
Last weekend, Eitan Orkibi wrote in the "Friday Cabinet" of this newspaper that the reluctance of Netanyahu to return is racism and a desire to leave extra-hegemonic populations under-represented in public systems.
Without signs and without masterpieces, I can illustrate that in any non-right-wing coalition that does not budget for Shas' educational institutions, the chances of members of the Revolution '77 communities reaching representation in the legal and academic systems are several times higher. For there is no one to ask for responsibility and not to commit to a policy - just to provide a sense of identity.
Were we wrong?
Fixed!
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