Translator's introduction: At the beginning of the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, public opinion in European countries almost showed a trend of one-sided support for Ukraine, demanding sanctions against Russia and cutting off relations with Russia.
Now, it has been nearly four months since the Russian-Ukrainian conflict broke out. What has happened to European attitudes towards this war?
On June 15, the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), a European think tank, conducted a survey on people in ten European countries from April 28 to May 11. The focus of public opinion has turned to the question of "how the conflict will end" and the cost of the war, and European society's view of the war has been unexpectedly divided.
The survey roughly divides Europeans into two opposing groups: the peaceful camp and the justice camp.
Supporters of the peace camp want peace now, even at the cost of Ukrainian compromise with Russia; the justice camp believes that peace can only be brought about by the complete defeat of Russia; and there is a refusal to choose between the two opposing camps swing camp.
According to this, some of the findings of this survey are quite different from what we expected in the past: in terms of political parties, the right is not more inclined to the justice camp than the left, for example, the far right in France is the most pro-peace; The geographical factors are not decisive, for example Poland and Romania belong to Eastern Europe, both bordering Ukraine, but Poles are one of the most hawkish groups in Europe and Romanians are one of the largest dovish groups in Europe.
There are also surprising divisions within old Europe, such as Germany, which is often criticized for its pro-Russian government, and whose people have the toughest attitude toward Russia (66% think Russia is responsible for the war), while in Italy, many (28%) ) that the United States is the greatest obstacle to peace.
The investigative agency believes that Europe is facing a "battle of wills" that is more critical than military and economic warfare.
While Europe is widely seen as showing unexpected consensus and solidarity in the face of Russia, underlying divisions over refugee issues, Ukraine's accession to the EU, the impact on living standards and the threat of nuclear escalation have created peace, justice and The split between the three key camps, the delay of the war and the limited impact on the effect of sanctions on Russia will continue to deepen the split between the camps.
The outcome of this war will determine whether Europe will be permanently marginalized on the world stage.
The Eurasian Society for Systems Science has specially compiled this article for readers to think about.
The article was originally published in ECFR and represents the author's own views only.
Written by Ivan Krastev, Mark Leonard
Translators: Ahsen Eurasian Society for Systems Science
(For the original reference, click here; the subtitle of the article is added by the translator)
foreword
In the weeks and months after Ukraine was invaded, the unity and decisiveness of Europeans surprised both Putin and the Europeans themselves.
Post-heroic European society’s anger at Russian aggression and fascination with Ukrainian valor fueled the unexpected shift in Europe.
They inspired historic change in their government; they opened their homeland to millions of Ukrainians; they demanded severe economic sanctions; and they forced Western companies to leave Russia as quickly as possible.
While previous "European moments" have been marked by European flags mobilizing people outside the EU's borders, including Ukraine, this time the Ukrainian flag mobilizes people inside the EU.
Europeans discovered that they were a more powerful force than previously thought.
According to the famous critic Moises Naim, "Europe finds itself as a superpower".
But will European unity last as the war heads into its fifth month?
Will there be cracks between and within EU countries?
To find answers to these questions, the European Council on Foreign Relations conducted a pan-European poll in ten countries.
The survey was conducted in mid-May, when people were just digesting the shock of the incident.
Now the public debate is moving away from events on the battlefield and towards the question of "how will the conflict end" and its impact on people's lives, on the country and on the EU.
Europeans are increasingly aware of the consequences of war for the global economy and society: high inflation, energy and food crises.
The poll measures the resilience of the European public, not just their anger at Putin's war.
The survey respondents were about 8,000 people from all over Europe.
Their countries are Poland and Romania - on the front lines, traditionally skeptical of Russia, Central European countries; France, Germany and Italy - Western European powers that have previously earned a reputation as "Russlandverstehers"; Portugal and Spain — a southern European country that has typically been less involved in Russian policy in the past; Finland and Sweden — a Nordic country that applied to join NATO as a result of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine; and the United Kingdom.
The findings suggest that public opinion in Europe is changing and the worst days may be yet to come.
The resilience of European democracies will depend on the ability of governments to maintain public support for policies that ultimately inflict pain on different social groups.
That would force governments to balance the quest for European unity with divergent views within member states while putting pressure on Moscow.
Surveys show a widening gap between the positions of many European governments and public sentiment at home.
Big divisions began to emerge: some wanted the war to end as soon as possible, others wanted to keep fighting until Russia was defeated.
1. Who stands in the way of peace?
Europeans are not divided on who is to blame for the war - three-quarters believe Russia is responsible for the conflict.
There is also no disagreement over who is the main obstacle to peace - two-thirds point to Russia.
The only exception is Italy, where the Italian public's position is roughly divided.
Overall, Europeans have no hesitation about which side to take: they want Ukraine to win.
They are ready to help it defend itself.
Is the biggest obstacle to peace coming from Ukraine or Russia?
Red: Russia; Blue: Ukraine, EU or US.
(ECFR)
In addition, a new ECFR poll shows that most Europeans are ready to show solidarity with Ukraine in the form of financial aid, arms shipments, support for Ukraine's accession to the EU, and acceptance of refugees.
At the same time, they also support tough measures against Russia, including imposing economic sanctions, ending fossil fuel imports, and deploying troops to Eastern Europe (but not Ukraine itself).
While Europeans blame Russia for the war and want Ukraine to win, European countries and societies are divided over how the war should end.
2. Peace or Justice?
Three camps surfaced
In theory, all European governments agree that it is up to the Ukrainians to decide when to stop the war and reach a form of peace.
But should Europe seek to end the war as soon as possible (even if it means Ukrainian concessions), or should the overriding goal be to punish Russian aggression and restore Ukraine's territorial integrity (even if it leads to a protracted conflict and greater humanity) Suffering) on these issues, voters were clearly divided.
Should Europe seek to end the war as soon as possible (peaceful position) or punish Russia for aggression (justice position)?
Green: choose the peaceful camp, accounting for about 35%; purple: choose the justice camp, accounting for about 22%; yellow: swing camp, accounting for about 20%; gray: other.
(ECFR)
The findings divide Europeans into two opposing groups: the peace camp and the justice camp.
Supporters of the peace camp want peace now, even at the cost of Ukraine's compromise with Russia.
The justice camp believes that only a clear defeat of Russia can bring peace.
This division exists within many countries as well as among them.
As the conflict turns into a protracted war of attrition, Ukraine could become a key dividing line in Europe.
And unless political leaders carefully manage this difference in positions, it could spell the end of the extraordinary European unity.
Of the ten countries surveyed, one-third (35%) of respondents belonged to the peaceful camp and one-fifth (22%) belonged to the justice camp.
Another fifth (20%) refused to choose between peace or justice, but still largely supported the EU's response to the Russia-Ukraine war.
Members of this swing camp share the same anti-Russian sentiments as the justice camp, but also fear escalation — just like the peace camp.
In the coming months, pressure will increase for the group to stop watching.
Because their views, and their votes, are crucial in determining Europe's next move.
The representation of the peace and justice camps varies widely across member states, generations and parties.
A notable finding is that, in all ten countries, while the peace camp was equally represented by men and women, the justice camp was clearly dominated by men: 62 percent of men and 38 percent of women.
The proportion of peaceful camp, justice camp and swing camp in the survey sample of ten countries, grey is other.
From top to bottom are: Italy, Germany, Romania, France, Sweden, Spain, Portugal, Finland, the United Kingdom, and Poland.
(ECFR)
In terms of party politics, it can be assumed that right-wing voters are more likely to belong to the justice camp than left-wing voters.
But this rule is rarely fully established.
In Germany, a preference for peace dominates among voters in the centre-right CDU/CSU and the centre-left Social Democrats.
Among the major parties, the Greens have the largest number of swing positions.
In Finland, supporters of the ruling Social Democratic Party have a strong preference for justice, while voters in the centre-right National Coalition Party are roughly evenly split.
In Spain, the radical right's "Voice" (VOX) has the largest share of justice supporters among its voters, even if they still lean slightly towards peace.
Likewise, in Sweden, voters of the radical-right Sweden Democrats are the most pro-justice of the three largest parties.
In France, meanwhile, the far right was the most pro-peace, while many voters on the left dominated the swing camp.
In Italy, while voters from all parties prefer peace to justice, voters from the Italian Brotherhood and the League (far right) are the biggest supporters of the peace camp (over 60%).
Members of the peace camp and the justice camp have different attitudes towards war.
While everyone blamed Russia for the conflict, only 64 percent of those in the peace camp said so, compared with 86 percent of those in the justice camp.
Of the three groups, 92 percent of voters in the swing camp put the greatest blame on Russia.
Likewise, most people in the peace and justice camp see Russia as the main obstacle to peace, but only 53% of the peace camp see Russia as the main obstacle to peace, compared with 79% of the justice camp.
Likewise, 87% of voters in the swing camp see Russia as the main obstacle to peace.
If someone sees America as an obstacle to peace, they are more likely to join the peace camp.
While some pro-Russian (or anti-American) voters may be part of the peace camp, that doesn't necessarily make the peace camp a Russia-friendly group.
While both the peace camp and the justice camp agree that both Russia and Ukraine will be worse off because of the war, the justice camp believes that Russia will be "worse" first - members of the peace camp believe that the two countries will be worse off because of the war. Among them, Ukraine will suffer more.
So some in the peace camp want the war to end, probably because they think it has caused undue pain in Ukraine.
Was it Russia or Ukraine that got worse relatively in the war?
Dark red: Russia, light red: Ukraine.
From top to bottom are the choices of the peaceful camp, the justice camp, and the swing camp.
(ECFR)
The peace camp is also more likely than the justice camp to believe that the EU will be worse off because of the conflict.
This may be another reason why they want to stop the war.
In many ways, the peace camp is a pessimist camp.
In terms of Europe's political and practical response to the war, all three main camps support severing economic ties with Russia.
However, the proportions of supporters are quite different: in the peace camp, 50% support but 37% disapprove; in the justice camp, the ratios are 83% and 11%.
In the swing camp, the ratios were 83% and 7%.
There are also differences between the peaceful camp and the justice camp on whether to sever diplomatic relations: the justice camp clearly supports this (70%-23% for and against), the swing camp (60%-30% for and against) ) also supported this, while the Peace camp opposed it (40%-49% for and against).
Likewise, the Justice and Swing camps want to sever cultural ties, while the Peaceful camp opposes this.
Military issues have also caused considerable disagreement.
On whether a no-fly zone should be set up over Ukraine, the Justice and Swing camps support (54%-24% and 41%-23% respectively), while the Peace camp is skeptical (supportive). The ratio with unsupported is 48%-25%).
On the issue of sending troops to Ukraine, the Justice and Swing camps expressed support (52%-32% and 49%-31% respectively), while the peaceful camp opposed (24% support and disapprove). %-59%).
On the issue of Ukraine's accession to NATO, both the justice camp and the swing camp have a high support rate (the ratio of support and opposition are 71%-15% and 75%-8%, respectively), while the peaceful camp is split, with 37% supporting , 40% disapprove.
On the issue of whether to send more troops to the eastern member states of NATO, the justice camp and the swing camp once again expressed strong support (the proportion of support and opposition are 75%-14% and 75%-8% respectively), and the peace camp also has differences , 41% approve, 40% disapprove.
On Ukraine's EU membership, all camps are in favor, but the peace camp offers only tepid support.
Do you support Ukraine joining the EU?
Blue: for; red: against.
From top to bottom are the choices of the peaceful camp, the justice camp, and the swing camp.
(ECFR)
Moreover, members of the peace and justice camp have come to very different conclusions on whether their country should now increase defense spending.
The majority (53%) in the justice camp support higher military spending, even if it means cutting funding in areas such as health, education and crime prevention.
Meanwhile, only 29 percent said their country should not increase defense spending despite the war, as it would cut spending in other areas.
In the peace camp, the proportions were almost the exact opposite -- 29 percent favored higher military spending and 51 percent opposed.
The swing camp is more divided on this issue, with a slight preference for avoiding increased defense spending (35 percent for and 30 percent against).
The other two choices for this question were "neither" or "don't know," with a substantial number of voters in the swing camp (26%) choosing the former.
So, in criticizing Russia, the swing camp is as hard-line as the righteous camp—they blame Russia for the war in the first place; insist that Russia is the biggest obstacle to peace; and argue that Europe should cut ties with Russia.
But they do not share the moral anger and escalating goals of the justice camp.
They are closer to the peace camp on whether the war will make Ukraine and the EU worse off, or whether defense spending should be increased.
In some ways, swing voters have Kissinger-like realist instincts.
They are openly hostile to Russia and support a tough policy on Russia, but they fear a protracted war will be too costly for Europe.
Speaking at the World Economic Forum in Davos at the end of May, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky warned that "our task is to keep the world from getting tired of war".
This is a formidable challenge.
Fifty percent of members of the peace camp believe their government is paying too much attention to the conflict, while 38 percent think it is "just enough" or "too little."
Conversely, in the justice camp, 52 percent felt that there was either enough or too little attention to war; only 38 percent felt that there was too much attention.
On this issue, the swing camp is closer to the justice camp: only 35% think too much attention is paid to war, while 47% think there is enough or too little attention to war.
Therefore, war weariness is unlikely to cause swing voters to hesitate between goals of peace and goals of justice.
The remaining voters were more likely to say "too much" was focused on the war (38%) than "just right" or "too little" (22%), even though most of them Don't know at all (40%).
Do you think your government is investing too much energy in Ukraine compared to what other nationals are facing?
Red: Too much; Grey: Don't know; Blue: Appropriate; Yellow: Not enough.
From top to bottom are Romanian, Poland, Italy, Spain, France, Germany, Portugal, UK, Finland and Sweden respondents' choices.
(ECFR)
The data also suggest that even in the righteous camp, some kind of "solidarity fatigue" could soon emerge.
Romania and Poland are the two most affected front-line countries, and the only two where more than 50 percent say their governments are too focused on the war at the expense of other pressing issues.
Since many peace supporters believe that it is Ukraine, not Russia, that will ultimately be made worse by this conflict, further Russian military advances could lead to more people joining the peace camp.
3. Different fears of the same war
A huge divide is emerging among EU member states, between those who see themselves as players in the war and those who still want to avoid getting caught up in the conflict.
For example, respondents in Poland prefer justice (41%) to peace (16%).
Meanwhile, the most peaceful are Italy (52%) and Germany (49%).
Europeans view the causes of war very differently.
In Poland, Sweden, Finland, Portugal and the United Kingdom, for example, more than 80 percent said Russia was primarily responsible for sparking the conflict.
That compares with just 56% in Italy, 62% in France and 66% in Germany.
Regarding who is the biggest obstacle to peace, 64% of all countries surveyed pointed to Russia - but only 39% in Italy and 42% in Romania agreed.
In Italy, more than a quarter (28 percent) said the U.S. was to blame, compared with 9 percent of the nine other countries surveyed.
Still, the break with Moscow is real, and will continue for some time no matter when and how the war ends.
All countries strongly support cutting all economic ties with Russia (62% support, 22% oppose), and no country (not even Italy) opposes the move.
There is also strong support for cutting cultural and diplomatic ties with Russia, although the calls are not as strong as economic ties.
Some countries oppose ending these ties: Italy opposes ending cultural contacts, and Italy, France and Germany oppose ending diplomatic ties.
Europeans see both Russia and Ukraine as losers in this war.
Most Europeans also think the situation in the EU will be worse, contrary to the optimistic rhetoric of many European governments, who see the war as an EU "moment".
In turn, the prevailing view in most countries surveyed was that the war would have no impact on the United States or China.
In the ongoing conflict, the two biggest concerns for Europeans are the cost of living (including higher energy prices) and the possible threat of Russia's use of nuclear weapons.
While this anxiety was present in all countries, respondents' main concerns varied somewhat.
In Portugal, Italy and France, the biggest concern was the impact of the war on the cost of living and energy prices.
By contrast, these issues are the least of Sweden, Poland and Romania.
Swedes, Finns and French are more worried than others about the threat of a Russian cyberattack.
The countries closest to Russia—Finland, Poland, Romania and Sweden—are relatively more concerned about the threat of Russian military action against them.
Perhaps it is Russia's immediate neighbors who fear being invaded, and all the people in the countries visited fear the risk of nuclear war.
What worries you most about the war in Ukraine?
From top to bottom: Rising living and energy costs, Threat of Russian use of nuclear weapons, Threat of Russian use of chemical weapons, Threat of Russian military action, Economic downturn or unemployment, Russian cyberwarfare against our government and businesses threats, the immigration of Ukrainian refugees into our country.
(ECFR)
Fourth, Eastern Europe is not monolithic?
Differences between Poland and Romania
In trying to imagine the division the war will cause in Europe in the future, analysts often refer to the "split between east and west" and the difference between the countries on the front lines and those geographically farther from the conflict.
The ECFR study unfolds a more nuanced map.
For example, it revealed significant differences between Poland and Romania, both frontline countries that host large numbers of refugees and have historically been suspicious and hostile to Russia.
Even though Poland and Romania both border Ukraine and their governments are both major supporters of Kyiv, their citizens have very different attitudes to the war.
Eighty-three percent of people in Poland blamed Russia for the conflict; in Romania, it was just 58 percent.
What's more, 74 percent of Poles see Russia as the biggest obstacle to peace, compared with 42 percent of Romanian people.
Green countries have the most peaceful camps; yellow countries have the most swing camps; purple countries have the most justice camps.
(ECFR)
These two countries actually seem to be on two different planets in terms of whether they prefer peace or justice.
As mentioned earlier, Poland was the only country in the polls where the justice camp clearly outperformed the peaceful camp (41% and 16% respectively).
Meanwhile, Romania, like France, Germany, Italy, Sweden and Spain, clearly favors peace over justice (42% and 23% overall).
Poles are one of the largest groups of hawks in Europe, and Romanians are one of the largest groups of doves in Europe.
In Poland, 77% want to cut all economic ties with Russia; in Romania, only 45% think so.
74% of Poles support a complete cessation of fossil fuel imports from Russia, compared with 51% of Romanians.
Likewise, 71% of Poles want to sever all diplomatic relations with Russia, compared to 39% of Romanians.
73% of Poles support ending all cultural contacts with Russia, compared with 40% of Romanians.
▲ In the context of the Ukraine war, should the government increase defense spending?
From top to bottom are: Overall, Poland, Sweden, Germany, Finland, France, Romania, United Kingdom, Spain, Portugal, Italy.
(ECFR)
Poles and Romanians also differ in their level of solidarity with Ukraine.
For example, 71% of Poles support more economic aid to Ukraine, compared to 54% in Romania.
On the issue of arms shipments to Ukraine, Poland was 78 percent in favor, compared with 46 percent in Romania.
The two countries are most divided on the idea of sending troops to Ukraine: Poland is one of the few countries with a higher approval rating than disapproval, at 46 percent and 30 percent respectively; Romania is opposed by 44 percent , 26% support it.
While Poland is one of only two countries where 50% or more say yes on whether the war means the country should increase its military spending, Romanians are less supportive.
Geography is not a determining factor in citizens' attitudes toward war.
5. The unexpected split of old Europe: Germany and Italy
Some of the European countries that have been friendliest to Russia in the past have also shown different trajectories.
While Eastern Europeans often accuse Germany of trying to appease Russia, the new poll shows Germans are tougher than Italians.
For example, even though most Germans (66%) and Italians (56%) largely blame Russia for the war, they disagree on "who is the biggest obstacle to peace".
63% of Germans think the answer is Russia, compared to 39% in Italy.
In Italy, 20% believe the US is most to blame, and 28% believe the US is the biggest obstacle to peace, making Italy the country with the highest percentage of respondents with both views; in Germany, only a minority Hold the aforementioned thoughts (11% and 9%, respectively).
In both countries, there is widespread support for cutting economic ties with Russia: 57% of Germans and 47% of Italians support it, while 29% and 36% respectively oppose it.
The Germans are tougher than the Italians in several other respects.
When asked to decide, for example, whether reducing Europe's energy dependence on Russia is more important, or sticking to the EU's climate goals, Italians are divided.
However, most Germans prefer to address Europe's energy dependence.
Germans are quite divided on whether to cut cultural ties to Russia, while Italians make it clear that they prefer to keep cultural channels open – the only country in this study to support this view.
52% of Germans support sending additional arms and military supplies to the Ukrainian government, while 33% oppose it.
Italy is the only country with a majority against the proposition (45% against, 33% support).
Likewise, a majority in Germany favors sending more troops to NATO's eastern member states (45% support, 32% oppose).
But Italians are mostly against the move (45% against, 30% support).
Perhaps the most striking difference between Germany and Italy is the stance of citizens of both countries on defense spending.
Of all the countries surveyed, Italy was an exception, with 63 percent saying there was no need to increase defense spending despite the war; only 14 percent supported it.
Meanwhile, Germany, with 41 percent in favor and 32 percent against, joins Finland, Poland and Sweden as the only four countries with majorities in favor of increased defense spending.
For the EU, which of the two goals of reducing energy dependence on Russia or tackling climate change is more important?
Purple: reducing energy dependence on Russia; green: tackling climate change.
(ECFR)
Therefore, the relative friendly stance of governments towards Moscow in the past is not a bellwether for their public opinion.
6. The coming refugee crisis?
The Ukraine war overturned past assumptions about European divisions.
A striking feature of the war's impact is the dramatic shift in attitudes in Eastern Europe in the face of those fleeing the conflict: some of the countries that were most eager to turn away Syrian refugees during the 2015 crisis are now embracing the most Ukrainian refugees.
However, ECFR polls suggest that immigration could still be a divisive issue in eastern Europe, as has been the case in Turkey since Ankara opened its borders to Syrian refugees.
While most Europeans are happy to host Ukrainian refugees, Romania, Poland and France are the countries least willing to see the prospect.
This may be due to the fact that Romania and Poland are already taking in so many Ukrainian refugees, and the perniciousness of France's immigration politics - France has so far accepted only a small number of Ukrainian refugees.
The fact that refugees in Poland currently live mostly in private homes may influence how the public imagines the country's next steps.
Do you support your government in taking in Ukrainian refugees?
In terms of support, Poland ranks third and Romania last.
(ECFR)
7. Conclusion
War is like a roller coaster: public opinion changes with every turn, and public opinion itself is a very powerful driving force.
As Gideon Rachman of the Financial Times recently wrote, "The war in Ukraine is really fought on three fronts and three protagonists. The first front is the battlefield. itself. The second front is the economic war. The third front is the war of wills. The three players in the war are Russia, Ukraine and the Western alliance that supports Ukraine.”
What happens on any of these three fronts affects the other two.
A military victory in Ukraine was crucial to expanding the size of the righteous camp, whose unofficial leader Zelensky possessed an extraordinary ability to communicate with the European public.
Supporters of the peace camp, already the largest group of European citizens, could grow in numbers if there is a growing sense that tough economic sanctions on Russia have not had the desired results.
So how do the new findings describe the ongoing "battle of wills"?
How can measures to arm Ukraine and sanction Russia continue to gain support?
Ukraine's reliance on the actions of its European neighbors means that who wins this "battle of wills" may be more important than what happens in the economic and military spheres.
The next few weeks will be crucial, with data showing that, with the right political message, it should be possible to bring Europe together.
Opinion polls suggest that Europe's break with Russia is irreversible, at least in the short and medium term.
Now, Europeans can no longer fantasize about integrating Russia into their framework or political community.
They seem to be envisioning a world completely decoupled from Russia.
But a European consensus on Russia does not automatically translate into a common position on the EU's role in the war.
These figures already predict that as the war drags on and the costs associated with it increase, so too will the divide between the peaceful and the righteous.
The survey revealed potential divisions over refugee issues, Ukraine's accession to the European Union, the impact on living standards and the threat of nuclear escalation.
Together, these factors constitute the main divide between the peaceful camp and the justice camp.
In many European countries, the Ukrainian cause could change from an attempt to unite the nation to a divisive political issue.
But in addition to creating tensions within individual countries, the war could also mean increasingly polarized political positions between countries such as Poland and Italy.
In the early stages of the war, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe were convinced that the past hardline against Russia was right, and within the EU, confidence and strength were growing.
In the next phase, however, countries like Poland could find themselves marginalized if the peace camp expands its appeal among other member states.
While the Russian-Ukrainian conflict could lead to a stronger EU, the study shows that public support for increased defense spending is not high enough to just listen to what political leaders have to say.
Perhaps the most worrying sign is that most Europeans see the EU as one of the main losers in the war, rather than its relative solidarity as a sign of an increasingly powerful union.
The danger remains that the peace and justice camps may become polarized, as was the case with debtor and creditor countries in the euro crisis in the early 2010s.
If the EU is held back by internal divisions, the war could mark the permanent marginalization of Europe on the world stage.
Public opinion in Europe strengthens EU unity in the face of Russia's invasion of Ukraine.
Today, it is up to Europe's leaders to maintain that unity.
Finding a rhetoric that appeals to swing voters who are tough on Russia but fear the danger of escalating conflict would provide a way to "cut the circle" (by: accomplishing what people thought was impossible) of public opinion.
If the EU can maintain the broad fronts it has displayed so far, and if governments stick together and not try to humiliate each other, a stronger geopolitically Europe can still emerge from the shadows of war.
How the Russian invasion of Ukraine is resolved will have far-reaching implications for the brewing Sino-American conflict.
The article is reproduced from the WeChat public account of "Minzhi International Research Institute".
The editor of this article has made some corrections and additions to the translation according to the original text.
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