Operation Wall Guard

The Yom Kippur failure of the guard of the walls: this is how the police failed to stop the riots in the cities involved

The State Comptroller reveals in a serious report the failures that led to the loss of control in Israel: from the failed intelligence in the networks, through the lack of coordination with the Shin Bet to the lax response. The ridiculous number of police officers, the lack of training, the lack of resources, the collapse of Moked 100 and the fiasco the day after - all the failures that endangered hundreds of thousands of citizens

Shlomi Heller

07/27/2022

Wednesday, July 27, 2022, 3:59 p.m

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On video: Documentation of the lynching of a Jewish man in Acre during the "Guardian of the Walls" operation (documentation on social networks according to Section 27 A of the Creators Law)

The police were not prepared for the riots that broke out during the "Guardian of the Walls" operation in the cities involved in Israel and failed to deal with them - this is according to a serious report published today (Wednesday) by State Comptroller Matanyahu Engelman, which also points to serious failures of the Shin Bet in the matter. Due to the helplessness of the security forces , hundreds of thousands of citizens were in danger.

The report reveals that the intelligence of the police and the Shin Bet failed to assess the seriousness of the events that could break out, that the coordination between the organizations was lacking and that the organizations did not recognize the government's guidance on the subject.

Among other things, this was due to the fact that there was no software for collecting intelligence from social networks and that there was a shortage of Arabic-speaking intelligence coordinators.

The auditor also stated that the number of police officers who faced the rioters was significantly less than required, the training of the police officers was not good and that there was a lack of means to deal with the rioters.

Even when the police realized the seriousness of the situation, they did not give the necessary operational response in the face of the threat they themselves defined.

At the same time, the 100 hotline collapsed under the load and thousands of calls from citizens in danger remained unanswered.

Today, one year and three months after the events, the police do not have enough evidence against the rioters and only 18% of those arrested have been charged.

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"The Yom Kippur omission of the guard of the walls".

Linz Arabi in Bat Yam (Photo: Reuven Castro)

Lack of coordination of unpurchased software: failure of the intelligence system

The report also shows that despite the disturbing scenarios - the police intelligence system did not present an outlook regarding events that broke out outside of Jerusalem in general and in mixed cities in particular.

"Police attention was directed mainly to dealing with events in Jerusalem," stated the auditor.

"Even after the events broke out, there were still major deficiencies in intelligence, there were substantial gaps in the transfer of intelligence to units in the field and no reflective intelligence picture was formed."

Regarding the omissions that led to the unpreparedness of the police for the riots in Shomer Hahomet, the auditor refers to a series of aspects, chief among them the lack of coordination between the police and the Shin Bet in regards to the information collected about troublemakers on a criminal and nationalistic background and the lack of a system for collecting visible intelligence from social networks.

More in Walla!

"They acted with a nationalist and racist motive": 7 were accused of murdering Yigal Yehoshua in Lod

To the full article

"The omissions that endangered hundreds of thousands of citizens."

Clashes in Lod (Photo: Liran Levy)

"The police officers did not undergo proper training."

A vehicle that was lynched in Umm al-Fahm (photo: Israel Police Spokesperson, Police Spokesperson)

The auditor's report shows that in 2018 software was installed in the police systems to collect intelligence from social networks in the national and district units, which was used by the investigations and intelligence department.

About two years later, it was decided to upgrade the police systems with more advanced software, but due to legal difficulties in purchasing the new software, former police commissioner Moti Cohen decided not to apply for the purchase of another system and the use of the existing software ended in July 2020.

And so, for ten months until the end The Wall Guard riots, the police had no software to collect intelligence from social networks.

It was based on manual collection and was limited in gathering information, "The police did not have full capabilities for monitoring network information, which were needed to detect threats. Under these circumstances, the ability of police intelligence to warn in advance of the events and provide relevant intelligence during them was severely damaged," it said.

The auditor points out in the report the lack of coordination between the police and the Shin Bet in the field of intelligence on troublemakers. According to a government decision from 2014, the Shin Bet was authorized to collect intelligence on the public order field on a nationalistic basis while the police were supposed to collect intelligence on a non-nationalist basis.

However, in practice the police and the Shin Bet were not familiar with the procedure on the subject and made it difficult for the bodies to follow and conduct themselves amid the chaos created on the streets of the cities involved in guarding the walls. With reference to the overlap between criminal events in Arab society and nationalists, it was found that no boundaries were defined between the organizations and it was difficult for both to cross-reference intelligence with each other - on The background of the Shin Bet's policy of separating nationalist and criminal events and leaving responsibility for criminal events in the hands of the police.

At the same time, the Shin Bet failed to understand the situation and estimated that if riots broke out in the mixed cities, they would be localized and minor. ", stated in the report.

However, the service estimated that the events that will actually take place will be local, and the main emphasis will be on Jerusalem.

"The Shin Bet, like the police intelligence, did not provide a warning about the Wall Guard incidents, and did not form a reflective intelligence picture regarding the strength, scope and severity of the events that broke out," stated Engelman. It also emerged that in the Shin Bet's activities in mixed cities during the Wall Guard incidents, he came across in operational difficulties due to coordination problems with the police.

"Gaps were found regarding the documentation capabilities of the police."

Riots in Haifa (Photo: Yoav Itiel)

25 police officers facing huge riots that endanger the citizens

The State Comptroller's report points to the severe lack of manpower in the cities involved, which resulted, among other things, from the intelligence estimates that riots could only break out in Jerusalem.

In May 2021, reinforcement forces were assigned to the Jerusalem District in the amount of 1,414 police officers, detracting from the forces of the other districts.

Thus, at the time of the outbreak of the events, the wall guard did not have an adequate personnel center for the district and in the city of Lod there was a lack of 57% of the forces that were supposed to deal with the riots.

The presence of forces in Lod and Acre at the time when the events broke out was small and was unable to provide an adequate response to the events.

Thus, the number of forces present in Lod consisted of 25 policemen, and was not based on organic special forces trained to deal with disturbances.

The police force that was stationed in Acre and prepared for the demonstration was too small and numbered only 58 policemen - most of whom were not equipped or trained to deal with disturbances.

According to the auditor, even two days after the outbreak of the events and the development of the demonstrations - the police command did not formulate a relevant situational picture reflecting the scope of the events and their intensity.

"Therefore, there was a delay in the formulation of the operational response and the deployment of the forces required to deal with them," stated the auditor.

"Following the serious incidents that took place in Lod, reinforcements were sent to the city, but in practice it was not enough to deal with the scope and intensity of the events, certainly not in the first days of their occurrence. Thus, serious incidents occurred in the city even after the reinforcements were flown in, and the police failed to give them an adequate response."

"Did not pass exercises on the subject": two years without appropriate training

In addition to the lack of manpower, the auditor reveals that some of the police officers who were at the violent events did not undergo appropriate training at all.

"Beginning in 2019 and for more than two years, dedicated police officers from the Jaffa, Acre and Lod stations did not undergo public order training," the report states.

"As a result of this, in the events of the wall guard, commanders, operational units and reinforcements were caught up in dealing with serious and multi-scene incidents of disorder, without receiving appropriate training for this activity and without undergoing training and exercises on the subject."

"Poor intelligence coordination between the Shin Bet and the police." Lynching in Umm al-Fahm (photo: official website, no)

Already after one day of riots: policemen were left with no means of dispersing demonstrations

The report shows that the police showed up to the Wall Guard events with a considerable lack of means to disperse demonstrations, radios and protective equipment for the forces in the field.

In the Coast district, all means of dispersing demonstrations ran out already on the first day of the events, and the forces operating in the Center district also suffered from shortages.

The mission headquarters in Lod had a shortage of 20 radios.

It was also reported that there was a general lack of personal protective equipment for patrol officers, including helmets and vests, in the Central District there was a lack of personal protective equipment, at the Coast Guard Headquarters there was a lack of main protective equipment, at the Acre station there was a lack of helmets and protective suits, in the Tel Aviv District there was no protection for mobility devices and vehicles Deficiencies were discovered in patrolling and in the protection of the vehicles in the police units.

The report also shows that operational units were deployed in the area without being assigned vehicles suitable for the nature of the tasks and in the amount appropriate for the scope of the forces.

Gaps were discovered in the police's ability to control and follow up regarding the state of the stocks and the extent of their use, and it became clear that there is no standard for the measures that should be used by the police in an emergency.

Also, no minimum quantities were set for emergency stocks and no "red lines" were defined beyond which equipment would not be issued until stocks were completed.

At the same time, no emergency procurement budget was marked.

In addition, the police allocated equipment to only eight of the 20 MPG reserve companies, which even so were recruited a week late, and large gaps were discovered in the number of vehicles and means of communication used by them. According to the standard, 64 vehicles should be available for the benefit of 16 MPG reserve companies vehicle, and in practice there were only 32 in the pool.

The police headquarters collapsed - the citizens were left alone in the face of danger

One of the most serious omissions emerging from the report is the collapse of the police's call center 100, which left thousands of citizens in danger without an answer.

For example, it appears that 2,836 calls from residents seeking help were received at the 100 center of the Lod Police Department, which were not answered, and 4,059 calls were answered - but did not receive a relevant response.

"Moked 100 failed in its role in the event, where its best performance is required more than ever," the report states.

"In this state of affairs, there is a considerable harm to the sense of personal security of the citizens. Against this background, among other things, local organizations of residents and other factors have developed to deal with the events."

A Jewish man who was on his way home in Acre was lynched during the "Guardian of the Walls" operation

On video: Documentation of the lynching of a Jewish man in Acre during Operation Guard of the Walls (security cameras)

Low number of arrests, lousy indictment rate: failures of the "day after"

One year and three months after the disturbances, the police are having difficulty determining how many suspects were arrested during the Wall Guard riots.

According to the investigation division of the police, about 3,200 suspects were arrested, however, the research and statistics section of the police estimates that only about 2,200 suspects were arrested.

The auditor also stated that "the number of arrests carried out and the number of indictments filed against the background of the Wall Guard events are few in proportion to the scope of the violent events, their severity, characteristics and the number of participants in them".

Thus, according to the data of the investigation division, about 3,200 people were arrested, while indictments were filed against only 574 suspects, which is 18% of all those arrested.

In the cities of Acre, Lod and Jaffa, 276 people were arrested, and indictments were filed against about 90 suspects, which is 33% of all those arrested.

"Gaps were found regarding the documentation capabilities of the police, including their ability to collect photographic evidence against suspects of involvement in incidents of disorder," the report stated.

"In addition, police stations will be reinforced with investigators who have no experience in investigating incidents of disorder on a nationalist background and with investigators who do not speak Arabic. In the case of many suspects, not enough evidence was collected, detainees who participated in the riots were released, and the cases in their case were closed without indictments being filed against them for their participation in the disturbances."

Comments

The police stated in response to the auditor's report that "The Israel Police welcomes the State Comptroller's report and will work to implement the issues raised in it. Moreover, a significant portion of the comments made in the report were examined and addressed by the police even before its publication, as part of the control and learning processes that the police carried out after Operation 'Guardian of the Walls'" The audit report raises important and central issues, most of which are on the agenda of the police and has received a lot of organizational attention for a long time.

The Israel Police officers are constantly working to protect and faithfully serve all the citizens of Israel, and to provide them with equal police services regardless of origin, religion, or skin color, and this was also the case during Operation 'Guardian of the Walls', during which the police operated with increased forces all over the country, in order to prevent incidents of violence and disorder, with the aim of saving human lives and maintaining the safety and security of the entire public.

With the beginning of the occurrence of the events and the formation of the situation, which included a large and unusual number of scenes of incidents of disorder and shooting from the Gaza Strip, the forces were increased and all the necessary actions were carried out in order to handle the incidents in the places where incidents of violent disorder occurred.

Among other things, the forces were diverted according to situation assessments and their availability, mission headquarters were established, the forces were reinforced and 20 MGB reserve companies were recruited, numbering about 2,000 fighters

. The situation continued continuously. The deployment of forces at the beginning of the events was based on the assessment of the situation and the intelligence that existed. As the picture of the situation was formed and additional operational forces were accumulated, these were directed to many centers in the various cities.

The intelligence division presented a reliable, up-to-date and comprehensive intelligence situation assessment which emphasized the intelligence picture based on information that was available at that given time.

As the intelligence picture changed, the police acted accordingly.

As part of learning the lessons, a strengthening plan was built which provides a graded response to the various gaps in the field of equipment, training and manpower.

Among other things, a crime prevention department was established in the SDF wing, whose entire mission is to thwart crime in Arab society. In the intelligence field, several decisions were made that were intended to strengthen the scope of intelligence gathering and the ability to formulate a situational picture. Staff work was also carried out with the relevant security organizations for preparation and coordination for the period that includes Sabar Events with triggers for 2022. We would like to

emphasize that at all times, the Israel Police and Shin Bet work in full cooperation for the sake of the security of the state and this was also the case.

A cooperation that has since resulted in the 'Wall Guard' operation to uncover suspects of committing serious crimes, arrest them and remove them from society.

In the operational field, headquarters work was carried out to deal with the multi-scene SDF. The operational concept that bases the operational response of the Israel Police to large-scale multi-scene SDF on mission headquarters was updated.

The commanders of the reserve companies participated in trainings conducted with the aim of strengthening the connection of the mission headquarters to the organic forces.

As a lesson from the events of the wall guard, and in order to enable a rapid consolidation of forces, it was decided to establish 26 additional reserve companies in the MGB. This move should provide a significant boost to the police's ability to deal with disturbances on a large scale in a short period of time. In addition, a new division was established which will respond to the events of the Pass" d and terrorism and will begin its activities in the coming months.

In the Border Guard, three professional teams were established following the events.

The first team is an operative team established during Operation Guard the Walls that maps in real time the gaps in the equipment and operational readiness of all the forces.

The second team is a strategic team whose recommendation was accepted by the political echelon in establishing the Israel National Guard.

The third team is a documentation team that researched the events and actions in depth and published a book documenting the individual operation and the actions of the corps that resulted from its lessons.

In addition to the establishment of teams and intensive activity to produce lessons in the three levels mentioned above, the MGB commander promoted a military concept of expertise, professional strengthening and mission-based operational activity. To realize the concept, among other things, operational arms were established that operate organically and are equipped with SMG, the tactical brigade was doubled and deployed throughout the country, established The BTP brigade to respond in areas of friction, the amount of reinforcements of mandatory soldiers after the wall guard from the IDF was doubled, in regular headquarters work with the IDF, a plan was prepared to double the reserve companies in a multi-year plan and more.

In addition, at the end of the regular headquarters work, it was decided to allocate financial resources in order to renew and increase the stock of ammunition used to disperse demonstrations and the stock of protective measures used by the forces in the field.

Ammunition was purchased and a budget was allocated for the purchase of protective equipment for police officers, with the aim of ensuring good and proper policing services for the citizens of the State of Israel while maintaining the safety and security of the police officers.

In addition, a systematic plan was prepared to reduce the gap created in the field of training for the use of means to disperse the PSD. This is about thousands of police officers who will undergo the training.

Following the criminal events, during Operation 'Guardian of the Walls' and 'Law and Order' which began immediately after it, thousands of suspects were arrested, hundreds of items were seized AMLAH of various types and indictments were filed accordingly.

These are suspects who were involved in various incidents including disturbances and riots.

During the first days of the operation, Moked 100 received many calls from citizens, an unusual volume in relation to the operational routine of the Israel Police and the forces deployed in the field.

An unusual number of calls referring to the same event were also received.

The forces in the field acted simultaneously with activity at the scenes of missile drops in any event or call received at Moked 100, where the priority given is first to life-threatening events and damage to government symbols.

As for police services among Arab society, we note that in recent years we have been working to deepen police services in Arab society.

As part of this activity, the directorate for improving police services to the Arab society was closed and a CF department was established to coordinate operational activity in Arab and mixed cities as well as to increase the partnership with the Arab society, in order to respond to the unique needs of the residents to reduce crime, and strengthen the norms of compliance with the law and increase the sense of security among the normative public .

We are also working to recruit police officers from among Arab society as patrols, detectives, and investigators in order to increase cooperation and service to Arab society.

In the CF wing, a new media department was established in Arabic for the purpose of monitoring and transmitting information to the Arab society.

A mechanism was established to detect conflicts in order to provide an operational response while planning and coordinating.

The establishment of police stations and points in Arab society continues and will continue for the purpose of improving governance and making police services accessible to Arab society."

The Shin Bet stated in response: "The findings and conclusions of the State Comptroller's report are studied, and integrated into the service's activity, which already took place during the events and even more so after them, as well as investigating and drawing lessons from the events.

From the beginning of 2022, the Shin Bet decided within its mandate to expand its activities in the Arab sector in general and in the involved cities in particular. Areas were determined in which the service's activity would be expanded and deepened, with an emphasis on issues in the field of national public order and the interface between criminal and security activities. These moves are made in accordance with the authority of the service according to law and within Ongoing dialogue with the legal advisors to the government and the Israel Police.

As stated in the report, the Shin Bet pointed to basic phenomena in Arab society, as well as an escalation over time, which was met with a regular response by police preparations for protest events, even violent ones.

Contrary to what was stated in the report, the Shin Bet recognized from the moment the events began, that it was an escalation on a nationalistic background and accordingly conducted an investigation.

The Shin Bet led to the filing of indictments against 133 perpetrators involved in the incidents and the unraveling of 28 terrorist attacks.

It should be noted that during this period the Shin Bet was simultaneously involved in an extensive attack activity in Gaza that helped to end the campaign quickly as well as in an activity to prevent an outbreak in the Yosh.

The relationship between the Shin Bet and the police Israel is strong, fluid and powerful beyond one process or another.

The issue of network monitoring is being addressed while investing many inputs and resources and it is clear that these efforts are bearing fruit.

However, additional steps are required, including in the area of ​​legislative amendments, and the service is advancing these steps in cooperation with the authorities.

It is important to note that the Shin Bet is subject to the limitations of the law and the restraint of force when it comes to the depth of coverage against Israeli citizens.

In conclusion, alongside the Shin Bet's responsibility for detection and prevention ahead of time, it would be right to reiterate that the possibility of predicting, and accordingly also preventing, an event of a mass outbreak is challenging and limited by its very nature, it would be right to deal with trends and deal with them. These issues are under the care of several authorities in Israel, And the service works to reduce the risk of a widespread outbreak."

The Ministry of Internal Security responded: "During the past year, the Ministry and the Israel Police carried out an in-depth and thorough process of drawing lessons from the Wall Guard incidents. This process was manifested in a long series of steps, actions and processes to increase national preparedness for large-scale incidents of disorder, and with a special emphasis on increasing personal security in the cities Involvement, in the Arab society, in the Negev and in Jerusalem.

When Minister Amr Bar-Lev took office, after "Operation Wall Guard", a series of headquarters works, investigations, learning processes, practice and improvement were carried out under his direction in order to draw the lessons from Wall Guard events and distill detailed plans from them For immediate implementation The subject of preparedness for incidents of disorder at the national level and potential points of friction within Israeli society were defined within the policy goals of the Minister, and from this implementation processes were dictated in the Ministry of Internal Security, the police, and other internal security systems.

The actions carried out in the past year, which will be detailed below, provide an extensive and comprehensive response to the main issues pointed out in the auditor's report, and in the bottom line, put the response capabilities of the Israel Police to similar incidents, already at this time, in a way that is immeasurably improved and upgraded than it was a year ago in the events of May 2021 Below

is

a breakdown of key steps taken by the Ministry:

- For the first time, the Ministry of Internal Security, with the Israel Police, built a national reference scenario for incidents of disorder and civil conflagration. The reference scenario was presented and approved by the Political and Security Cabinet and serves as a reference point for national planning, force building, training and strengthening.

- The Israel Police was strengthened in 2022 to an unprecedented extent - about 1,380 police officers were added to the police, of which over 500 are permanent officers for the MGB, hundreds of police officers assigned to increase their presence in the settlements of the Arab Society, as well as a unique assignment of dozens of police officers to the cities involved, as well as to Jerusalem and the Negev region .

- Along with the strengthening of the standards, processes of adjustment and organization were carried out in the operational structure of the Mageb, among other things by establishing four operational areas whose purpose is to provide a mission response to the challenges of IDF, disturbances and fighting the phenomena of crime, also the tactical unit of the Mageb was doubled and reorganized , the "BTP Brigade" was established, whose purpose is to respond to friction points in routine and emergencies, volunteer bases were established in the north and south, and various headquarters units were strengthened.

- In the field of the reserves - a strengthening plan for the significant expansion of the MagB companies in the reserves was agreed upon and launched. The plan includes the establishment of 26 additional companies over the next three years. 6 of them will be established by the end of 2021. In addition to these, the establishment of two new Mag reserve companies has been completed "B/MI", as well as the establishment of four new MGB reserve companies operating under the command of the IDF.

- In the field of equipment and inventory - shortages of inventory and essential operational equipment were mapped and identified, including means of protection, ammunition and various means to deal with incidents of disorder manifested as part of Wall Guard incidents.

In order to complete the equipment and inventory, for both the regular companies and the reserve companies, a broad procurement program was launched with budgetary backing.

- In the field of volunteers - the "Israeli Guard" program was formulated and approved, which enables the expansion of the volunteering model in the Israel Police, as well as the series of unique volunteer tracks in the Israeli Police Force called "Edge Companies". and in an emergency.

- As for individual treatment in the cities involved, the ministry formulated, within the framework of Government Resolution 549, a unique model called Safe city in the cities of Acre and Lod, this model is based on a combination of advanced technological systems and a tactical-operational response.

The purpose of the model is to increase personal security in these cities, while detecting and early identification of incidents and increasing the speed of response to them.

For this purpose, 65 additional standards were approved for the police in these localities, as well as an operating and technology budget amounting to tens of millions of shekels.

Alongside this model, these cities, as well as the city of Ramla, were expanded and strengthened, with unique additions to community-oriented policing processes, the expansion of cameras in public space and an intervention and prevention program.

- In the field of responding to aspects of consciousness, communication and public mediation, headquarters work was completed to reorganize the spokes division in the Israel Police, in a way that expresses an emphasis on early identification of discourse trends, abilities to formulate an influence and consciousness strategy, and providing a quick response to respond to the public in an emergency.

As mentioned, this work has been completed and started.

- It should be emphasized that alongside these actions, the Ministry of Internal Security, together with the Israel Police, operates a broad national plan to combat violence and crime in Arab society.

A plan that was approved as part of Government Resolution 549 in October 2021, was budgeted, and began to be realized from 2022. This plan, along with the strengthening aspects included in it, produces a significant and clear expansion of the cooperation between the police and other security bodies, including the IDF and Shin Bet, in a way that Substantially improved the work interfaces, the flow of information and the joint operational and potential actions.

This issue was expressed throughout the past year in a series of events, including the events of the terrorist wave in the months of May-April, the events of the escape of the prisoners from Gilboa prison, the events of the month of Ramadan and more.

These aspects, which concern the complexity of the interface between the criminal and the nationalist, were strengthened, practiced and improved throughout the year, in accordance with the emphases noted in the auditor's report.

In conclusion - the Ministry of Internal Security, under the leadership of Minister Amr Bar-Lev, carried out large-scale infrastructural operations during the past year, which directly relate to the audit findings presented in the State Comptroller's report. "Keeper of Walls" - is a central goal that the Ministry has set and worked toward during the past year. The Ministry intends to continue and persevere in the implementation processes of the various lessons, to assimilate them on an ongoing basis and to ensure a fundamental change in the national preparedness for similar events in the future.

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• Matanyahu Engelman