Tarik Yildiz is a sociologist. He has notably published
From the fatigue of being oneself to ready-to-believe.
Fighting crime to combat Islamist radicalism
(Puits de Roulle Editions, 2020).
FIGAROVOX. - A study conducted by the CSA polling institute revealed that 91% of the French population approves of the expulsion of "preachers of foreign nationality holding speeches contrary to republican values". However, they are only 72% among 18-24 year olds against 98% among those over 65 years old. What inspires you?
Tarik YILDIZ. -
With all the necessary precautions that must be taken for the proper analysis of a survey, the differences between the results in the different age categories surveyed confirm work carried out in many contexts: the perception of young adults on the subjects linked to religion, secularism and respect for the "values of the Republic" differs, to a certain extent, from that of the rest of society.
First of all, it should be remembered that it is not easy to draw conclusions without having isolated the potentially explanatory factors: whether there is indeed a correlation between belonging to an age group and positioning on different questions of society –in this case, the expulsion of foreign preachers-, the causal link is not easy to demonstrate.
The variables can intersect: age, political position, entry into the world of work and more broadly professional situation, family situation (and in particular the presence of children or not), etc.
Furthermore, certain sociologists such as Jean-Paul Willaime have demonstrated a form of instability in identifications and the expression of opinions (political or religious): interpretations cannot be too rigid given the particularly changing nature of the results in the younger categories.
Distrust of the state, perceived as an oppressor by nature, in line with a form of Marxist reading of society, represents an important factor among young people claiming to be close to the LFI movement.
Tarik Yildiz
How do you analyze this generational break?
Beyond these precautions and by comparing the results with other studies, we can evoke certain explanations linked in particular to the socio-professional category of the individuals questioned.
Indeed, a correlation may appear between age and social position.
The latter will condition the relationship to events: a young student, for example, will have less chance of experiencing tensions because of religion in his workplace.
Read alsoSecularism at school: "We must reset the republican software, especially for the younger generations"
Similarly, political positioning seems to be decisive.
The same study reveals that 29% of those questioned who consider that the expulsion from the territory of imams of foreign nationality holding speeches contrary to “French republican values” is not a good idea declare that they are partisans of France Insoumise.
This “generational break” thus seems to be explained not only by the perception of events, which varies according to socio-economic position, but also by political positioning, the two dimensions possibly being closely linked.
In the last presidential election, the candidate of France Insoumise came out on top among 18-34 year olds with 32% of the vote, ahead of Emmanuel Macron and Marine Le Pen, both at 23%.
Distrust of the state, perceived as an oppressor by nature, in line with a form of Marxist reading of society, represents an important factor among young people claiming to be close to the LFI movement.
These correlations are clarified by other surveys which reveal dynamics specific to the younger generations.
The progression of a form of relativist ideology should be noted, as illustrated by the study carried out by Ifop published in March 2021: the high school students questioned were then mainly in favor of the wearing of conspicuous religious symbols by students in high schools. public (52% against only 25% in the adult population as a whole).
These results confirm this difference in perception.
For some young people, it is not a question of not respecting republican values but on the contrary of upholding "humanist values" recognizing everyone's right "not to be offended" according to their community affiliations, real or assumed.
Tarik Yildiz
Is respect for republican values less important among the younger generations? For what reasons ?
It is above all a question of defining what are the “republican values”.
A new generation, strongly influenced by what is commonly called the "Anglo-Saxon" conception of society, emerged.
An extension of individual freedoms in a form of recognition and freedom of “communities” has imposed itself in certain discourses.
For some young people, it is not a question of not respecting republican values but on the contrary of upholding "humanist values" recognizing everyone's right "not to be offended" according to their community affiliations, real or assumed.
This evolution is also observed in sociological surveys: by studying the archives of semi-structured interviews, the expression of moral judgments was not uncommon.
The interviewees positioned themselves more frequently on what they considered to be “good” or “bad”, assuming that they were defending collective values and not community ones.
This type of statement now gives more room to a form of relativism - "everyone does what he wants" - which consecrates the quest for individual happiness and the "respect" of each "community" which must be recognized and valued by nature.
What more general lessons can be drawn from the current sequence?
In reality, there is no homogeneous youth but several categories of young people.
If 52% of high school students questioned are unfavorable to the right to criticize, even outrageously, a religious belief, symbol or dogma, this figure rises to 78% among Muslim high school students in the aforementioned Ifop survey.
It is therefore necessary to distinguish between different dynamics.
First of all, there is a relatively classic distrust of the state among the youngest categories, which explains the refusal, in principle, to support the expulsion of a foreigner from French soil.
We can also observe a change in values with a form of Anglo-Saxonisation of discourse: the relegation of a French universal model to the background in favor of a form of "tolerance" of the visibility of the religious fact or even of a resurgence of religious belief as indicated by Frédéric Dabi in his book
La Fracture
.
The latter thus indicates that a majority of 18-30 year olds believe in God, which had not happened for forty years.
Finally, this is due to a form of radicalism among some young Muslims, particularly in the REP and REP+ areas.