Like his predecessor, Baha Abu al-Ata, who did not heed Israel's warnings and Hamas' entreaties, Taysir Jabari, the commander of the Islamic Jihad in the northern Gaza Strip, today paid with his life for his arrogance and the excessive self-confidence he displayed, in his attempt to impose restrictions on Israel, for the arrest of his operatives shaming.
Along with him, other field commanders were killed in the high-quality attack by the IDF and the Shin Bet, some of them directly related to the specific threat that hovered over the southern settlements in the last week.
This will not be the first time that the terrorist organizations will be forced to admit that they made a mistake in assessing the limits of Israel's tolerance and inclusion, however, it must be assumed that at this time they are busy preparing for the coming days of battle, more than learning the lessons from the previous days of violence.
In a way that is not only symbolic, the report on Israel's operation in Gaza captures Ziad Nachala while he is in Tehran.
From there he also unleashes his threats to respond "with all force" to Israeli aggression.
If we judge things based on these statements, then we have turned to a "combat round" whose appeal, strength, geographical distribution, and composition of participants will depend mainly on the dynamics that will be created. Parts of the public, it is not at all certain that he will choose to stand against it.
How should Israel act in view of the situation?
A.
Maximum protection to prevent harm to the soul: - This goal has a double importance - both preserving the lives of our citizens and denying the opponent achievements and leaving him, at the end of the round, bruised, beaten and without success.
B.
Powerful damage to the commanders and capabilities of the adversaries - in order to reduce the duration of the fighting, it is suggested that Israel's moves at the very beginning of the operation be of maximum intensity.
A campaign with increasing graduated power will result in its duration longer than desired.
As far as harming the commanders is concerned, the same applies to those who found their safety abroad.
third.
Targeting the Palestinian Authority and a powerful preparedness against Hamas - Hamas should carefully consider the feasibility of its joining. If it joins anyway - its commanders should be harmed and the terrorist towers should also be included in the first attack targets.
d.
The focus of fire in the south, vigilance and a threatening look to the north - it is important to make sure that we are not surprised by the north and it is worth going back and clarifying the price that Israel will charge from those who join.
God.
Vigilance and a quick and determined response to terrorism for violent nationalist events within Israel - the formation of an "internal arena" under the influence of the conflict in Gaza or against the background of the incitement around Mount HaBait that increases every year towards Tisha B'av must not be allowed.
Although Israel enters the current conflict in the Gaza Strip with no choice, it can become an opportunity to strengthen its deterrence and change in its favor at least some of the elements of the equation used today, in dealing with the Gaza Strip.
Meir Ben Shabat is a senior research fellow at the "Institute for National Security Studies" (INSS), Tel Aviv University, served as a national security advisor and head of the National Security Council between 2017-2021. Before that he was one of the top Shin Bet officers.
Ruthie Pines is a doctoral student at the School of Political Science, Government and International Relations at Tel Aviv University and works at the Institute for National Security Studies, Tel Aviv University
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