From the moment the escalation in Gaza began, last Monday, the Shin Bet's Operations Division began airing the files of senior Islamic Jihad leaders Taysir Jabari and Khaled Mansour, in order to be prepared for the possibility that it would be decided to eliminate them. To refresh the "black sash" command for the option of a belt campaign.
Initial preparations for the assassination of Jabari were made as early as last Wednesday, but in Israel it was decided to wait, thinking that the Islamic Jihad would withdraw, and also to gain international legitimacy and complete the deployment of forces (mainly Iron Dome batteries).
In the meantime, the IDF presented three different plans for action, and recommended the most violent plan of the three. His recommendation was approved by the political echelon. Those who led the collection of intelligence and the construction of the operational file that led to the assassinations are members of the operations division of the Shin Bet, headed by N.
This is a secret wing, which is also isolated within the Shin Bet itself. Building an intelligence picture for elimination is a complex matter. A puzzle of thousands of pieces of information, which the Israeli intelligence community in general, and the Shin Bet in particular, are world champions in putting together.
The operatives in the Shin Bet are skilled in extracting bits of information, and turning them into valuable intelligence; their fighters are trained in extracting information from the field and turning it into a complete picture. Some of the intelligence comes from human sources, and the other part from eavesdropping or cyber operations,
From visible information and various operations carried out in the field.
In this aspect, Gaza is a more complicated area to operate than any other arena.
Unlike Lebanon or Iran, which are open to tourists, businessmen and other parties - which are a constant potential for the activity of intelligence organizations - Gaza is besieged and very suspicious, and those who arrive there are searched and tracked strictly (as happened in the failed special operation in the Gaza Strip in November 2018, in which Lt. Col. Mahmoud Khir al -law).
The operations wing of the Shin Bet gathers intelligence on potential targets throughout the year: where they live and work, what vehicles they use, who their family and friends are - every detail that might be used for something, someday. the decrees, but naturally more intensely with the heads of the terrorist organizations, with the understanding that hitting them is a significant achievement that can change the picture.
Each of these assassination operations was conducted simultaneously from the HML of the Shin Bet's operations wing and the air force's pit.
N., who commanded the intelligence side, made sure that all the information was current and solid: that Jabari and Mansour were in their hiding places, and that there was no danger of harming others.
After the final incrimination was carried out, the baton was passed to the commander of the Air Force, Colonel Tomer Bar, who controlled the attacks from the air.
The full story in tomorrow's supplement
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