On Tuesday morning, the Prime Minister's Office published a statement that Yair Lapid called Central Command General Yehuda Fuchs, the commander of the 8th Army and the head of the operations division of the Shin Bet N, and thanked them for the operation in which the wanted man Ibrahim Navolsi was eliminated in Nablus. The laconic and sparingly worded message was an unusual mention of the Shin Bet's Operations Division and its head, whose part in the events of the past week is more dramatic than published - and more central than any other factor that participated in them.
In fact, the Operations Division (and the Shin Bet in general) are the main ones responsible for the success of the operation in Gaza. The elimination of the two military commanders of the Islamic Jihad in the Gaza Strip, Taysir Jabari and Khaled Mansour, is recorded in their name. Other factors worked alongside them - the Southern Command, the Air Force and a unit 8200 - But without the two jokers who were eliminated, it is doubtful whether the operation would have been crowned as an unequivocal victory.
The Shin Bet is a secret organization that operates away from the public eye. The Operations Division is a bubble within a bubble: some of its operations are isolated even from other members of the Shin Bet.
His role, in essence, is to find creative ways to realize the goals of the Shin Bet.
The last two heads of the Shin Bet, Nadav Argaman and Ronan Bar, grew up in the Operations Division and headed it. The current head of the division, N., grew up in the division since he was released from military service in the Dovdvan unit, and went through a long path to becoming his commander. The operation in Gaza was the clear highlight of his tenure So far, and short of impressive achievements by any measure.
between Samaria and Gaza
On Monday, a week and a half ago, the IDF and the Shin Bet arrested Bassam Saadi, a senior member of the Islamic Jihad (hereafter GAP: Palestinian Islamic Jihad), in northern Samaria. It is not clear why this arrest - which was one of many hundreds of arrests carried out as part of Operation "Breaking the Waves" - triggered the organization's military arm in Gaza. Perhaps it was the man's seniority, perhaps the fact that he was recorded being dragged on the floor and bitten by a dog, and perhaps the presence of the organization's senior officials in Tehran at the time. It is also possible that the organization's operatives in Q put pressure on their colleagues in Gaza, to work to rescue them from the Israeli press.
One way or another, in Gaza they decided to respond.
In the past, the automatic response was to launch rockets into Israeli territory.
But rockets (as proven in the last operation) are mostly inaccurate, and the GAP wanted blood. Therefore, they chose a different pattern of action: launching an anti-tank missile or sniping, which would guarantee hitting and killing Israelis.
Israel's strong intelligence coverage in Gaza immediately overwhelmed the GAP's intentions, which translated into a severe warning. The commander of the Southern Command, Eliezer Toledano, decided to close the entire surrounding area, in order to reduce the number of available targets to zero. Criticism came immediately, but Toledano was determined: the burning of the anti-tank missile hitting the soldiers' bus in "Black Arrow" in 2018 while he was serving as the division commander - which miraculously ended without dozens of casualties - has burned in him ever since.
Life precedes the quality of life, he clarified, adding: What will I say to the parents of the children who will be killed on the bus on the way to summer camp, or to the parents of the soldiers who will be killed by whipping?
In the first few days, Israel tried to end the tensions quietly.
Pressure was put on Hamas so that it would put pressure on the Palestinian Authority and take it down from the tree. As part of this, the crossings to the Gaza Strip were closed, laborers were prevented from going to work in Israel, the passage of goods and fuel was stopped, and fishing areas were reduced. The Egyptians also joined the effort, and tried to use their influence to calm the spirits - but the "F refused to relax.
Therefore, already on Monday evening Chief of Staff Kochavi ordered to update the "Black Sash" order of readiness for the campaign in Gaza.
During all this time, the Shin Bet's Operations Division worked on alternatives. The organization collects information about its opponents all year round: where they live and work, what vehicles they use, who their family and friends are - every detail that might be used for something, someday. The enemies in all sectors, but naturally more intensely against the heads of the terrorist organizations, with the understanding that harming them is a significant achievement.
Last Wednesday, two days into the alert and alert, the Shin Bet already knew how to show preliminary readiness for Jabari's assassination. Mansour was also in the crosshairs from the first moment, but he was a much more complex target than his northern counterpart: more violent and dangerous, and also experienced and cautious - In routine, and certainly in times of war.
Building an intelligence picture for elimination is a complex matter.
A puzzle of thousands of pieces of information, which the Israeli intelligence community in general, and the Shin Bet in particular, are world champions in putting together. The operatives in the Shin Bet are skilled in extracting bits of information, and turning them into valuable intelligence;
The fighters in them are trained in extracting information from the field, and turning it into a complete picture.
Some of the intelligence comes from human sources, and the other part from eavesdropping or cyber operations, from visible information and various operations in the field.
In this aspect, Gaza is a more complicated area to operate than any other arena.
Unlike Lebanon or Iran, which are open to tourists, businessmen and other parties - which are a constant potential for the activity of intelligence organizations - Gaza is besieged and very suspicious, and those who arrive there are scanned and followed strictly (as happened in the special operation that failed in the Gaza Strip in November 2018, in which Lt. Col. Mahmoud Khir al was killed -law).
This requires the Shin Bet field personnel to be extremely careful not to be caught, and also not to thwart the operation. The goal is for the target to continue his daily routine without being suspected of anything. In the case of the senior members of the terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip, this is a particularly complex challenge. Some of them have been persecuted for years, and are taking steps They go to great lengths to not provide Israel with an opportunity to harm them. This includes abstaining from cell phones, using hiding apartments and relying only on trusted people, and even making sure that innocent people are in their immediate vicinity as a human shield.
Jabari, for example, hid on the sixth floor out of 14 in the "Palestine Building" in Gaza.
There were civilians on the floors and in the apartments nearby.
Since the definitions of the operation were 0 mistakes, minimal collateral damage and complete avoidance of harming children, and not harming Hamas so as not to drag it into combat - it was necessary to make sure that Jabari alone would be harmed.
Here too, it is a complex intelligence challenge of building a complete picture;
This picture is passed on to the Air Force, which turns it into an operational plan - which weaponry to use to ensure that the target is killed, without being harmed.
As published, the Air Force chose a particularly challenging and complex method: inserting a bomb with a thunderbolt into the seventh floor, which would penetrate the floor to the sixth floor and explode there, and then inserting several more bombs into the apartment itself.
Annihilation in Shlapstunda
Last Thursday, the Shin Bet continued to refine the plan. N. spoke almost hourly with Toledano in the Southern Command and with the head of the southern region of Shin Bet A, to complete the preparations.
In the meantime, the political echelon approved the plan, out of three alternatives presented to it by the IDF (the chosen alternative was the strictest, recommended by the army).
At the same time, it was decided to wait a little longer, in an attempt (which failed again) to calm the GAP, and also to gain international legitimacy for the action and to complete the deployment of Iron Dome batteries throughout the country, in preparation for the expected escalation. That evening the plan was already complete and was being considered for execution; in the end it It was rejected. The IDF wanted to carry it out on Saturday, but the Shin Bet pressed to bring it up to Friday so as not to lose the opportunity, and so as not to be surprised by an attack that could be carried out at any moment.
On Friday morning, the Minister of Defense and the Chief of Staff arrived for final approvals of plans at the Southern Command. The execution time was set for four in the afternoon, a sleepy hour, or as Toledano defined it in a closed conversation: "an hour of crackdowns and slapstick".
The operation itself was conducted at the same time from the HML of the Shin Bet's operations wing, and from the air force's pit.
N., who commanded the intelligence side, made sure again that all the information was current and solid: that Jabari was indeed in the apartment, and that there was no danger of harming others.
After the final incrimination was carried out, the baton was passed to the commander of the Air Force, General Tomer Bar, who controlled the attack from the air.
At 16:14 the bombs were dropped, and the "Dawn" operation was launched.
Mansour was also targeted from the beginning of the operation, but there were insufficient intelligence and operational conditions that allowed him to be hit already during the opening.
A day later it became possible: once again, under the leadership of the Shin Bet's Operations Division, in cooperation with the Southern Command, the Air Force and the Israeli Defense Forces (especially Unit 8200, which established a joint sub-unit with the Shin Bet for operational intelligence extraction), the Shin Bet managed to close There is a circle on him in the house where he hid in the Rafah refugee camp.
IDF spokesperson
Here too, the challenge was not only to get the location, but to map its surroundings to ensure that killing it would not cause great damage that would complicate Israel.
It was therefore necessary to find out not only where he was hiding, but also what the house was made of so that the Air Force would know which military base was best suited for an attack, but also who the neighbors were: which family lived in which building, and how many people were in each apartment.
There is no country or army in the world that would do all these actions.
The Americans would drop a few tons of bombs without blinking, even if all the inhabitants in the nearby buildings were killed;
The Russians would take down the whole neighborhood, to ensure a kill.
Israel operates surgically;
Avoiding unnecessary harm has many reasons and advantages - from reducing the possibility of escalation (it is doubtful that Hamas would have been able to continue to stand by if the bodies of civilians were piled up in Gaza), through the denial of international criticism which is critical to the legitimacy of the action, to the ability to look at oneself in the mirror and say that she did everything to harm only those needed
The challenge in eliminating Mansour was threefold: to know for sure that he was in the building and exactly where in it, to know who was with him, and to know who was around so as not to harm them.
After the picture was completed, the process was repeated: N. managed the operation on the Shin Bet side, and Tomer Bar completed it on the Air Force side.
This time, the Air Force used a different method, and to ensure that Mansour was killed it used three bombs, with warheads that would ensure a targeted hit: the first hit the first floor of the building, the second the second floor, and the third the third floor.
Mansur was killed immediately;
The residents of the nearby buildings were not harmed at all.
While in Israel they are trying to make sure that Mansour was indeed eliminated, the networks started making noise about the death of seven civilians, including five children, in the Jabaliya refugee camp.
The Palestinians were quick to accuse Israel of attacking and killing innocent people;
For a moment it seemed that the success of the operation was overshadowed, and the business got complicated.
Toledano rushed to the command fire center, trying to find out what happened.
Within minutes he ruled out the possibility that the IDF attacked Jabaliya at or around this time. A few minutes later it was already possible to determine with certainty that a rocket launched by the GAP fell in the Gaza Strip and killed the civilians.
This information changed the picture again: now the GAP was presented as the one killing the residents of Gaza. The civil anger that accumulated in the Gaza Strip helped Hamas and Egypt pressure the GAP to agree to a ceasefire.
Gaza is still here
The operation in Gaza was very successful.
This stood out especially after a series of wars and operations, since the second Lebanon, in which Israel ended the campaign in a sour draw.
It is true that the opponent this time was the weakest in the neighborhood, and the fight was between a heavyweight boxer and a featherweight boxer.
And yet, for the first time in a long time there is no doubt who won and who lost, and this result resonates not only in Gaza but throughout the region.
There are quite a few lessons to be learned from this short round in the Gaza Strip, with the understanding that it was a luxurious round, and against Hamas (and certainly against Hezbollah) it will be much more complicated to reproduce such achievements.
But we also need to highlight the positive side: the conduct at the senior political and security level, and among them, was efficient and free of ego and struggles.
The inter-organizational cooperation was exceptional in quality, and the results accordingly.
The synchronization between all the arrays - the intelligence, the operational, the economic, the international and the awareness - was successful, and it is possible to achieve all the objectives of the operation: a short and focused campaign against the Islamic Jihad, without Hamas interfering in it and with minimal harm to the innocent and damage.
The other side also has quite a few lessons to learn.
This is the fourth time in the last two decades that a terrorist organization has regretted starting a campaign.
Hassan Nasrallah said this explicitly after the Second Lebanon War, that if he had known what the results would be, he would not have initiated the kidnapping of Ehud Goldwasser and Eldad Regev.
Hamas regretted the kidnapping of the three boys that led to Operation Protective Edge in 2014, and regretted it again last year when the five rockets it fired at Jerusalem led to Operation Wall Guardian.
There is no doubt that now the GAP also regrets having initiated the escalation.
But the successful completion of the round does not exempt Israel from a broader perspective, because even after it, Gaza remains Gaza - with all its problems and challenges.
A responsible political leader is expected to hold a strategic discussion, and honestly ask himself what he wants to achieve in Gaza not tomorrow morning, but in 10-20 years.
As long as this discussion does not happen, Israel will continue to maintain a fragmented hold in Gaza - a sure recipe for the next round.
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