Behind the scenes of Operation "Dawn": the IDF's drone army is exposed

It was the unmanned aerial vehicles that set the tone between the two targeted countermeasures at the beginning and end of the operation.

Their number in the Gaza Strip was the largest since their use began in the second intifada.

The scope of their use, and the coordination between all the factors, resulted in the "Dawn" being defined as a "very successful operation"

Amir Bohbot

12/08/2022

Friday, August 12, 2022, 08:59 Updated: 12:36

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Friday, 4:16 p.m.

Many Palestinians in the Gaza Strip were in mosques at that time.

Others were prepared for the Friday dinner after the prayers.

None of them estimated that the work of ants that lasted for many months was about to come to a thundering end: the Shin Bet managed to uncover the hiding apartment of Taysir Jabari, the commander of the Islamic Jihad in the northern Gaza Strip. The head of the Shin Bet Ronan Bar gave the approval for the transfer of the precise intelligence For a pit in Kirya in Tel Aviv.

The head of the operations brigade, Brigadier General Yaron Finkelman, signaled to the senior officials in the room that included the fighter jets, drones and ground forces, who confirmed alertness and alertness for an attack within seconds.

They waited for the order.

The responsibility was transferred to the Chief of Staff Aviv Kochavi. Next to him in the room were the senior staff of the General Staff and the deputy head of the Shin Bet. Seconds later, Kochavi said the pair of words that means approval for targeted countermeasures: "I may carry out."

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Seconds later, Kochavi said the couplet of words that constitutes approval for targeted countermeasures: "You may carry out."

HML during the "Dawn" operation (photo: official website, IDF spokesperson)

Eight smart bombs dropped from fighter jets glided towards the attacked apartment one after the other and exploded.

The walls of the apartment collapsed one by one.

In the 120 seconds that followed, unmanned aircraft attacked the commander of the anti-tank system of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Abdullah Kadum, who was riding a motorcycle in Gaza. Other targets were the organization's central command and control center, rocket launch sites, weapons production sites and weapons depots. At the same time, tanks rose above the high mounds of dirt and attacked positions manned by activists.

The next few minutes were nerve-wracking. The Chief of Staff and the other senior officials in the hole waited for a seal from the Shin Bet and Aman Shajabari was eliminated.

The information flowed into the pit.

Finally there was a sigh of relief: Jabari was killed and Abdullah Kadum was mortally wounded and his legs were amputated.

Before the Palestinians had time to leave the mosques and try to digest the meaning of the explosions and the mushrooms of smoke in the skies of the Gaza Strip, masses of drones appeared above them. This was the largest number in the skies of the Gaza Strip since the outbreak of the Second Intifada, when their integration into the work of intelligence gathering and targeted countermeasures began. The Palestinians call them "Zanana". , because of the annoying hum they make during the flight. At this point, the IDF began hunting the terrorist operatives and the other senior officials who remained alive, but are hiding underground, in hiding apartments or in sensitive facilities such as hospitals, UNRA branches, clinics and educational institutions.

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To the full article

The tank commanders did not know until the last minute that they were participating in the operation.

A tank in the field during the "Dawn" operation (photo: official website, IDF spokesperson)

"The planning and preparation for an attack by all the parties, with an emphasis on the Operations Wing, the Air Force, the Southern Command, the Amman and the Shin Bet, resulted in the fact that there was a very large number of attack cells compared to all previous operations, in relation to the size of a field cell," said a reserve officer who took Part of the "Dawn" operation.

The officer was very familiar with the previous plan called "Black Sash".

"It was like waking a dragon from its sleep," he said.

"The first second he opened his eyes, he dealt a fireblow that the enemy never dreamed of. It is true that the Palestinian Islamic Jihad is not Hamas, and it certainly does not come close to Hezbollah, an organization much larger in scope and lethality, which is spread over a vast geographical area compared to Gaza. But it explains to everyone in the region what the IDF is capable of doing in a short period of time."

Past operations have highlighted two key gaps in combat: obtaining real-time intelligence on the whereabouts of the hiding enemy, and fire available to attack before the target disappears.

Therefore, one of the key moves made possible by the Chief of Staff and outgoing Air Force Commander Major General Amikam Norkin was the simultaneous production of a large number of attack cells at the same time. and synchronization with all the forces in the area in the name of safety. The force includes fighter planes, Iron Dome batteries, intelligence gathering planes and more.

A second dramatic move includes the placement of Air Force officers with extensive experience in operating armed unmanned aerial vehicles, under the command of Col. Y., who were responsible for the entire Gaza Strip, and in cells of the Gaza Division known as the "canopy of fire" for the short ranges from the fence. Previously, they were placed in wagons The operation of the drone squadrons for backup purposes and quality advice in real time.

In the attack cells in the "Dawn" operation, they worked to connect the UAV operators' wagons with the attack cells, and to shorten the timelines from the moment of identification and confirmation of the target until its attack.

"Until you sit in an attack cell and see how a UAV operator talks and coordinates it, you don't understand the gaps in language and understanding that existed before," said an official involved in the decision-making process at the Southern Command. "Those Air Force officers in the cells build a quick picture and understand what the The drone operator knows the officers and trusts them.

They provide each other with relevant information and together shorten schedules in the production of intelligence in real time and in attacking the object.

That's how you attack more targets in a short period of time."

Proved that he knows how to jump between Tel Aviv and the front in the south.

Kochavi (photo: official website, IDF spokesman)

On Saturday night, Col. (res.) Yoav Rom received a message on his cell phone from an officer in the Southern Command: The commander of the Islamic Jihad in the southern Gaza Strip, Khaled Mansour, was killed in a targeted attack by the Shin Bet and the Air Force.

The assassination was carried out 12 years after Mansour was involved in the killing of Yarom's subordinates, Major Eliraz Peretz and the late First Sergeant Ilan Sviatukovski. From the point of view of the former GDS commander Golani, this was a personal closing of the circle, and from the point of view of the extremist terrorist organization - a very big shakeup.

Mansour was the actual Chief of Staff of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, especially after the assassination of Jabri, and the one who initiated the anti-tank attacks against Israel.

"Mansour was much more problematic than Jabari in terms of his experience and his lack of boundaries," explained an officer in the Southern Command.

"Until we thwarted him, he was the leading factor in the fighting, and not without reason, after he was thwarted it didn't take long until we reached a ceasefire.

But even before the dust settled on the operation, there was a feeling that the large scale of the aircraft that were hovering in the air at any given moment, and the unusual decentralization of authority from the Air Force to the Southern Command, in everything related to attacking the targets, could be better utilized.

To explain this process, one must dive into the drama and operational breakthrough behind the scenes.

First, a senior security official stressed, this is a "very successful operation".

The challenge facing the Chief of Staff was the question of how to surprise the Islamic Jihad, when it was already prepared and prepared to carry out anti-tank attacks and most of its senior commanders were hiding.

The reality in the region was already very tense anyway, and yet the IDF had to foil the anti-tank attacks and harm the organization's top brass.

"In military terms, to go from a routine to a broad operation, it is about 'zero time,'" explained a senior security official.

"It's very challenging - to pull out of the drawer the operational plan we've been working on for the past few months and turn it into an order appropriate to the reality on the ground, the weather, the location of the army and the enemy forces, the context of the missions, and the list goes on. This in a very short time and under compartmentalization. Everything was secret. When few knew about The operation. This would not have happened without operational harmony between all the wings and commands, including the Shin Bet.

The level of performance in the end was very high, because we were properly prepared."

"Much more problematic than Jabari."

Khaled Mansour (photo: official website, Twitter)

Although this is a 55-hour operation, the Chief of Staff has proven that he knows how to jump between Tel Aviv and the front in the south several times, and finally develop around the combat watch one small and crowded room deep in the ground in Kirya, for the purpose of activating a "thinking forum", to which the sensitive officials will come And the important ones who didn't sleep for several days in a row. They included the Shin Bet, Amman, Matafash, the Air Force, Amts and Southern Command, and this in order to synchronize all the factors, determine courses of action and try to solve problems quickly and creatively.

Sometimes it is There were in-depth discussions - how it is right to take risks in combat, how to take advantage of opportunities and sometimes also to forge destinies. "For sure, the final order that put the entire army into emergency mode and announced the start of the operation will be different from the original operational plan, because there are so many variables along the way," said the security official , and emphasized that the process requires many adjustments such as high readiness of all formations and building capabilities in the air and on land in those seconds.

"I don't want to think about what would have happened if the tank had fired in front of the aircraft," said an officer from the Southern Command, "it must be on the set second. Why? Because as soon as the Islamic Jihad commanders hear an explosion, they run from their positions and disappear. They switch to another mode . They get used to it."

According to him, the tank commanders did not know until the last minute that they were participating in the operation.

They learned this at the moment of the order to destroy positions of the Islamic Jihad near the border, when there are operatives in them.

"It has to happen on the second, otherwise it won't happen. The synchronization of time, intelligence and fire is of critical importance. The tank commanders didn't need explanations, because they are constantly practicing attacking such positions. From Jabari's thwarting to the end of the tanks' firing, approximately Two minutes".

"I don't want to think what would have happened if the tank had fired in front of the aircraft."

A tank in the "Dawn" operation (photo: official website, IDF spokesman)

The targeted thwarting of Jabari on Friday, the damage to the command and control center, the fact that the Islamic Jihad is not an organization that operates in a classic hierarchical manner like Hamas, and its commanders often act on the basis of an extreme ideology of senseless resistance and on the basis of gut feelings, these did not make the experience Call the organization's next steps a difficult challenge for the intelligence agencies.

That is why it was decided to

place groups of UAVs in the skies of the Gaza Strip, backed up by fighter jets and helicopter gunships around the clock, so that at any given moment there will be ready fire against the enemy.

Does not tickle the capabilities of the IDF," said the source.

"Still, we had the wisdom to bring a gun to a knife fight. We didn't go to a fair fight with them. Why? Because they tried to harm civilians (launch an anti-tank missile at civilian vehicles, AB).

Our job is to stop the danger.

remove the threat."

In places where the operatives of the Islamic Jihad came out of their hiding places and tried to carry out aggressive moves, they found the IDF directing fire at them. Wounded terrorist operatives and a large number of attacks that were stopped at the very last moment.

This is because some commanders in the Islamic Jihad moved from street to street or apartment to apartment, with babies and children in their hands.

One of the commanders who used to do this "in a cynical and cruel manner" until the moment of the attack, was Abdullah Kadum, who is now lying sedated and ventilated in Shifa Hospital in Gaza.

At a certain point, the Islamic Jihad operatives internalized the firepower, timing and precision that the IDF was using against them, and began to avoid leaving the hiding apartments and headquarters that were placed under the cover of sensitive installations. Without stimulation and trickery, their whereabouts could not be traced.

Reserve officers of the Southern Command raised, at the beginning of the investigations following the operation, a criticism that said: "At one point the Gaza Division had difficulty attacking targets because the enemy is hiding. The exposure-attack company of the land is not working as successfully as everyone hopes. It is a good idea, but not really effective And effective in every arena and in every scenario. The enemy did not come out of the holes, and there is a positive point in that, because he acts slowly. But in front of Hamas or in the northern arena, he will not have this luxury, and the IDF will have to provoke the enemy, make him fight, come out of the holes so that those above will wait To him the drones. This reality will force the IDF at some point to land maneuver, or other creative actions.

This is a significant lesson."

"There are few armies in the world that have such capabilities."

Air Force activity during the operation (photo: official website, IDF spokesperson)

The Southern Command did not ignore the criticism, claiming that it was correct, but insisted on highlighting the achievements, such as the fact that the opening blow caused the Islamic Jihad a "systemic shock", as a result of which the activists launched the first rocket only five hours later.

"Then the IDF moved to increase the achievement by hunting.

"An attempt to damage the building of the force," said the army. "We damaged their production quality in the wall guard operation and the current operation

It is not for nothing that 20% of their rockets fell in the Gaza Strip.

They have real difficulty.

Almost everything that has been restored in the last year has been bombed.

We hit rocket launchers and mortar launchers that they don't know how to produce in the Strip.

We injured many activists.

We got better at hunting.

We need to improve.

It's not a perfect operation, but it's definitely a very good operation, with something to learn from it, but also something not to learn from it." The variety of unmanned aircraft capable of staying over the Strip for a long time set the tone between the two targeted countermeasures carried out by the fighter jets.

The IDF realized already in 2019 that the future lies in squadrons of unmanned aircraft and their availability for the divisions and brigades, and what is going to happen in wars and operations, such as the incident in Operation Dawn, will be a "boutique service", unless a significant force is added. That's why they went out for a procurement tender of a UAV named "The Spark", which has classified capabilities, as part of a secret project called "Storm Clouds", which is shared by the Air Force, the Land Arm and the defense industries in Israel.

Last week, the Chief of Staff inaugurated the special squadron called the "Phoenix", (Squadron 144) which received the classified unmanned aerial vehicle. Air Force officers defined the "Spark" as "a new aircraft capable of operating in a groundbreaking manner.

There are few armies in the world that have such capabilities." Chief of Staff Aviv Kochavi added to the mystery when he said at the ceremony: "The name of the chosen squadron, 'Phoenix,' does not refer to the usual Phoenix. It is a Phoenix in a different configuration. Because a squadron has never been established in the Air Force for multi-pronged needs. The squadron embodies innovative concepts that are going to break through everything we knew in the past, and take us into the future. We need a squadron because the reality on the ground is changing."

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