Laurent Chalard is a geographer and works at the European Center for International Affairs. Find him on his
personal blog
.
FIGAROVOX. – The “Climate and Resilience” law, passed in August 2021, set a “zero net artificialisation” objective by 2050. What did it contain and what was its objective?
Laurent Chalard. –
First of all, it is important to point out that the objective of this law may seem quite utopian.
Indeed, “zero net artificialisation” is unheard of in history for a very long time, except during periods of war, when it is not a question of construction but of destruction.
In normal times of economic development, it is obvious that the “zero net land take” objective is a utopia.
The real objective of this law is to halve the rate of land take in ten years (by 2030).
Laurent Chalard
The real objective of this law is to halve the rate of land take in ten years (by 2030).
Those who promulgated the law mainly had the objective of reducing in the short term an annual rate of soil artificialization which seemed too high in France and unsustainable.
However, we had already been on a downward trend since the 2000s. forests of 31,409 hectares compared to 21,079 hectares in 2020-2021.
We have therefore already seen a drop of one third, but the State finds that this is not significant enough: the objective is to achieve an artificialization of the soil of only 10,000 hectares per year.
Behind the utopian objective of zero artificialisation by 2050, of which we wonder if it will really be applied, we have, I repeat, a real objective of a reduction by two over the next ten years.
The implementing decrees which are in the process of being issued concern this ten-year period.
When we talk about the artificialization of soils, this concerns three types of spaces: so-called natural spaces (wetlands for example, knowing that they have been very badly treated since the Second World War by development, both economic and agriculture, we forget that most wetlands have been cleaned up to become fields);
agricultural areas (urbanization has developed to the detriment of fields and in particular
openfields
, easily urbanizable cereal areas) and finally forest areas.
The forest progresses in France every year.
According to IGN, it gained 2.8 million hectares between 1985 and 2019, or 80,000 hectares per year, reaching a coverage of 31% of the territory in 2019, more than double the 19th century.
The artificialization of soils in the forest remains very marginal.
Laurent Chalard
It should be remembered, concerning the latter, that the trend is not negative: the forest progresses in France each year.
According to IGN, it gained 2.8 million hectares between 1985 and 2019, or 80,000 hectares per year, reaching a coverage of 31% of the territory in 2019, more than double the 19th century.
The artificialization of soils in the forest remains very marginal.
The real problem is to fight against the artificialization of good agricultural land.
The most significant example is the EuropaCity project, definitively abandoned: the megacomplex wanted to settle in the triangle of Gonesse, in the Val d'Oise.
It was the typical example of the artificialization of an extremely fertile zone.
France has a large artificial surface (5.4% of the territory). Why do the French have this appetite for artificialisation? Who are responsible for it?
France does indeed have a larger artificial surface than the European average (4.2% in 2018 according to Eurostat data), but it is much smaller than in Belgium (11.4%) or the Netherlands ( 12.1%).
We must therefore qualify.
For example, in Brittany, on the coast, there are many more dwellings than inhabitants present on the territory (in Carnac, there are 8,681 dwellings in 2019 according to INSEE for a permanent population of only 4,236 inhabitants!) , hence the feeling of creeping concretization.
Laurent Chalard
However, there are still specific explanatory factors for France.
The first is that France is the most touristic country in the world.
It is a country where there are many second homes and tourist residences.
The number of dwellings is consecutively much higher than the number of dwellings necessary to house the population.
For example, in Brittany, on the coast, there are many more dwellings than inhabitants present on the territory (in Carnac, there are 8,681 dwellings in 2019 according to INSEE for a permanent population of only 4,236 inhabitants!) , hence the feeling of creeping concreteness.
France, since the 1960s, has allowed itself to be totally overwhelmed by the development of mass distribution.
Laurent Chalard
The second characteristic is France's attraction to supermarkets, hypermarkets and more generally to peripheral commercial activity areas.
France, since the 1960s, has allowed itself to be completely overwhelmed by the development of large-scale distribution through unsuitable commercial urban planning policies, which have not prevented the nibbling of spaces on the outskirts of cities and are the one of the main drivers of land take in France.
This is due to the choice made by the State to favor mass distribution over small businesses.
This choice was not made by other countries such as the Netherlands: only non-food businesses were authorized on the outskirts of cities.
It is a question of legislation.
It should also be noted that in France, municipal fragmentation has benefited mass distribution.
Indeed, the latter put the municipalities in competition with each other, which enabled it to obtain land quickly.
It was impossible for a very long time to prevent this development.
A third, more recent element is the boom in logistics.
France, because of its location at the heart of Europe, a passageway between Southern Europe and Northern Europe, has seen the development of numerous warehouse areas for logistics purposes;
they are very heavy consumers of space.
They are the ones that consume the most space in relation to the number of jobs.
On the Mediterranean coast as in Brittany, this diffuse suburban development is a heavy consumer of space.
This distinguishes us from Spain, for example, where the cities are denser and more concentrated.
Laurent Chalard
A final element comes into play: the importance of individual housing.
In France, individual housing dominates (55.2% of housing in 2019 according to INSEE), especially in peri-urban and rural areas.
In particular, it is a diffuse individual housing model that dominates in certain regions: on the Mediterranean coast as in Brittany, this diffuse suburban development is a major consumer of space.
This distinguishes us from Spain, for example, where cities are denser and more concentrated, especially for main residences.
There are more urban collective habitats.
What are the consequences for the landscape?
The "city entrances" of almost all French cities now look alike: the landscape is severely degraded, some speak of "ugly France".
It is a minority France in terms of portions of territory, but it is the France of all cities.
This implies that since the Glorious Thirties, the outskirts of French cities have been made "ugly", especially since these commercial areas have low quality facilities.
In the United Kingdom, supermarkets are often built of bricks and are in the heart of cities, of a district, and not in the outskirts, built of sheet metal.
There is a form of double jeopardy on the landscape plan of the French peripheral commercial development model: it is qualitatively horrible through the massive use of sheet metal, and consumes a lot of space on the periphery.
We have really damaged the landscapes of our French cities and the actors of the territories bear a strong responsibility for what happened.
Small towns artificialize territories little and the fact of prohibiting them the artificialization of soils is to definitively ratify their decline.
Laurent Chalard
What are the consequences of this law in the short term? Won't the municipalities seek to build quickly before they can no longer do so? Can we take stock after one year?
Perhaps the most important question is that of rural areas.
As always, this technocratic law is taken from above, and therefore applies uniformly throughout the territory.
However, the question of limiting the artificialization of soils in large metropolises and medium-sized towns, where there are the most peripheral constructions and where their growth is concentrated, makes sense from an ecological point of view, but for small Commons makes no sense.
The small towns artificialise the territories little and the fact of prohibiting them the artificialisation of the grounds, it is to definitively ratify their decline.
We do not leave growth prospects to territories which in any case consume very little soil.
I think that the decrees should distinguish sparsely populated territories where room for maneuver could be left to small municipalities, in the case for example where a company is going to settle there or wishes to expand, so as not to burden the prospects for economic recovery, in particular reindustrialisation, of a rural France, which is not doing well.
For the moment, it is difficult to make a real observation.
We don't have the 2022 figures yet, but if there was a slight rebound in single-family housing construction in 2021, it was due to the post-Covid period.
We remain on figures much lower than what was observed in the 2000s. In 2021, according to SDES data, we have 163,000 individual housing units started in France, against 259,500 in 2006. We are far from the 2006 peak.
This is reflected in the field of business premises: in April 2021, still according to the SDES, 24.2 million square meters were started against 32.6 million square meters in 2012. Before the “Climate and Resilience” law , a decline had therefore already begun.
It is too early to take stock;
the first coercive decrees have not yet appeared.
Both the housing market and the business market are more dependent on demographic developments in the country and access to mortgage credit, which has tended to decline in recent months with the Ukrainian crisis, and the development of economic activity directly linked to the Ukrainian crisis as well.
Will the municipalities grant building permits at all costs before this is no longer possible?
It is in the realm of the unknown.
On the one hand, there may be a desire on the part of certain municipalities to act in this way, but at the same time there must also be a demand.
It is a real market of supply and demand.