The developments in the last few days of the seven-month-old Russian-Ukrainian war have been dazzling.
Four states under partial control of Russia are about to be put into Russia, the "partial mobilization" of the Russian State Duma and President Vladimir Putin, Putin's more explicit nuclear threat, the sudden exchange of Russian-Ukrainian prisoners, etc. It has caused different speculations about the direction of the situation from the outside world.
But an indisputable fact is that the war has entered another phase.
From the announcement to the implementation of the "partial mobilization" of the four state government's investment in Russia (23rd to 27th), with the goal of recruiting 300,000 reservists, to the "partial mobilization" that Putin warned that the wind of nuclear blackmail could blow back to the West The more obvious threats seem to show Putin's will to go all-out in Ukraine regardless of domestic and foreign risks.
Heavy domestic and foreign political risks
In Lugansk, which is being counterattacked by the Ukrainian army, nearly 40% of the land in Donetsk is still in the hands of the Ukrainian army, Kherson is facing the slow advance of the Ukrainian army, Zaporozhye While the capital of Zaporizhzhia is still in the hands of Ukraine, the legitimacy of this referendum on membership in Russia is obviously far less than the referendum in Crimea in 2014.
What's more, the people of these four states have fled in large numbers, and the results of the referendum are difficult to be representative.
Moreover, this logic of "inhabitant self-determination" is definitely not within the scope of neutral countries with potential separatist forces in Turkey, India, China, etc. that can be accepted.
A few days ago, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has called on Russia to return Ukrainian territory, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi said today is not the time for war, and Xi Jinping has remained relatively neutral after meeting with Putin at the SCO summit. In addition, the "betrayal" of Kazakhs' insistence on neutrality has appeared in Russia's backyard, the border conflict between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, and Azerbaijan is also challenging Russia's theoretical military protection of Armenia. Putin's nuclear threat will further increase Centrifugal forces of these neutral and traditional spheres of influence.
Putin claims that the West intends to destroy Russia.
(AP)
Since most people in Russia are extremely resistant to the war affecting their normal life even if they support "special military operations", Putin's "partial mobilization" may trigger a rebound in popular sentiment, making his support similar to the hard push of retirement age reform in 2018 The difficult situation that fell by nearly 30% was staged again.
Recently, the State Duma has legislated to increase the penalty for resisting the mobilization order, and Putin's mobilization order did not mention "partial" mobilization nor clearly set the upper limit of mobilization personnel, etc., all of which have intensified the risk of public opinion rebound.
In fact, after its mobilization order was launched, "how to break an arm" (to avoid military service) became a hot search term on Google in Russian, direct flights out of Russia were quickly sold out, and rumors of street demonstrations against mobilization in Russia caused the Developments such as the arrest of 1,000 people indirectly show the political risks of "partial mobilization" for Putin.
The so-called "artists are bold," what is Putin doing so boldly to take on countless political risks?
Automatic Victory after Public Commitment to Russia?
Radical nationalists who have previously criticized Putin for not being aggressive enough and ordinary Russians still living a normal life despite the national disaster generally welcomed Putin's decision to hold a referendum on membership in Russia.
From Margarita Simonyan, editor-in-chief of Rossiya Segodnya, to Konstantin Malofeyev, a Russian nationalist and wealthy businessman, the war could end soon.
Moscow has armed men bringing reactionary demonstrators.
(AP)
When all four Ukrainian states have become de jure Russian territory through referendums, Ukrainian offensives (and not retreating from local Ukrainian-controlled areas) will also become invasions of Russia, and Russia's nuclear weapons use principles have allowed Russia to use conventional weapons. The use of nuclear weapons in wars when there is an existential threat to the nation.
Malofeyev pointed out that there are only two possibilities, one is Russian victory, and the other is nuclear war.
He believes that if Ukraine does not give up the attack, that is, Russia cannot win immediately, and Russia, which cannot lose, will have to use nuclear weapons.
However, as Putin said, Ukraine has previously launched attacks on Russian territories such as Belgorod and Kursk on the border. May also officially admitted responsibility for the attack on the Russian air base in Crimea, but Russia has never responded to such an "invasion", let alone an escalation of the level of nuclear weapons.
With such historical experience, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky once again stated at the UN General Assembly that Ukraine will take back all its territory by force.
Can local mobilization reverse the saw?
Other less radical nationalists, even if they do not think that Russia will use nuclear weapons immediately, believe that the mobilization order has brought the Russian-Ukrainian war into a new situation of "no return", which will change the previous situation of Russia's "left-handed" and Ukrainian The tragic situation of the army's counterattack.
But can the mobilization order reverse the tug of war?
While Russia claims to have more than 2 million reservists, and Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu has stated that the number of mobilizable personnel is as high as 25 million, according to a 2019 study by the RAND Corporation, there are participants in monthly and annual routines. There are only about four or five thousand people in military training, and as late as the end of August 2021, Russia launched a plan to recruit reservists to participate in regular military training.
It can be seen that even if the Russian government can persuade 300,000 reservists to join the war, they will have to be retrained before they can be sent to the battlefield.
Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu speaks on TV in Moscow on September 21, 2022.
He said that Ukraine's trade power was only 200,000, with 60,000 killed and nearly 50,000 wounded, while Russia's death toll was only 6,000. However, it is difficult to explain why Russia, which has a front line of the same length as Ukraine, still has half of its enemies withdrawn from the battlefield. To mobilize new recruits to fight.
(AP)
The 3rd Army Corps, newly formed by volunteer soldiers in June this year, can serve as a reference for new recruits.
This nearly 10,000-strong unit formed a team in July and underwent a month of training, equipped with more advanced Russian tanks, and sent it to the Russian-Ukrainian battlefield in August.
Before the Ukrainian offensive against northeastern Kharkiv, the 3rd Army Corps was sent to Kharkiv to strengthen its defenses, but finally fled under the advance of the Ukrainian army, leaving behind many tanks and armored vehicles.
If Putin's "partial mobilization" this time wants to avoid the history of the Third Army Corps from repeating itself, I am afraid that in the fields of training, equipment, formation, etc., it will take more time and planning to redeploy, and it will not be achieved in an instant. thing.
The Institute for War Studies (ISW), a Washington think tank, believes that this Russian mobilization will not reverse the war situation within this year, and may have a significant impact in the coming year, calling on Ukraine and Western countries not to underestimate and not take it seriously. Estimate this mobilization.
After the partial mobilization, under the dimension of conventional warfare, there are three possible developments: (1) the existing "energy card" will take effect, and the European front for Ukrainian aid will collapse after the winter; A successful counter-offensive took place in a few months' time, and a large tract of land was recaptured; (3) the two sides continued the tug-of-war, which was delayed until next spring.
Since Germany's natural gas storage has exceeded 90%, EU countries have also introduced a series of policies to deal with energy shortages in winter. French and German leaders also criticized the Russian invasion as "imperialism" in their speeches at the UN General Assembly. to the possibility of the collapse of the European Aid-Ukraine Front.
Although the Ukrainian army is advancing slowly in Kherson and Luhansk-Kharkov at the moment, it seems that it will be very difficult to repeat the rapid counter-offensive of Kharkov under the increased vigilance of the Russian side. .
Therefore, the chances of the war dragging on are high, and Russia's victory depends on its population, general armament, and available resources, which ultimately also outnumber Ukraine's.
The Kharkov-Luhansk front as of September 21.
Ukraine is advancing in the key city of Lyman.
(ISW)
Unlimited upgrade possibilities
The premise of this judgment, of course, is that the war will not fall into a situation of infinite escalation launched by the Russian side because Ukraine continues to attack the four regions of Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson and Zaporozhye.
And even if Putin decides to escalate the war, nuclear weapons are not the only possibility.
In Putin's televised speech on the 21st, when he explicitly mentioned "nuclear weapons", he often contrasted it with the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons against Russia by the West. In the paragraph that emphasized the maintenance of Russia's territorial integrity, he used "we All weapon systems at hand".
While nuclear weapons are included in the sense of the word, nuclear weapons are not the only option.
But this does not mean that nuclear weapons are not the only "valid" option.
In theory, Putin could turn a partial mobilization into a general mobilization, or even a formal declaration of war, as a further escalation.
But as mentioned above, this is not only a more serious risk of public sentiment rebound, but also mobilization has no immediate battlefield effect, and the declaration of war itself may be able to fully invest Russia's industrial power into arms production, but what Russia lacks is high-tech. Modern weapons, not artillery, ammunition and tanks and armored vehicles, are also difficult to reverse the tug of war with these new production capacities under the high-tech ban in the West.
Another strategy often cited by Russian nationalists is an all-out attack on Ukraine's livelihood infrastructure.
For example, after the Ukrainian Kharkov counter-offensive, the Russian army used missiles to attack the power supply and water supply infrastructure in Kharkov, and also hit Zelensky's hometown and the central city of Kryvyi Rih. dams, leading to downstream flooding.
However, Russia has insufficient weapons for precision strikes, and it is extremely difficult to carry out such an offensive in full scale.
This difficulty is clearly visible from the fact that the Russian army has still not been able to clean up the Ukrainian air defense system and gain air superiority.
Zelensky spoke at the UN General Assembly via video.
(AP)
Therefore, if the Russian military wants to avoid the "slow victory" of the tug-of-war, but to quickly defeat Ukraine, it will use less harmful tactical nuclear weapons (rather than strategic nuclear weapons that can cause large-scale casualties) to launch a warning attack on Ukraine, Seems to be the least cost effective option for Russia.
But the first use of nuclear weapons will bring the diplomatic risk of betrayal and separation in the international arena, and even the devastating crisis of nuclear war and the third world war. For Putin, this step is absolutely a desperate gamble.
Use advance as retreat to promote talks with war?
To avoid the dangers that may be brought about by the tug-of-war or infinite escalation, a solution at the negotiating table is of course the best way out.
On the same day that Putin announced "partial mobilization" to escalate the war, Russia and Ukraine also reached an agreement on the exchange of prisoners under the mediation of Turkey and Saudi Arabia. In addition to the release of 10 prisoners from the United States, Britain, Morocco and other nationalities, Russia also 215 Ukrainians were released, and Ukraine will return 55 prisoners of Russians or pro-Russian Ukrainians, including pro-Putin wealthy Ukrainian businessman and politician Viktor Medvedchuk.
This has to be said to be a little light in the haze of war.
Putin's four-state entry referendum and "partial mobilization" may also be a means of advancing and retreating and promoting peace through war.
The premise for Russia and Ukraine to reach the negotiating results is that both sides can go down the stairs.
In Putin's televised speech, it is not difficult to find a gap: on the one hand, Putin supports the referendum of four Ukrainian states to join Russia, on the other hand, he insists on solving the whole Donbas (press: only Luhansk and Donets are included) Croatia) remains the main target of its military operations unchanged.
Interpreted from a good-faith perspective, this creates the possibility of a compromise between Russia and Ukraine: Ukraine can accept the Russian influence or autonomous status of Luhansk and Donetsk, while Russia can return to Ukraine the already public investment Russia's Zaporozhye and Kherson Russian-held areas.
Against the backdrop of a tug-of-war and a possible weakening of Western aid, the exchange could constitute a pull for Ukraine to return to the negotiating table, or allow Putin to declare to the Chinese the results of a "special military operation".
And the battlefield pressure that Putin mobilizes over time will become the thrust that drives Ukraine back to the negotiating table.
At the moment when Russia and Ukraine are facing tit-for-tat, the imagination of such peace talks seems to be impossible.
But how could Putin's invasion be considered impossible before the war began?
Why did Putin choose war mobilization over some form of retreat?
Putin escalates the war: Can the public investment in Russia and mobilization of 300,000 people to participate in the war reverse the war in Ukraine?
[International Video] Putin ordered local mobilization of 1,300 demonstrators in many parts of Russia. The situation in Russia and Ukraine | Putin announced that the increase in troops may be postponed until next year. The war will end in a short period of time