DER SPIEGEL:
Ms. Fix, Russian dictator Vladimir Putin has ordered a partial mobilization and is seeking to annex occupied territories in Ukraine.
Does this mark the beginning of a new phase of the invasion?
Fix:
Yes, we are now entering the most dangerous phase of this war yet.
The partial mobilization is Putin's admission that he would lose the war if he didn't act now.
It is a step taken from a position of weakness.
But it doesn't necessarily mean that Russia will win.
The mobilization will cause a lot of problems for Russia.
Just sending more men to war while the quality of soldiers, training and equipment does not match that of the Ukrainians will not make Russia more successful.
Most importantly, it will take time to complete the partial mobilization.
And the West will, in all likelihood, use this time to further arm Ukraine.
DER SPIEGEL:
What does Putin's move mean for Ukraine?
Fix:
It poses new risks for Ukraine and the West.
Ukraine must be prepared for the war to drag on.
The West's hope of eventually reaching a negotiated settlement with Putin has now receded even further into the distance.
DER SPIEGEL:
To what extent will Russia's partial mobilization change the balance of power on the battlefield?
Fix:
The Russian defense minister has announced that 300,000 reservists will be called up for military service.
That's a high number, and we'll see if he can really achieve it.
The decree issued for this purpose mentions quotas to be set for different regions.
There will not be 300,000 troops deployed to Ukraine at once – the mobilization will only be felt in the medium term.
It will not remedy the structural weaknesses that the Russian army has shown in recent months.
DER SPIEGEL:
Putin's army won't suddenly become more powerful?
Fix:
Russia will try to use the new troops to stabilize areas it has conquered and prevent a collapse of the army in those places.
But it won't be able to launch new offensives.
Russia has difficulty producing modern, high-tech equipment.
It will struggle to equip soldiers with even such basic items as winterized clothing.
The strategic advantages that the Ukrainian forces now have in this war continue to give them a good chance of being able to fight and win this war offensively.
But it will take time.
DER SPIEGEL:
How will partial mobilization affect the morale of Russian troops?
Fix:
Russia has indefinitely extended the contracts of those soldiers who are already in Ukraine.
If you were serving on a three or six-month contract and now suddenly see no perspective of ever getting out of this war, that is, of course, incredibly demoralizing.
Furthermore, inexperienced troops tend to worsen morale rather than improve it.
DER SPIEGEL:
Can Russia prepare many soldiers for war in a short period of time?
Fix:
Many officers who could conduct training are tied up in Ukraine.
The Russians no longer have the same resources they did in Soviet times.
Moreover, the Russian army is under enormous time pressure to secure the conquered territories with new troops as quickly as possible.
Russia went to war with the assumption that it would be over quickly and that no new recruits would be needed for that reason.
The partial mobilization was not part of the plan.
Putin wanted to avoid it at all costs.
Six months ago it would have been inconceivable that he would make such an imposition on the Russian population.
DER SPIEGEL:
Why is Putin taking this risk?
Fix:
He was under pressure from two directions.
First, by nationalists, by right-wingers and right-wing radicals, some of whom are within his own security apparatus and have long been demanding that Russia invest more in this war.
Second, Putin must demonstrate success to his own citizens in order to maintain his legitimacy.
He doesn't want to show weakness toward liberal forces that disagree with his regime.
DER SPIEGEL:
Does that mean the escalation was foreseeable?
Fix:
It came as a surprise to me.
When Putin has been under pressure in the past, he has often reacted indecisively and looked for middle ground.
I expected that he would try to avoid mobilization through more covert recruitment, like what is taking place in prisons and penal camps.
Partial mobilization is a surprisingly clear step, even if it is not yet full mobilization out of consideration for the population and the logistics it would require.
It suggests that the threat of losing this war is considered very real in Moscow.
DER SPIEGEL:
How should the West react to Putin's escalation?
Fix:
Russia wants to draw a border around the Ukrainian territories it already occupies.
Ukraine will respond to this with attacks to make it clear that the expected annexation is unacceptable.
In this kind of situation, the West cannot deny Ukraine counter-attacks.
Not if one is convinced that the occupied territories belong to Ukraine and that is has the right to liberate them.
There is also a principle at stake here.
Russia has already set a precedent in Crimea.
If it becomes the modus operandi of Russian policy to annex territories and declare them untouchable through sham referendums, this will have consequences beyond Ukraine.
DER SPIEGEL:
What, specifically, should Americans and Europeans do about it?
Fix:
The West will impose further sanctions against Moscow.
And it will use the window of opportunity until Russia can use the newly recruited soldiers to arm Ukraine even further militarily.
DER SPIEGEL:
The West should supply even more weapons to Ukraine?
German Leopard tanks, for example?
Fix:
I think it is likely that will happen, yes.
DER SPIEGEL:
How dangerous is a dictator like Putin when he has his back against the wall?
Fix:
Putin's escalation policy left the war even more closely to his person.
He is apparently willing to take enormous domestic political risks to turn the conflict to his advantage.
For many people in Ukraine, but also in Russia, this development is a tragedy.
DER SPIEGEL:
How seriously should Putin's threats of a nuclear strike be taken?
Fix:
They're not new.
Putin has merely repeated them once again.
This nuclear rhetoric is dangerous.
As before, the use of nuclear weapons ultimately harms Russia much more than it helps.
I therefore consider such a scenario unlikely.
DER SPIEGEL:
Is there any turning back for Vladimir Putin now?
Fix:
He would have to come under enormous domestic pressure to step back.
And at the moment, I don't see a step back in the sense of serious negotiations with Ukraine or even a withdrawal.
DER SPIEGEL:
How will this war end?
Fix:
There is no scenario for a clear end to this war.
We will see bitter military battles, but not at the end in the conventional sense whereby one party loses on the battlefield, admits defeat and then negotiates.
Instead, the war will lead to lasting instability, both in Ukraine and in Russia.
DER SPIEGEL:
There will be no peace as long as Putin is in power?
Fix:
No.
As long as Moscow, whether under Putin or a similarly minded successor, pursues policies with such ambitions, there will be no peace.