What are the chances of a Russian nuclear attack?

Over the past few days I have received several emails from correspondents stating that the "risk" of nuclear war is "small", or that it is "unlikely".

It is worth reflecting carefully on the meaning of these predictions.

What does "unlikely" mean when we talk about a nuclear war?

I can translate it for you.

It means: “I have no idea.

But I have a feeling."

That hunch is based on assumptions that may seem plausible to us, but of which we cannot be sure.

We think we know what Vladimir Putin considers to be of strategic interest to him.

We believe that some brave soul in the Russian command structure would heroically refuse to carry out a presidential order to launch a nuclear attack.

We might think that these weapons are as dysfunctional as their tanks, which would explode on launch or mid-flight.

Or we think there could be a coup to topple Putin before he has a chance to pull the trigger.

We can assess the probability of an earthquake and assign a number to it.

But with this there is no way to do it.

We have no data or probability distribution, and the usual empty words do not help us either.

The only thing we have is information from public sources and our security services.

They may have information about whether someone is plotting against Putin.

Or whether Putin faces domestic opposition.

But we have to treat that information professionally.

Remember the debacle of weapons of mass destruction?

Back then, many Western governments did not apply the highest verification standards.

We must ask ourselves: Is the source reliable?

Is there a second source?

Is there additional corroboration?

Do these sources have an agenda that could lead them to distort the truth or lie?

Our Western thinking about risk is rooted in the modern concept of probability, developed by the great Russian mathematician Andrei Kolmogorov in the 1930s. Probability and statistics allow us to calculate the numerical probability of an earthquake or help us make forecasts about the economy.

But this framework is not useful in this case.

Right now, it's best to think not about quantifiable risk, but about unquantifiable uncertainty.

A decade before Kolmogorov released his famous axioms of probability, the American economist Frank Knight developed a concept of uncertainty derived from partial knowledge, also known as

uncertainty .

In this framework, the most we can do is make intuitive judgments and improve them as we go along.

And that is exactly how we should approach the scenario of nuclear war: with humility and doubt.

Clearly there are scenarios that speak against the use of nuclear weapons by Russia.

But I can think of two in which the bomb finally goes off.

The first is one in which Putin realizes that he has lost the war, in which he knows that he personally will not survive, and in which he decides to take on the Western European enemy.

What speaks against this scenario is that the Russian elite could prevent it.

They obviously have not the slightest desire to perish in a nuclear holocaust.

It is clear that my scenario will not occur.

But it is also possible that a last-minute intervention by the generals and oligarchs will not happen, or it will happen and fail, or it will happen and succeed but come too late.

Let's not pretend that it is in our hands to write the end of this particular Hollywood script.

In my second scenario, Putin calculates that launching a smallish tactical nuclear weapon in Ukraine would split the Western alliance.

Specifically, it would break the Biden-Scholz axis.

From the beginning of the war, I have maintained that the Germans are the weak link in the Western alliance.

This is also known to Putin, who could come to the conclusion that this is his best weapon.

Here's how this scenario could play out: Joe Biden has claimed that a nuclear detonation in Ukraine would trigger NATO's Article 5 collective defense clause, based on the spread of radiation to nearby NATO territories.

I find it hard to see how the Germans would accept this argument.

I cannot be sure of that, if only because it is an unprecedented situation.

What I do know from personal experience is that the Germans are the most paranoid in the world about everything nuclear.

Despite severe gas shortages and rising electricity prices, they are willing to shut down their remaining nuclear power plants in the winter and spring.

Do we really think that the Germans have the same perception of nuclear risk as the British or the Americans?

What you read from German think tanks is not representative of the general sentiment in the country.

Now think about the other things that would happen in this case: world stock markets would crash, as would the euro and the pound;

German industry would stop producing;

Europe would sink into the worst economic depression in its history.

There are good reasons for Putin not to try.

There are many more ways for it to go wrong than for it to go right.

But as a strategic scenario, this is no less plausible than the scenario of the unknown soldier who refuses to push the button.

I cannot attribute probabilities to my scenarios.

But I think you can't either.

What I think we should do is look at them with an open mind.

This is the only numerical prediction I'm willing to risk.

The chances of this happening are slim to none.

If there is finally a nuclear war, it will be preceded by multiple predictions about its high improbability.

Wolfgang Münchau

is Director of www.eurointelligence.com

Translation of News Clips.

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