The current list of Chiefs of Staff, and the Blue and White that preceded it, revealed a disturbing phenomenon of strategic unanimity in the ranks of our military command. First, almost all senior officers recently leaving the General Staff are partners in the Oslo strategy, which went bankrupt a long time ago.
Its renewal seems to personalities like Gadi Eisenkot and Benny Gantz to be a vital interest of Israel.
Second, it seems that most of them tend to condition Israel's strategic moves in agreement with the Americans, and even in advance coordination with them.
Dealing with the Iranian nuclear issue raises this question acutely.
Although the discussions on the subject are secret, naturally, but from what little is known, it seems that even here most of the officers do not favor an overly independent position of Israel.
But conformist conservatism around one unified opinion, this or that, could be very harmful to clarifying Israel's strategic path.
Hierarchical organizations like the army are destined to develop such uniformity.
Commands tend to please their commanders, and commanders naturally want to appoint their likes.
The conservatism embedded in the army sometimes arouses internal opposition.
The last example is the severe criticism that Major General (Ret.) Yitzhak Barik made of the conduct of the army.
It is also possible to recall Brigadier General Shimon Neve's attempt to reform Israeli military thought, from the mid-1990s until close to the Second Lebanon War.
But these and other examples were more about the military's operating methods, and less about the country's overall strategy.
In her affairs, a gray routine of thought is evident: adherence to the alliance with the US to the point of almost losing independence, and adherence to slogans such as "separation" or "courage for peace".
The high command of the military, any military, is not the best incubator for cultivating creative strategic thought.
First, because of its inherent conservatism.
Second, due to its closure - army life is relatively isolated from culture, politics, and economics.
Going to school happens at a relatively old age, and there are fewer chances to cultivate a political or intellectual spirit.
The dedication and professionalism of most of the officers should not be taken lightly, and a worthy captain for Israel could grow out of them - but the chances are not high.
Against this background, it is possible to understand, for example, why Gantz and Ashkenazi reacted with a conservative contraction to Trump and Netanyahu's "Plan of the Century", and tried to thwart it, as evidenced by the recent testimony of the director general of the Ministry of Defense, Amir Eshel. Against this background, the list of Gantz's chiefs of staff should be examined and Eisenkot.
Their rich military career did not qualify them, for example, to deal with the enormous changes that the war in Ukraine is causing, and will further cause, in the international political arena.
The fight against terrorism does not necessarily cultivate a thorough understanding of the whole struggle between us and the Arabs, on all its sides, the demographic, economic, political and cultural ones, alongside the military ones.
The list of the chiefs of staff is built on the assumption that the senior officer is the engine that should lead the wagons in which we all sit.
It's a mistake, maybe in good faith.
Israel has had three prime ministers who came from among the senior officers.
One of them, Ehud Barak, is one of the most failed prime ministers with the least political understanding that have ever been here.
Rabin and Sharon, whatever the assessment of their tenure, reached the leadership position after long years of political and political training, and operated from systems with a political tradition, and not from temporary and hollow frameworks, so-called parties that were established not long ago.
Gantz and Eisenkot have not acquired political experience, and so far have not indicated a new strategic path for Israel.
Eisenkot calls for a return to the pattern of the failed attempt by Rabin and Peres to settle the conflict over the land.
Gantz is wary of such statements, but his actions show that this is his way.
Their military career in itself is not a guarantee of their ability to lead the country, and perhaps the opposite, in a certain sense.
Our strategic leadership should be sought elsewhere, and not necessarily in the army.
were we wrong
We will fix it!
If you found an error in the article, we would appreciate it if you shared it with us
