A step away from war: this is how the Israeli attack on Iran was stopped at the last moment

3 times Israel was about to bomb the reactor, but the heads of the security establishment, with the help of the president and the most powerful rabbi in Israel, fought with all their might against Netanyahu and Barak.

Who was called "Fox", how Peres succeeded under Netanyahu, and how the relationship between the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defense ended: "He sold me to Obama" | Excerpt from the new biography "The Netanyahu Code"

Lucky luck

04/10/2022

Tuesday, 04 October 2022, 09:19 Updated: 09:41

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Netanyahu attacked: "The nuclear agreement with Iran is several times worse than the previous one" (Credit: Contact)

It was almost midnight on Monday, October 24, 2011. Benjamin Netanyahu left the Prime Minister's House in Jerusalem, walked to the convoy of secured cars that were waiting with open doors and was swallowed inside one of them.

A few minutes later, the convoy crossed the city center and began to climb up the steep road to the Haredi Har Nof neighborhood.

The prime minister was embalmed in an expensive suit and heavily made-up, a remnant of the joint photo shoot with the mayor of New York, Michael Bloomberg, with whom he met at his home earlier.

Bloomberg is one of the type of people who charmed Netanyahu.

Jewish-American, world-rich and friend of Israel.

He also represented to him the American spirit and culture that he admires and considers himself one of their flesh.

Over the years, even when he was in the opposition, Netanyahu made sure to maintain a warm relationship with Bloomberg, which included meetings in New York and Jerusalem.

That evening, their meeting lasted longer than it was allotted.

Being in the company of his distinguished friend put Netanyahu in an uplifted mood.

Conversations about American politics and New York gossip brought him back to his days as Israel's ambassador to the United Nations, one of the happiest periods of his life.

Now, through the darkened windows of the car, Netanyahu looked at the city's receding lights. This night held a great promise. He felt that he was facing A meeting that will decide his fate and the fate of the country.

Just then, a familiar, unsettling congestion spread through his nasal cavities, and he reached for his Otrivin drops.

Netanyahu used them a lot, and his associates made sure to scatter countless of them in the car, in drawers in the office and at home, and in their pockets.

At that time, the prime minister smoked a lot and did not give up the habit even on long trips, with the air conditioner running at full power and the windows closed for security reasons.

"I don't have many pleasures", he used to reason and asked in advance to be attached to drivers and security guards who are able to bear it.

On stressful days the symptoms worsened.

In one case, when he was staying at his home in Caesarea on a weekend, the condition deteriorated to the point of severe headaches, and after consulting with Zvika Berkovich, the family doctor and his close friend, he was evacuated by his security guards in Ishon Lil to the Hillel Yaffe hospital in Hadera.

The diagnosis was severe sinusitis.

He felt that he would decide the fate of the country.

Benjamin Netanyahu (Photo: Reuven Castro)

Only a few minutes passed from the moment he set off until his car approached house number 45 on Kabalan Street.

Inside one of the apartments in the gray-looking building, 91-year-old Rabbi Ovadia Yosef was waiting for him.

Since Netanyahu kept his coalition promises to the Shas, the relationship between him and the rabbi has blossomed, and the night meeting was meant to mark two happy events that happened a few days before: the rabbi wanted to thank Netanyahu for the return of the kidnapped soldier Gilad Shalit and congratulate him on his 62nd birthday.

The rabbi played a real role in Shalit's release.

He ordered the four Shas ministers to vote in favor of the controversial prisoner exchange deal, in which more than 1,000 prisoners and security detainees were released - the highest price Israel has ever paid for a single soldier. The fate of Shalit, who was held captive by Hamas for more than five years, united the public Netanyahu was euphoric in those days. His decision to carry out the deal, contrary to everything he preached for years about "surrendering to terror", made him, in the eyes of many of his opponents, a responsible leader, a pragmatist who is willing to pay a heavy political price, because he acted against his power base on the "hard" right. In the public opinion polls commissioned after the soldier's return, the Likud crossed the threshold of 30 mandates.

For about three decades, Ovadia Yosef's house served as an elaborate political control center, to which heads of government, ministers, and security officials made pilgrimages.

The rabbi took advantage of the fact that Shas was a Libra party and made it a central element in almost all governments since the 1980s. Rabin visited Yosef three times in 1992-1993 to convince him to support the Oslo Accords. Sharon met with him twice in 2005, before approval The disengagement plan. Olmert came to him in the first days of the Second Lebanon War. Now it's Netanyahu's turn. "Many times I say things that are accepted and seen as necessary later," he said a few hours before to the mayor of New York, echoing the prophecies of the rage of his great grandfather and his father The historian. He tried to recruit Bloomberg to the same topic he was going to present to Rabbi Yosef: stopping the Iranian bomb.

"Threats against the people of Israel" When the motorcade stopped at its destination, Netanyahu wore a cap and was led by his security guards through a back entrance, hidden from view.

Inside the house the lights were on, and cakes and juice were waiting for the guest.

A security team was deployed inside and along the open balcony overlooking the Judean Mountains.

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The relationship blossomed.

Rabbi Ovadia Yosef and Benjamin Netanyahu (Photo: Government Press Office)

This time, too, Netanyahu did not deviate from his custom, and was about two hours late.

The rabbi, desperate to wait for him, immersed himself in sacred studies.

Netanyahu was greeted by Shas ministers Eli Yishai and Ariel Atias. When he entered the rabbi with them, he didn't notice him at all. For many minutes Netanyahu looked at Yosef with interest, until Friday he intervened and said: "Your honor the rabbi.

The Prime Minister is here.

" "Ali, give it to him.

Let him continue.

don't disturb him

I enjoy watching the rabbi study Torah with such love," Netanyahu interrupted him with a wave of his hand.

"It's late," urged Yishai.

Netanyahu ignored him. In his efforts to warm the atmosphere for what he was going to say, he acted like a well-oiled marketing machine and harnessed all of his famous powers of persuasion to interest "My eldest daughter is religious," he said. "Like the women here, she also wears a headscarf."

A few more minutes passed, until Tuesday was fed up.

He approached Rabbi Yosef and drew his attention to the presence of the Prime Minister in the room.

Only then did the rabbi lift his head from the open book.

He was wearing ordinary clothes, and not the traditional embroidered robe and headdress that provoked laughter mixed with wonder outside the Torah world.

When he saw the guest, he gave him a warm fatherly look.

Suddenly Netanyahu raised his eyes dramatically to a spot on the ceiling.

"I ask to disconnect the cameras," he ordered.

The rabbi's house was photographed 24 hours a day, including the bedroom.

This intimate information was shared only by close family members, but Netanyahu was aware of the cameras and microphones operating in the guest room.

"The scene in which the prime minister of Israel, with excessive make-up, stands in the middle of the room, juggling his way into the rabbi's heart, looked like something out of a play," one of the Shas leader's assistants later described the scene.

Netanyahu was not satisfied with that.

Immediately afterwards he asked all the advisers to leave the room.

His chief of staff, Natan Eshel, remained in place as usual.

Netanyahu shot him a condescending look: "You too."

Eshel hurried to leave.

There are now four left in the room: Netanyahu, Yosef, Yishai and Atias.

After a small talk and blessings showered on him by the rabbi, for the decision to bring back Shalit and on the occasion of his birthday, Netanyahu began a monologue: "Your honor, the rabbi. There are threats against the people of Israel. I came to you because we are at a decisive moment. It may be that within days we will have to make the decision to attack Iran. We We are approaching the point of no return."

"The moment is near when it will be too late to attack."

Netanyahu (Photo: Reuven Castro)

The rabbi listened attentively.

Netanyahu sounded determined and complete with the decision.

He used Jewish-historical justifications: "This is the same Iran that tried to destroy the people of Israel. There was one Holocaust, and I will not let there be another. I will not leave our fate in the hands of the world. The moment is near when it will be too late to attack."

The rabbi nodded.

"According to all intelligence reports and assessments, the Iranian nuclear project is approaching a point where Israel will not be able to stop it."

"And what about America?"

asked the rabbi.

The possibility of a strategic damage to relations with the United States became more acute for him following his talks with the new American ambassador Dan Shapiro, a well-mannered Jew from Illinois who spoke basic Hebrew and made contact with the rabbi's court even before he started his position.

"It loves us. Help him," Yosef emotionally instructed the Shas leaders after their first meeting.

"Your honor, you know we can't trust the world," answered Netanyahu, who believed that at the moment of truth Obama might abandon Israel to its fate.

"Purim is just around the corner. We face the danger of annihilation by the rule of evil, as we did then. Alone."

"Can't wait?"

"Our planes are capable of hitting the nuclear facilities in a way that will delay the project for many, many years. We need time. If we don't act soon it will be too late. I prefer the Americans to attack, but in the meantime we have to prepare to do it alone."

Netanyahu, who estimated that he would be able to convince the rabbi easily, seemed surprised by the many and focused questions he pelted him with, despite the late hour.

"And what does Ya'alon say?"

The rabbi continued to make it difficult.

He highly valued the opinion of the former Chief of Staff and Minister of Strategic Affairs in the current government. For more than two decades he was consulted as a professional authority on security matters.

He is consulted as a professional authority in security matters.

Ya'alon (Photo: Reuven Castro)

In view of the sense of urgency that took over the room, and in a typical pattern of action to achieve the goal by all means, Netanyahu assured the rabbi: "Boogie will arrive today or tomorrow. I will take care of it personally."

Although Netanyahu knew that such a meeting would not help him, since Yealon was among the group opposed to an independent Israeli attack, but he also understood that he would not be able to prevent its existence.

When he got up to go, in a rare moment of closeness, the rabbi hugged him and said excitedly: "May God guide you with good advice to do the right thing. May God have mercy on the people of Israel, let's think and consider the matter."

The meaning was clear.

Despite the excellent atmosphere and apocalyptic tone, the rabbi refused to be a rubber stamp for an action that seemed adventurous to him.

Netanyahu's nightly persuasion meeting failed, but he did not intend to let go for a moment.

Netanyahu returned and spoke with the rabbi on this issue several more times.

It was just a handful of thousands of operations, covert and overt: military, intelligence, policy, political, propaganda and media, that he won and will win over.

From the moment he began his second term as prime minister, Netanyahu behaved as if fate had assigned him a historic role.

The fight against the Iranian bomb, which in his view threatens not only the State of Israel and the Jewish people, but the entire civilization, was the purpose of his rule.

Mazal Mualem, author of the biography "Zofen Netanyahu" (photo: courtesy of the photographers)

Deceit is essential in warfare

Despite their seniority and the close alliance between them, Netanyahu and Defense Minister Ehud Barak had difficulty obtaining agreement to attack Iran within the "Eight," the limited body of ministers that worked alongside the political-security cabinet and at the time became the main forum for discussions on the issue.

The only one who supported the attack was Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman.

Yuval Steinitz, the finance minister close to Netanyahu, was among the opponents but is considered to have aligned himself with his patron at the moment of truth.

This was also the assessment of Minister Moshe Ya'alon.

The dramatic differences in the political and security leadership were not revealed to the public, but in the first half of 2011 the heads of the security system changed one after the other: the Chief of Staff, Gabi Ashkenazi, the head of the Mossad, Meir Dagan, and the head of the Shin Bet, Yuval Diskin.

The three strongly opposed the attack on Iran, and upon their withdrawal broke all the dams.

They waged an unprecedented campaign against the move they called "Messianic".

The criticism was not without personal accounting - Netanyahu greatly reduced Dagan's influence and did not extend his term, and did not appoint Diskin to head the Mossad even though he hinted to him that he was his preferred candidate - but it did show a fear of the consequences of such an operation: an all-out war and a national disaster.

The disappearance of the three seemingly removed the main obstacles towards making the decision to attack.

It is true that their replacements, Benny Gantz, Tamir Pardo and Yoram Cohen, also objected to the move, but as far as Netanyahu and Barak were concerned, the Chief of Staff, the head of the Mossad and the new head of the Shin Bet were much more comfortable clients.

The way there was through the eight, whose members could influence their colleagues in the government.

Since Shas had four ministers, who all voted as one, the bulk of Netanyahu's and Barak's persuasive efforts were directed at Eli Yishai, the party's representative at the prestigious forum. Yishai was an unusual figure in the group of eight. His military experience was as a sergeant in a transport unit, but years of sitting in the political cabinet Security, combined with common sense, gave him a deep understanding of security and geopolitical issues. Like all forum members, he also accumulated hundreds of hours in Iran as part of a "seminar" on behalf of Netanyahu and Barak.

The two did not spare experts, maps and numerical data about the centrifuges and the enriched uranium.

In addition to current security reviews, the seminar also included secret visits to the bases of the Air Force, the Intelligence Division, and the special units that trained around the clock on the bold attack plans.

Added to this were long personal conversations with Netanyahu and Barak, together and separately.

But despite the heavy pressure they put on him and despite his excellent relationship with Netanyahu and his affiliation with the ultra-right wing of the government, Yishai resolutely rebuffed the advances and fortified himself in his opposition.

As the interior minister in charge of the home front, he was troubled by his lack of preparation for a long war, in which missiles are fired every day at population centers.

"No time".

Netanyahu and Barak (Photo: Reuven Castro)

Barak and Netanyahu were surprised by the strength of Yishai's resistance.

His support group in the eight was ministers Dan Meridor, Benny Begin and Moshe (Boogie) Ya'alon.

They were as exposed as he was to the secret materials, the attack plans and the pressurizer, so he could talk to them freely.

They trusted him.

In the outer circle, President Shimon Peres and the American ambassador, Dan Shapiro, put all their weight on Yishai so that he would stand up to his opposition.

This is how the chairman of the Shas was marked by Netanyahu and Barak as a significant obstacle that must be removed from the path. The means: getting closer to Rabbi Ovadia Yosef.

As I remember, the night meeting with the rabbi was held at the end of October 2011, after the exchanges at the top of the security. As Netanyahu promised that night, soon A meeting was arranged between Yosef and Ya'alon, but the conversation between the two drove Barak and him even further away from their goal.

Ya'alon Slad Mebarak as a politician.

He thought he was manipulative.

Since he saw himself as no less a security authority, he found it difficult to come to terms with Barak's privileged position with Netanyahu.

He was convinced that the defense minister was motivated by a cynical political interest: creating a dependency between Netanyahu and him for the needs of his political survival.

Therefore, in his meeting with Rabbi Yosef, Ya'alon did not hesitate to raise doubts about Barak's motives.

"Israel should not attack alone now," he told the rabbi.

"We're not there yet."

"Netanyahu and Barak say there is no time," Yosef responded.

"Ehud Barak pushes everyone there hard. I suspect his motives. I'm not convinced."

"what does he want?"

asked the rabbi.

"He's very cunning and doesn't tell everything. I don't feel like I can trust him. I told Eli that too, he knows what I'm thinking."

After Ya'alon, Barak also came to the rabbi.

He came to the meeting in a high mood.

While waiting for him, he noticed a piano in the living room of the house and immediately sat down and started playing.

When he finished playing a Bach prelude, the rabbi's assistants applauded.

"Give me fifteen minutes, I'll turn it around," Barak boasted before the meeting.

He made a bitter mistake.

Despite the intelligence he gathered on the rabbi and the personal charm he exuded, not only was he unable to break through the wall of his opposition, but he also increased his fear.

"It's a fox," said the rabbi about him coming out of his house.

"This is dangerous for the Israelites. His words are not true."

Yaalon's message went through.

Not a disaster, not a picnic

At least three times Israel came close to exercising the military option in Iran, according to foreign sources.

According to Barak's version, in the fall of 2010 and 2011 and in the summer of 2012. For the first time, Dagan, Ashkenazi and Diskin stood as a wall in a decisive meeting where they realized that Netanyahu and Barak were going to order Chief of Staff Ashkenazi to "step over the system", a term that in military jargon means one step before going into action. Ashkenazi said at the time that the army had no operational capability. Dagan even came to the home of Attorney General Yehuda Weinstein and warned him that the attack could lead to war and therefore it must be approved in the government, and not in a limited forum.

On another occasion, when they left another tense security discussion, the head of the General Amos Yadlin, to calm down Ashkenazi.

"You know they can't do that."

Ashkenazi replied: "Even if there is one percent like that I am not calm. What they are doing can easily degenerate into a war."

The following years proved Shidlin right.

Netanyahu and Barak did not attack in the fall of 2011. They did not execute their plan in the summer of 2012 either, when they signaled to the heads of the security establishment, the political establishment, the American administration and the Israeli public that the attack was a matter of days to a few weeks.

The informal efforts to curb Netanyahu and Barak were coordinated by Peres.

"We all came to him at the president's house, and he pulled the strings," says a former senior official in the security establishment.

Netanyahu knew at least some of his moves.

"Shimon said that Bibi told him: Remember that everything comes to me in the end," recalls one of Peres' advisers.

"He meant that Shimon was undermining him in front of the heads of the security establishment and the Americans. This was of course true. Dagan, Ashkenazi and Diskin talked to him a lot claiming that they were afraid of an attack that would lead to a major war and the destruction of relations with the United States."

In June 2012, at an update meeting between Netanyahu and Peres, the president tried to convince the prime minister if the attack on Iran was imminent.

Netanyahu did not deny this.

Peres tried to maintain restraint: "It is possible to destroy a nuclear installation, but one would not know. Suppose we attack, and they will lower the reactor [under] the ground. What will we do then?"

Then he slammed him: "You have to take into account what the impact will be. We will be lepers in the world. After all, until now the world has not demanded from us what it has demanded from the Iranians. You have to think about what will happen here in the rear. How will we defend ourselves here against missiles every day."

In the first half of August, routine update talks were held in the president's office with the entire political and security elite, including Netanyahu and Barak.

The two hinted to him that the system was ready for the command to attack.

Peres is horrified.

He felt he had to prevent a disaster.

On the evening of August 15, he asked Ayelet Frish, his communications consultant, to arrange an urgent television interview for him.

What happened, she asked.

"I will not stand aside in the face of this madness. I have a moral obligation," he replied.

The next day, the former head of the Shin Bet, Avi Dichter, was to be appointed Minister of Homeland Defense. With the addition of Dichter, who retired from the Kadima party, Barak and Netanyahu could have obtained a majority in the cabinet.

"Tried to calm the spirits."

Amos Yadlin (Photo: Reuven Castro)

In this atmosphere of panic, Yonit Levy, the senior presenter of Channel 2 News, was invited to the President's residence.

Peres' headline in the interview was sharp and deadly for Netanyahu: "Israel cannot attack alone in Iran."

In the prime minister's office they went wild.

At night, one of the former heads of the security bodies called Peres and said to him: "Thank you, you did a great thing."

That summer, ahead of the presidential elections in the United States, the tension in the White House increased.

Obama, who ran for a second term, was unable to get assurances from Netanyahu and Barak that they would not surprise him before the elections in November.

Israeli offensive action before the elections was his nightmare.

One by one he sent senior officials of his government to Israel to monitor and warn.

On July 14, 2012, Tom Donilon, the American national security adviser, landed in Israel secretly.

The timing of the visit was not only due to the issue of the attack in Iran.

A week later, Mitt Romney, the Republican candidate in the presidential elections, was expected to arrive in Israel on a high-profile trip.

Romney won the support of the gambling magnate Sheldon Adelson, and unofficially but prominently also the support of Netanyahu, who was convinced of his victory.

The Romney-Adelson-Netanyahu triangle kept the American president from sleeping.

To undermine the effect of his opponent's visit, Obama signed a law at the same time to expand the security cooperation between the United States and Israel and transferred 70 million dollars to the Iron Dome project.

This is how he portrayed himself as a friend of Israel no less than his rival.

At the same time, with Donilon he delivered an unprecedented threat to Barak and Netanyahu: if you attack Iran, it will be interpreted as an attempt to interfere in the elections and impeach the president of the United States.

Two days later, at the end of a short stay in Cairo, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited Israel, after two years of refraining from visiting it.

She met with Netanyahu, Barak, Peres and Lieberman, probed whether Israel intends to attack and delivered a message similar to the one carried by Donilon.

A week later, on Saturday evening, July 28, Romney landed in Israel.

He portrayed himself as a friend of Israel.

Obama and Netanyahu (Photo: Reuters)

As I recall, Netanyahu and the Republican presidential candidate were old acquaintances, from their days as prodigies of the BCG consulting firm in Boston.

Netanyahu went out of his way to give Romney a public hug.

He held two sumptuous dinners for him.

One, at the King David Hotel with his wife and the Adelsons who came especially to Israel, a meal designed to help him with fundraising.

The second, an intimate meal at the house of the Netanyahu couple, to which Romney and his wife were invited as well as ministers Lieberman and Barak.

Barak decided to exclude his legs from the event.

In closed conversations, he severely criticized Netanyahu's interference in the American election system.

The incident did not prevent Netanyahu and Barak from presenting a united front during the visit of the US Secretary of Defense, Leon Panetta, to Israel on July 31, when Romney was still in the country.

During August, in briefings and background calls to journalists, they sounded coordinated and created the impression that the attack was a matter of weeks.

"I'm tired of all these intimidations," Netanyahu said at the time in briefings, "People bring me slides that are all meant for an investigative committee. I told them to stop speaking for the record. That I'm responsible. I believe that injury to the rear can be prevented with proper defense."

It seems that Netanyahu tried to create a feeling that he was determined to attack.

Netanyahu's statements sounded like arrows he was shooting at Chief of Staff Benny Gantz.

Barak and Netanyahu continued to gallop towards the target.

Ministers in the political-security cabinet feared that they would be called upon to vote for action in Iran when the planes were already in the air.

To concerned ministers, Barak said: "It will not be a picnic, but Israel will not be destroyed and we will not become lepers in the world. Those who oppose can resign. The responsibility lies with the Prime Minister and me. A nuclear Iran is more dangerous than a war that would break out because of a military attack."

In addition to the American administration, Russia and China also followed the moves of the Israeli Prime Minister and Defense Minister with vigilance and concern.

The three powers feared a war that would ignite the Middle East, shake the energy markets and lead to a rise in oil prices.

Even the most powerful intelligence agencies in the world could not know that it was political developments within Israel that would shelve the attack plan.

The cover of Mazal Moalem's book The Netanyahu Code (photo: official website, cover photo Abir Sultan, cover design Emri Zertal, Kinneret Zamora Beitan)

Ehud Natash

ב־30 באפריל 2012 הלך לעולמו בנציון נתניהו. כאשר בנימין נתניהו קם מהשבעה, הוא עלה לקברו של אביו והמשיך מיד לישיבת הממשלה, אך עיניו כבר היו נשואות אל הערב: אל כינוסה של ועידת הליכוד.

כמה חודשים לפני כן החליט נתניהו לנצל את נסיקתו בדעת הקהל בעקבות עסקת שליט ולהקדים את הבחירות לכנסת בכמעט שנה, לספטמבר 2012. כך יכול היה להבטיח את כהונתו השלישית. כדי להעניק לעצמו שליטה מוחלטת במפלגתו בעת מערכת הבחירות, הוא ביקש להיבחר כנשיא הזמני של ועידת הליכוד, תפקיד שהיה מקנה לו חופש פעולה לבצע שינויים בחוקת המפלגה לטובת שריון דמויות חדשות, מיזוג בין מפלגות והחלטה על הדרך שבה תיקבע רשימת הליכוד לכנסת. בשעות שלפני התכנסות הוועידה עמל ארוכות על הנאום שעמד לשאת בה. הוא חשב שיצלח את האירוע בקלות.

אלא שתוכניתו השתבשה כליל. בניגוד מוחלט לשבוע האבל, שבו נעטף מדי יום ביומו בחומם של אלפי מנחמים, הליכודניקים קיבלו את פניו בקריאות בוז רועמות והאגף הימני־קיצוני לא חדל מלקטוע את נאומו. נתניהו חש כי הוא מאבד שליטה על המתרחש. הוא גנז את ההכרזה על הקדמת הבחירות, הורה לבטל את ההצבעה מחשש שיתבזה ועזב את האולם חבוט ועצבני.

במשך הערב זרמו אל אהוד ברק דיווחים שוטפים על המתרחש בוועידת הליכוד. גורלו של שר הביטחון היה תלוי באותה הצבעה. הוא עמד אז בראשות סיעה בת חמישה חברים שהסקרים ניבאו את היעלמותה, ולו היה נתניהו מצליח להיבחר לתפקיד נשיא הוועידה, היה יכול לשריין אותו ברשימת המפלגה לכנסת. הדבר לא נעלם מעיני חברי הליכוד, וזאת היתה הסיבה לקבלת הפנים הזועפת. תבוסתו של ראש הממשלה הייתה מבחינת ברק צלצול השכמה.

כמה ימים לאחר מכן הצליח שר הביטחון לשנות את המצב כשתמך בלהט ברעיון לצרף לממשלה את שאול מופז, יושב ראש קדימה באותה עת, ואת 28 המנדטים של מפלגתו. נתניהו, שאירועי ועידת הליכוד העלו בו היסוסים לגבי הקדמת הבחירות, ראה בהרחבה של הקואליציה מהלך חלופי מוצלח. בלילה שבין 8 ל־9 במאי התייצב לצד מופז במסיבת עיתונאים בכנסת ושניהם הודיעו: אין בחירות, יש ממשלת אחדות. ברק נשם לרווחה, חייו הפוליטיים הוארכו.

השותפות לא נמשכה זמן רב. שאול מופז(צילום: ראובן קסטרו)

אבל השותפות עם מופז לא נמשכה זמן רב. 70 ימים בדיוק. ב־17 ביולי הוא פרש מממשלת האחדות, לאחר שנתניהו הפר את התחייבותו להעביר את "חוק הגיוס", שהיה אמור לשים קץ לפטור האוטומטי שקיבלו תלמידי ישיבות משירות בצה"ל ולהיחשב כהישג משמעותי ליושב ראש קדימה. בשיחות עם עיתונאים רמז מופז שברק ונתניהו ניסו לגרור אותו לתמוך במבצע באיראן. הם צירפו אותו לשמינייה, שהפכה לתשיעייה, וקיימו איתו מפגשים ארוכים יחד ולחוד. אבל הרמטכ"ל ושר הביטחון לשעבר לא השתכנע. "זה לא יקרה. לא ארים אצבע בעד תקיפה באיראן", אמר לנתניהו באחת השיחות.

עם פרישת מופז, בשיאם של המאמצים הדיפלומטיים הגלויים והחשאיים מצד ארצות הברית למנוע את התקיפה, ברק הגיע למבוי פוליטי סתום. הקדמת הבחירות נראתה עובדה מוגמרת, וככל שנקפו השבועות הבין שנתניהו לא ישריין אותו ויעדיף לוותר עליו לטובת חיבורים פוליטיים מועילים יותר. כמו רבים לפניו הוא גילה שנתניהו אינו מסוגל להתמסר לאיש.

בתום הקיץ הסוער החל שר הביטחון להתנתק מהברית פומבית. במהלך ספטמבר ניצל במות שונות כדי להביע הסתייגות מתקיפה באיראן. כך, למשל, באירוע הרמת כוסית לרגל ראש השנה באחד מבסיסי חיל האוויר אמר שאחריות הדרג המדיני היא לדחות מלחמות, והיציאה אליהן צריכה להיות רק לאחר שמוצו כל האפשרויות. בסוף אותו חודש יצא לארצות הברית לדיונים עם בכירי הממשל, ולא עדכן את נתניהו על פגישה שנקבעה לו עם רם עמנואל, באותה עת ראש עיריית שיקגו ועדיין מקורבו של אובמה. השניים נועדו בארבע עיניים, ושגריר ישראל מייקל אורן, איש אמונו של נתניהו, הודר מהמפגש בהנחיית ברק. אורן נותר בחוץ גם בפגישת ברק עם היועץ לביטחון לאומי, טום דונילון.

כשהדבר נודע לנתניהו הוא רתח: "אהוד מכר אותי לאובמה. לא רוצה לשמוע ממנו". הוא היה בטוח שברק הבטיח לאמריקאים שישראל לא תתקוף באיראן סמוך לבחירות בארצות הברית ובוודאי כאשר נתניהו בעצמו עומד בפני מערכת בחירות. נתניהו חיפש נקמה. ברגע מסוים הוא החליט לפטר את ברק, הזעיק את יעלון, סיפר לו על התוכנית והודיע לו שיתכונן להיכנס למשרד הביטחון בתוך יומיים. "אני אפטר אותו בפקס", איים. 39 אנשים ששהו בקרבתו מתארים איך עיניו נפקחו באחת, וכל חלקי הפאזל נפלו למקומם. אבל נתניהו לא מימש את האיום. במשך חמישה ימים ניתק מגע עם ברק, ולבסוף נפגש איתו בהפגנתיות בלשכתו, ולא במעון הרשמי, אבל הותיר אותו בתפקידו.

התחיל ממניפולציה פוליטית. ברק(צילום: ראובן קסטרו)

מה גרם למפנה אצל ברק? האם התכוון בכלל, בשלב כלשהו, ללכת על כל הקופה ולתקוף את מתקני הגרעין? "סיפור איראן הוא הזוי. עד היום אני לא יודע מה ברק רצה", אומר יעלון. "אני חושב שזה התחיל ממניפולציה פוליטית. הוא פשוט זיהה את האובססיה של ביבי עם איראן ואת החרדה הקיומית שלו וניצל אותן עד הסוף". מקורב לברק באותן שנים מסכים עם יעלון, אך משוכנע שלא רק נתניהו, אלא גם ראשי מערכת הביטחון וגם האמריקאים היו שחקנים על לוח השחמט של ברק.

בביוגרפיה ברק: מלחמות חיי, שראתה אור בקיץ 2015 ונכתבה בשיתוף פעולה מלא עם גיבורהּ, מובאת התייחסותו המפורטת של ברק לנושא. "ביבי ואני היינו מתואמים בנושא האיראני", הוא מצוטט שם, "אם כי היו בליכוד כאלה שחשבו שאני מוביל את ביבי בנושא הזה. דיברנו כל יום, לפעמים כמה פעמים ביום, ושנינו חשבנו שצריך להתכונן לפעולה באיראן ולקבל החלטה. כמה פעמים היינו על הסף, המערכת עברה למצב דריכות, אבל לא זכינו לרוב בין השרים ולתמיכת הדרג הביטחוני הבכיר". עם זאת, הוא מעולם לא סיפק הסבר, לא בביוגרפיה ולא בכל מקום אחר, לנסיגתו הבוטה מהתוכנית.

ונתניהו? השאלה אם היה מסוגל לקחת את הסיכונים העצומים שהיו גלומים בקבלת ההחלטה לתקוף עצמאית את מתקני הגרעין באיראן, בניגוד לעמדת ארצות הברית, היא שאלת מפתח בניסיון להבין את מנגנון קבלת ההחלטות שלו. בכל שנותיו עד אז כראש ממשלה הוא לא קיבל ולו החלטה היסטורית אחת. הפרשנות הרווחת מייחסת לו "פחדנות" ו"לחיצות" במצבים קיצוניים, והיא מחמיצה קו אחר לגמרי באישיותו. נתניהו חש מאוים בסביבה של חוסר ודאות, ולכן כמעט בכל מצב הוא חותר כמיטב יכולתו לצמצם סיכונים. מטבע הדברים, החלטות מנהיגותיות גדולות מתקבלות באקלים שבו חוסר הוודאות שולט, ונתניהו, המחפש ביטחונות, מעדיף להימנע מהן. בסיפור האיראני הוא פעל לצד ברק, התנהל כמי שמוכן ללכת עד הסוף ונראה שגם האמין שהוא מסוגל לכך, אולם ברגע האמת נסוג.

לא קיבל ולו החלטה היסטורית אחת. נתניהו(צילום: ראובן קסטרו)

נתניהו נימק זאת לימים בדיוק כמו ברק. "אם היה לי רוב", אמר ב־2019, "הייתי עושה את זה. חד משמעית". אלא שלפחות על פי היועץ המשפטי לממשלה באותה תקופה, יהודה וינשטיין, נתניהו לא נזקק לרוב. על פי חוות דעת שקיבל מווינשטיין, לתקיפה באיראן נדרש אישור ראש הממשלה ושר הביטחון בלבד, משום שהיא הוגדרה כפעולה נקודתית, ולא כמלחמה. נתניהו, לגרסת וינשטיין, לא עשה זאת מחמת הזהירות, כדי שברק והוא לא יישאו באחריות לבדם.

ההתקפלות של נתניהו הייתה מהדהדת, מכיוון שהוא עצמו טיפח במשך שנים את ההשוואה בין איראן למשטר הנאצי, טען שגרעין איראני יוביל לשואה שנייה והגדיר את האיום במונחים אפוקליפטיים. אם אכן כך, גם הסתלקותו של ברק לא הייתה אמורה למנוע ממנו את המעשה ההיסטורי.

ד"ר עוזי ארד, המכיר את נתניהו מקרוב שנים רבות וכיהן עד קיץ 2011 כיועצו לביטחון לאומי, מאמין שנתניהו חש את כאב ההחמצה: "לנגד עיניו של ביבי עומדים שני ראשי ממשלה — הקצין הפולני מנחם בגין שתקף את הכור בעיראק, ואהוד אולמרט שהיה כתב ב'במחנה' וקיבל החלטה נועזת לתקוף את הכור בסוריה. ביבי, שבעיני רוחו גואל את ישראל במעשה גדול ומרהיב, צריך להתמודד עם ההבנה שהוא בילף את עצמו. יכול להיות שגם ברק בילף אותו, אבל לדעתי בסתר ליבו הוא אוכל את עצמו, וכמו כל בן אדם במצבים כאלה הוא מחפש רציונליזציה".

לא הרפה מעמדתו. ברק אובמה(צילום: רויטרס)

בבחירות 2013 נשאר ברק, כצפוי, מחוץ לכנסת. מאז לא חזר אליה ולקדמת הבמה הפוליטית באופן רשמי. יחסיו עם נתניהו ידעו מאז בעיקר מורדות. ברק חבט בו בכל דרך אפשרית: בהתארגנויות פוליטיות שנועדו להפילו, כמנהיג הלא רשמי של תנועת המחאה נגד נתניהו כבר מראשיתה ב־2016, בהתבטאויות קשות כלפיו ובהתכתשות פומבית מכוערת עם בנו יאיר ברשתות החברתיות. "אם בימי הסיירת היו שואלים מי ישרוד יותר, אז ברור שהתשובה הייתה אהוד", אומר אחד מיועציו לשעבר של ברק, "הוא הוכשר וסומן למנהיגות, לראשות ממשלה. במבחן התוצאה ביבי ניצח את המפקד שלו, ולברק קשה להשלים עם זה".

גם בכהונתו השנייה, הנשיא אובמה לא הרפה מעמדתו שאת בעיית הגרעין האיראני יש לפתור באמצעות המסלול הדיפלומטי. במחצית הראשונה של 2013 גילה המודיעין הישראלי שבכירים אמריקאים ואיראנים מקדמים הסכם מאחורי גבה של ישראל. נתניהו זעם, אך לא הצליח לבלום את ההסכם שהתקדם במהירות או להשפיע על תוכנו. יחסיו המקולקלים עם הבית הלבן ודאי לא הועילו לו. גם לא הביטחון של אובמה שכבר לא יתקוף. "העסקה עם איראן רעה ותוביל בסופו של דבר למלחמה", התריע נתניהו בנאום מול שני בתי הקונגרס האמריקאי במרס 2015 וזכה לסבבים רבים של מחיאות כפיים. "לא צפיתי בנאום", אמר אובמה באדישות מכוונת, אך בבית הלבן האשימו את ראש הממשלה בניצול הבמה המכובדת לצרכיו הפוליטיים — הבחירות בישראל התקיימו שלושה שבועות לאחר מכן. ביולי 2015, בווינה, נחתם הסכם הגרעין. לנתניהו לא נותר אלא לכנותו "טעות היסטורית". הגישה של אובמה ניצחה.

בסאגת התקיפה באיראן שב נתניהו ונכווה מראשי מערכת הביטחון. בניגוד לכהונתו הראשונה, לא רק בעלי התפקידים שירש התעמתו איתו, אלא גם מי שמינה בעצמו. חשדותיו של נתניהו כי הם פועלים נגדו בחשאי הלכו והקצינו, כפי שממחיש האירוע הבא, המוכר היטב בחוגים הפנימיים של גופי הביטחון.

השותף המושלם לנתניהו. יוסי כהן(צילום: פול, מארק ישראל סאלם)

במהלך 2013 הורה נתניהו להוציא לפועל מבצע ביטחוני מורכב. המעורבים בדבר — כמה עשרות אנשים — נדרשו לחתום על התחייבות מיוחדת לשמירת סודיות. אחרי אחד הדיונים בנושא, ראש הממשלה ביקש מראש השב"כ יורם כהן להישאר בחדר איתו ועם היועץ המשפטי לממשלה יהודה וינשטיין. נתניהו הורה לכהן לדאוג לכך שהפיקוח על כל שותפי הסוד, ובכללם ראש המוסד תמיר פרדו והרמטכ"ל בני גנץ, יהיה הדוק יותר. כהן המופתע השיב שאומנם כראש ממשלה לנתניהו יש לגיטימציה לבקש זאת ממנו, אך כראש השב"כ הוא אינו יכול להורות על מעקב כפעולת מניעה, אלא אך ורק כתגובה לחשד קונקרטי להדלפה.

נתניהו דחה את הנימוק בטענה שאין גוף אחר שיכול לעשות זאת. כהן לא נרתע והפנה אותו למלמ"ב, האגף במשרד הביטחון האמון על ביטחון המידע. דומה שנתניהו ציפה לתשובה הזאת, והסביר שמשום כך נוכח בחדר היועץ המשפטי לממשלה: מאחר שלשב"כ בלבד האמצעים לעשות זאת, העברתם למלמ"ב דורשת הסדרה משפטית. כהן לא השתכנע ונאחז בחוק היבש, שלפיו השב"כ רשאי להשתמש באותם אמצעים רק כאשר יש חשד לריגול של אזרחים ישראלים.

המעמד עורר בכהן אי נחת. הוא סיפר אחר כך שהתרשם כי נתניהו היה מעוניין באקט גלוי של הרתעה: שראשי מערכת הביטחון ידעו שעוקבים אחריהם. השיחה הוקלטה, על פי הנוהל, בידיעת הנוכחים. בסופה סוכם על פתרון כללי, שלא היה רלוונטי לאותו מקרה. כהן עדכן את עמיתיו, האירוע היה לשיחת היום בחוגים הביטחוניים ותיאור חלקי ממנו התגלגל לתקשורת.

בתום כהונתו של פרדו בראשות המוסד, אחרי לבטים שנמשכו עד הרגע האחרון, הודיע נתניהו כי החליט למנות לתפקיד את ראש המועצה לביטחון לאומי, יוסי כהן. כמה חודשים אחרי שכהן התחיל את תפקידו נטען כי שרה נתניהו הייתה מעורבת במינויו ודובר על שיחת טלפון שקיים נתניהו עם נ', המשנה לראש המוסד, שנחשב למועמד המוביל. "האם תהיה נאמן לי?" נטען כי שאל, ונ' השיב כי יעשה את כל הנדרש כדי להיות נאמן למדינת ישראל.

Yossi Cohen was the perfect partner for Netanyahu.

With reason and highly developed emotional intelligence, he knew how to calm the prime minister's anxieties.

He excelled in this task to such an extent that Netanyahu himself marked him as his possible successor in Likud and as prime minister.

But with the retirement of his protégé from the Mossad in 2021, the sense of threat reawakened in Netanyahu;

Cohen, the eloquent and pleasant media favorite (not for nothing called "the model"), began to gain popularity among Likud voters.

Netanyahu was quick to pull the strings of the party to undermine his position.

A senior Likud minister was surprised when he told him about Cohen, as if in passing: "I don't trust him to be enough of an ideologue."

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