The video of the attack at the Shoafat checkpoint hits you twice:
in the stomach and in the head.
He hits me in the stomach, because it is hard to see soldiers being shot like that, from point blank range, knowing the dire result of a female soldier being killed.
And he hits his head, because he is frustrated to see the lack of professionalism and poor functioning of the fighters at the checkpoint.
The investigation of this event is expected to be particularly poignant, and it must be so.
The amount of defects in it is almost unimaginable.
The video shows most of them: the crowding of the soldiers and security guards at the checkpoint, which provides a concentration of easy targets to hit (if the terrorist had not been stopped with a gun, it is possible that the number of casualties in the incident would have been greater);
the exit of the terrorist from his vehicle and approaching them, without any of them suspecting or even looking at him;
the pulling out of the gun and the shooting, without any reaction on their part;
And worst of all - the car leaving and the terrorist escaping, without being shot and arrested.
Fighters at the Shuafat checkpoint the morning after the attack, photo: Oren Ben Hakon
At the time of the attack, there were quite a few soldiers and security guards at the checkpoint, some of whom can be seen in the video.
All were armed with automatic weapons, and were supposed to be skilled in rapid response.
Not one of them reacts as expected.
It is not clear whether this is due to a lack of practice and appropriate instructions, or an accidental accumulation of fighters who failed in their mission.
One way or another, this is an event that is the opposite of the IDF ethos: there is no operationality in it, no striving for contact, no lethality in it, and certainly no victory in it.
The IDF should honestly ask itself how this happened to it. Although the soldiers and security guards at the checkpoints are not infantry fighters, they are trained for this specific mission and should be skilled in exactly that.
It is also true that they are static most of the time, and engage in abrasive work where 99.9 percent of those passing through the checkpoint are innocent citizens, but this activity - like any other operational activity - is carried out precisely for the one hundred percent that remains.
Documentation of the shooting attack in Shuafat
The one who will conclude the investigation will be the Chief of Staff, Aviv Kochavi. On Friday, the IDF spokesman distributed photos of himself at the scene of the attack.
The Chief of Staff is seen in them talking to commanders and fighters, with the head of the AKA by his side.
Everyone (including the head of the ACA), wears protective vests, as required by the orders. The only one who does not wear a vest is the Chief of Staff.
The investigation of the attack will certainly raise problems of procedures and adherence to instructions.
It is worth remembering that these require not only the last soldier in the chain, but also the number 1 soldier in the IDF.
may encourage imitation attempts
During the holiday, there was quite a bit of criticism on social networks that the video of the event was distributed.
This can be understood from the point of view of the family of the soldier who was killed, but from a public point of view there is quite a bit of benefit: this is the best instructional video for how not to behave during an operational activity.
If the IDF assists him in order to end the next attempted attack in a different way, we will be punished. And in any case, the expectation that videos will remain confidential after 2022 is unrealistic.
Documentation from the scene of the attack, photo: Besmir Communication group
The claim (which was heard even by politicians) that a closure of the territories would have prevented the attack is also baseless.
The checkpoint is there to monitor the passage of Palestinians, and even a closure would not prevent access to it from the Palestinian side.
Furthermore, the Palestinians living in East Jerusalem hold Israeli identity cards, which allow them to pass freely even through the checkpoints (the terrorists came from the Israeli side of the checkpoint).
Those who want to deny this to them, are in effect dividing Jerusalem: it is doubtful that this is what those demanding the closure want to do.
This attack may encourage imitation attempts, especially by Palestinians who are mistaken to think that it is easy to harm soldiers.
The security system met (successfully) a similar challenge in 2016 in the wave of individual attacks, and needs to find ways to do it again now.
The conditions for this are more complex than before: the weakening of the Palestinian Authority and its security mechanisms, and the slow but troubling addition of the Tanzim to the circle of terror, portends an expected increase in warnings and the level of the threat.
This trend is expected to continue during the upcoming holidays, and probably until after the elections.
This will stretch the IDF, the police and the Shin Bet to the limit, and requires everyone - citizens and elected officials - to exercise discretion and calmness.
Israel has known periods and attacks more difficult than these, and was capable of them.
She didn't need passwords for that, but determined and calculated activity - which is already underway.
were we wrong
We will fix it!
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