Change in Iran?

Expert convinced: Revolutionary Guards will never give up

Created: 11/02/2022, 12:38 p.m

From: Foreign Policy

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard stands loyally behind the "Supreme Leader" Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

© afp photo/ho/Khamenei.ir

The security forces in Iran pose the greatest obstacle to regime change. They would even risk civil war.

• Since the death of Mahsa Amini, people in Iran, especially young women and teenagers, have been protesting against the Islamic Republic.

• Observers wonder if this could be another revolution with the potential to overthrow the Islamic Republic.

• But there is a strong opponent.

  The Islamic Revolutionary Guard's loyalty is to the Islamic Republic, and it will oppose anyone who opposes that system, no matter what the cost, argues foreign-policy author Afshon Ostovar.

• This article is available in German for the first time – it was first published in

  Foreign Policy

  magazine on October 18, 2022 .

Iran is in an identity crisis.

For nearly two months, people have been protesting against the Islamic Republic in the country's streets and neighborhoods, demanding the death of the supreme leader and an end to the theocratic regime's 43-year rule after 22-year-old Mahsa Amini was killed by Tehran's vice squad became.

The protests are being led primarily by young women and teenage girls who have shed their state-mandated religious headscarves in protest against Iran's 1979 Islamic revolution and the theocracy that emerged from it.

The nature and scale of the protests have led many to question whether this could be another revolution - one that could overthrow the Islamic Republic and replace it with a more liberal and representative democracy.

Whether the current movement can bring about change in Iran may depend on a number of factors.

But the main obstacle standing in the way of the protesters is the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), the most powerful descendant of the 1979 revolution. That earlier revolution was decided by the Iranian military's decision to declare neutrality and withdraw.

This heralded the end of the Pahlavi dynasty and set Iran on a new course.

The IRGC, on the other hand, was created precisely for the current situation:

Iran: Death of Mahsa Amini sparks widespread protests – Islamic Revolutionary Guards are brutal

The IRGC is a powerful military force and the bedrock of internal order in the Islamic Republic.

She oversees the regime's security and is the most influential voice in the country's strategic decisions alongside Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

This role has made them the main mechanism for the system of oppression in the country.

In previous political unrest, such as the 1999 student protests and the mass demonstrations following the 2009 presidential election, the IRGC and its volunteer militia, the Basij, used brute force, arrests and torture against protesters.

In the protests between late 2018 and into 2020, the IRGC resumed that role, but its tactics escalated in some locations to a fully militarized response, using edged weapons and armored vehicles to kill protesters on a much larger scale than previous crackdowns.

In the southwestern city of Mahshahr alone, the IRGC killed an estimated 180 mostly young protesters over four days in November 2019, with many of the victims being indiscriminately fired upon by troops armed with automatic rifles as they sought refuge in a nearby swampy area.

Similar operations took place across the country to prevent the widespread protest movement from escalating into an outright rebellion.

The deadly effectiveness of these tactics was deliberate and a direct response to the threat the protests posed to the regime.

In contrast to the pro-reform demonstrations of 1999 and 2009, the protests since 2018, including the current one, have been clearly anti-regime.

The protesters use slogans and carry out actions openly rejecting the Islamic Revolution and all that it stands for.

With actions such as the removal of headscarves, crowds chanting "Death to the Dictator" and the torching of posters bearing the image of Qassem Suleimani (the late IRGC field commander,

Protests in Iran: Revolutionary Guard fully identifies with ideology of Islamic regime

This attack is tantamount to an attack on the IRGC, because the Revolutionary Guards closely identify with the ideology of the Islamic regime.

The 1979 military was above all a national military, more committed to Iran as a sovereign country than to the Crown.

The Islamic Republic has cultivated a very different type of security architecture.

At the top is the IRGC, which, as the name "Revolutionary Guard" suggests, was created to protect the Islamic Revolution, not Iran.

For the IRGC, revolution is synonymous with Iran's theocratic system, headed by the Supreme Leader.

In addition, there is a network of foreign militant groups allied with the Supreme Leader, the so-called "Resistance Front",

with which Iran extends its political influence to the entire Middle East.

Although the IRGC has at times attempted to give its foreign operations an air of patriotism, the organization is not involved in regional conflicts for the sake of Iran's national interests, but rather to spread the Islamic revolution and export its particular brand of political ideology .

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The loyalty of the IRGC is not tied to Iran or geographical borders.

The political entity it serves is country agnostic and is primarily defined by the seat of the supreme leader.

For this reason, the IRGC considers the current protests and previous protests of recent years, which expressed clearly anti-theocratic demands, to be far more dangerous than previous riots.

By challenging the Islamic system, the protesters are challenging the IRGC's raison d'être.

The IRGC cannot exist under a form of government that is no longer defined by the Islamic Revolution.

If the current order is lifted, there will be no place for the IRGC.

As with the other Iranian armed forces, the top commanders of the IRGC are handpicked by the Supreme Leader based on their loyalty to him.

She and the other senior military and police commanders owe the Supreme Leader their place in society and all they have gained from the regime's rampant corruption.

Should the Supreme Leader fall, all will fall with him.

It is therefore not to be expected that the Revolutionary Guard will give in to the demonstrators or even side with them.

The IRGC's loyalty is to the Islamic Republic and it will oppose any opponents of that system at any cost, even if the Iranian people suffer as a result.

Should it be deemed necessary, and should the Supreme Leader request it, the IRGC will not hesitate to order its troops to use as much force as necessary to eliminate the threat posed by the demonstrations.

Violent military counter-protests are already taking place in parts of Iran, most notably in Sanandaj, Mahsa Amini's hometown, and are likely to increase as the protests continue.

Despite this willingness and determination on the part of the IRGC, the current protests pose an unprecedented challenge for the regime cheered on young women whose most revolutionary act was simply to bar their hair.

Iranian security forces have beaten and killed scores of women protesters to force people to return to their homes, but it hasn't worked.

The level of violence needed to contain this wave of fearless youth is likely to be greater than the regime is currently willing to risk.

Iran protests: In order to win, the regime must wage a war against young women and girls

Two things are at stake for the regime, both domestic and foreign.

On the international front, Iran's leaders need to consider the impact and possible consequences of crushing a popular movement for gender equality.

The greater concern, however, is the deepening of the crisis at home.

As more people are killed by the regime's forces, anti-regime sentiment hardens and the young generation becomes more radicalized.

The more violence is demanded of low-ranking soldiers against their fellow citizens, the more likely it is that those soldiers' resolve will falter.

The top management of the Iranian security forces has benefited from the current system, but not the rank and file.

Their risk calculations are entirely different from those of their commanders, and their loyalty to the system is all the more vulnerable and tested the more they are asked to murder and maim in the supreme leader's name.

The Islamic Republic has no qualms about killing its own people, as evidenced by its long history of oppression.

But when the enemy is one's own daughter, niece, sister or cousin, no one can escape the reality of the situation.

To win, the regime must wage a war against young women and teenage girls.

This is a war that can hardly be won.

And the regime probably knows that, too.

Afshon Ostovar

 is Associate Professor of National Security Studies at the Naval Postgraduate School and author of 

.

Twitter: @AOstovar

This article was first published in English in the magazine "ForeignPolicy.com" on October 18, 2022 - as part of a cooperation, it is now also available in translation to the readers of the IPPEN.MEDIA portals.

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