Biden and Xi Jinping met in Bali, Indonesia, on the eve of the G20, the first face-to-face meeting between the two leaders since Biden became president.
At the beginning of the meeting, Xi Jinping greeted each other with a smile, and Biden trotted all the way into the arena. The two greeted each other like old friends.
Judging from the announcement of the meeting between the two sides, the two cautiously promised to improve US-China relations and avoid direct conflict.
During their more than three-hour meeting, they pledged to do more to repair a relationship that is at its lowest point in decades.
They "mouth" believe that neither side wants the "competition" between the two superpowers to turn into a "conflict", but we all know that "conflicts" between China and the United States in many fields are still happening.
Describing a new framework for dealing with China, Biden said that the United States would "continue to compete vigorously" with China, but that this "competition should not turn into conflict".
Xi Jinping expressed more dissatisfaction with the current direction of development of the relationship between the two countries, saying that it does not meet the fundamental interests of the two peoples and the expectations of the international community.
It is worth noting that in the Chinese draft, the tone is harsh, and it is also speculated that this is the tone of the meeting - Xi Jinping's speech was "moderate", but the content was "hard".
China has always been the one to take the initiative in Sino-US relations, while the US often says nothing.
The populist politics in the United States is catering to this strategy and is gradually sinking into the quagmire.
On November 14, President Xi Jinping met with US President Joe Biden in Bali, Indonesia.
(Xinhua News Agency)
During the meeting, Biden reaffirmed his previous promise of "four nos and one intention" (not seeking a new cold war with China, not seeking to change the Chinese system, not seeking to oppose China by strengthening alliances, not supporting Taiwan independence, and not intending to conflict with China). Expanded and upgraded, and put forward the "five nos and four no intentions" - the United States respects China's system, does not seek to change the Chinese system, does not seek a new Cold War, does not seek to oppose China by strengthening allies, does not support "Taiwan independence", and does not support "Two Chinas" and "One China, One Taiwan" have no intention of conflicting with China; the United States has no intention of seeking "decoupling" from China, obstructing China's economic development, or enclosing China.
As the saying goes, "the person who needs to tie the bell has to untie the bell." It is not enough for the United States to make gestures, but it must also take practical actions. Otherwise, Sino-US relations can only be "cooking frogs in warm water."
But then again, what expectations do we have for China relations?
We must know that China and the United States will be in a period of structural conflict in the next 20-30 years, which is inevitable.
In fact, its nature is not fundamentally different from "Cold War" and "Thucydides Trap".
Even if it promises to "not seek a new cold war with China", this is also true.
The reason why China-U.S. relations are like a "new cold war" and analogous to the "Thucydides Trap" is that the structural conflict between China and the United States stems from the distrust and hostility of the "boss" towards the rising "big brother".
The West still lives in a power structure, which can easily turn into a conflict of power.
This is the same as the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, Germany, and Britain and the West. The original strategic layout, military, political, and economic interests have been challenged, and it is the outcome of the friction between "desire and fear."
The existing hegemonic countries are the biggest beneficiaries of the existing order, and the rise of emerging countries like China will inevitably change the "politics" in which the power game pattern dominates the culture.
Of course, the relationship between China and the United States is also different from the "Thucydides Trap": First, there is no such close intertwining of economy, trade, society, and technology between China and the United States today in all previous cases. relation.
Second, beyond the two countries, the global economic layout is also closely linked. "Finding consensus through peaceful means while recognizing differences" has become an internationally accepted principle.
It is true that the current Sino-US relations should not be "packaged" with "Thucydides Trap" and "New Cold War": the more they are packaged in this way, the easier it will be for people to label China and the United States as "there must be a war", and even fall into the Self-hypnosis and self-realization, this will not help the improvement of the relationship between the two countries.
It is necessary to find a brand-new discourse on the relationship between the two countries.
In the past, what China offered was a "new type of major-country relationship." To put it bluntly, it was an unknown way of crossing the river by feeling the stones, but it vaguely knew that it was a "new type" of major-country relationship.
After these years of dealings, it is no longer "unknown", but G2, so in recent years, the "new type of major power relationship" has rarely been mentioned.
So, how to define G2 in the new century?
Obviously, an accurate statement has not yet been found.
This time, Xi Jinping and Biden reached an agreement: "The United States and China should show the world that the two sides can manage their differences and avoid slipping into conflict and confrontation due to miscalculation or fierce competition."
On November 14, Xi Jinping met with US President Joe Biden in Bali, Indonesia.
After the meeting, State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi briefed the media and answered questions.
(Chinese Foreign Ministry)
In fact, after 2008, the scale of Sino-US relations has further shifted toward "conflicts and conflicts."
More and more people in the United States judge that they have benefited less from Sino-US relations than they have suffered. This also includes some false attributions to domestic economic problems. work”, and believed that the past methods of making profits in China by American companies were detrimental to the United States’ maintenance of technological advantages and so on.
Symptoms reflected in reality include: the United States returning to the Asia-Pacific, increasing its containment of China, the Republican Party's attitude towards China is comprehensively hawkish, and the Democratic Party's attitude towards China has entered into internal divisions.
In recent years, the gap in comprehensive national strength between China and the United States has been further narrowed. China's development stage determines that it will increasingly go global and hold more and more power to make rules. Chinese companies have gradually formed a dominant position in various industries, and even formed an absolute lead in some industries. The result is that the factors of "conflict" between China and the United States obviously outweigh the "mutual interests".
Taking Trump’s inauguration in 2017 and launching a trade war with China in 2018 as a mark, the two countries have entered a new stage, and frictions have become more frequent and fierce. Since then, the saying that “China and the United States cannot escape a war” Become less alarmist.
Then Biden took office, but in fact nothing changed.
The Sino-US trade war has continued since 2017. The picture shows US President Trump meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping during the G20 summit in Osaka on June 29, 2019.
(AP)
The essence of Sino-US relations are "contradictions and conflicts" and "mutual interests." How to manage and control these two relations is basically a multi-layer relationship pattern between the two relations, and it is the role of mutual generation and restraint.
If the factors of "conflict" are higher than "mutual interests", then the disputes, frictions and hostility between the two countries will increase, and vice versa.
These two factors have always existed in Sino-US relations, constantly changing priorities, working together, and resonating internally and externally.
Now as long as the gap between China and the United States in comprehensive national strength is further narrowed, the scale of Sino-US relations will be further tilted to "conflict".
In other words, although the "mutual interests" are great, the "conflicts" are still greater than the "interests".
Biden said, "The U.S. agrees that the principles guiding U.S.-China relations should be established, and the teams of the two sides can continue to talk on the basis of the existing consensus and strive to reach an agreement as soon as possible." This is also true.
The implication is that "mutual interests" are very important, but "conflicts and conflicts" are still serious. There is still no consensus on "contradictions and conflicts", but because "mutual interests" has a consensus basis, we will continue to work hard.
But we all know that this "conflict" is structural and cannot be resolved. It can only be left to time and the wheel of history.
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