The ShG is always to blame. There is no Israeli who does not know this common phrase, which unfortunately has become part of daily Israeli existence. Still, only a few surely remember that the phrase was coined for the first time in 1987, after a murderous terrorist attack that was nicknamed "The Night of the Gilshonim". In the same event Kesha blamed the IDF on a simple soldier, a total of 3 soldiers, for the terrible disaster during which an armed terrorist entered a military encampment and shot dead the soldiers inside.
The terrorist, a member of Ahmed Jibril's organization, had crossed into Israel a short time before from Lebanon using a glashon (Tisan).
He managed to kill an officer, and arrived at the SHG armed with a Kalashnikov and wearing a vest loaded with hand grenades. Roni Almog, the SHG who was standing at the entrance to the camp, escaped from his position without warning his friends, and thus the terrorist was able to enter the camp unhindered, shooting five soldiers to death more and injure ten more.
Only after many minutes was the terrorist eliminated by a police officer who rushed to the scene.
The murderous attack was recorded in the bloody pages of the history of the State of Israel mainly as a major omission, at the end of which the army found that the main culprit was the same Shag, who was even prosecuted for his part in the affair and served a sentence of one and a half years.
The army's decision to severely punish Almog in particular led to harsh public criticism, which as mentioned led to the creation of a new phrase in Israeli existence, the "Shg syndrome". The pair of words became a critical phrase symbolizing the attempt of the senior officials to evade accountability for their failures by shifting the blame onto their juniors in the chain The command, and especially the common soldiers.
35 years have passed since that difficult event, but things still remain the same.
The IDF claims to the outside that the handling of significant incidents is done in an in-depth manner, but even today the phenomenon of "blaming the SHG" and lack of acceptance of responsibility by the senior commanders is prevalent.
Thus, for example, Chief of Staff Kochavi's decision not to depose the previous "Agoz" commander, Lt. Col. Ephraim Tahila, after two of his platoon commanders were killed in a bilateral shooting incident last January, and this is against the advice of the inspection committee led by Gen. ) Noam Tivon.
The committee found problematic conduct in the unit, not only in the difficult incident, yet only relatively junior officers were punished.
Colonel Kochavi changed his mind and dismissed Lieutenant Colonel Tahila only after we revealed in "Israel Hayom" that the officer lied a few months later in another military investigation.
The case of recent weapons thefts from IDF bases also points to the "Shg syndrome", since it is very likely that if the army had gotten to the root of the systemic problem, the thieves would have had a harder time stealing weapons from the army, and of course they would not have been able to place 70,000 bullets and 70 grenades at night one.
However, there is also some justice in Chief of Staff Kochavi's approach that he is not in a hurry to "behead" highly privileged commanders, when the army is still in dire straits of quality personnel. the punishment," said the chief of staff a few months ago.
And yet, despite the desire to forgive mistakes, in such serious events - such as the infiltration of a terrorist into a military camp or the death of two company commanders - it is impossible for the responsibility to be placed only on the soldiers and junior officers.
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