A few days after the armed men of the Jenin Battalion kidnapped the body of the Israeli citizen Tiran Pero, who was killed in a car accident from the Palestinian hospital, the Chairman of the Palestinian Authority, Abu Mazen, summoned the Fatah and Tanzim senior officials to the Muktah in Ramallah for an important discussion.
According to Palestinian journalists, Fatah Secretary General Ata Abu Ramila, estimated that Abu Mazen would praise him for bringing about a solution to the affair, returning the body to his family in Israel with security coordination and preventing a large-scale IDF operation in the heart of the Jenin MP for rescue The body, which exacted a heavy toll: dead, wounded, destroyed infrastructure and infuriated the Palestinian population.
Contrary to the assessment at the top of Fatah, Abu Mazen opened the discussion with harsh criticism against Abu Ramila, defining his performance in the affair as a "failure", and claiming that he was causing chaos In Jenin, the capital of terrorism for decades.
There are claims that Abu Mazen hissed curses out of anger to the astonishment of the debate participants.
According to Palestinian sources, what angered Abu Mazen was the laxity of the senior Fatah officials and senior security officials in the face of the Jenin Battalion militants from the refugee camp. On the day the body was kidnapped, everything had already been coordinated to hand it over to the IDF.
An IDF unmanned aerial vehicle transmitted back a real-time recording of the body's arrival at the point where the ambulance was, and within a few minutes they noticed how it was descending, and being abducted a second time. Dozens of the camp's armed men recognized two senior Fatah and Tanzim officials standing next to the ambulance, and opposed it.
"You want to profit from the whole story? It won't happen!" shouted the armed men from the Jenin Battalion, kidnapped the body again and disappeared.
"Your strength in the field is zero!" shouted Abu Mazen, who understood more than anyone else that if the IDF had entered Jenin with large forces, the Palestinian protest would have been so large, infecting other districts in the Palestinian Authority, and playing into the hands of Hamas, the Jihad The Islamists and the Iranians who are trying to destabilize the region in order to harm the Palestinian Authority.
The Fatah Secretary General estimated that he would receive praise for bringing about a solution to the kidnapping case, but he was wrong.
Tiran Pro (Photo: Walla! System, use according to Section 27A of the Copyright Law)
Abu Ramila tried to defend himself, but Abu Mazen dismissed his words, continued the criticism and mentioned in his words Dr. Abdullah Ahmed Abu Tin, a senior director of the Palestinian Ministry of Health, a member of Fatah, who was killed by IDF forces while holding a weapon. "This is not the policy My..." Abu Mazen screamed and added, "Since when does a Fatah member pick up a weapon? Is that what I asked of you? How will I explain everything that is happening here in the world...?".
Abu Mazen claimed in the discussion that the mechanisms do not really control Jenin.
Abu Ramila did not remain oblivious and responded that while everyone is sitting in Mokta, he and his men are dealing with the large amount of money flowing to the militants in the Jenin refugee camp from Turkey, Lebanon, Iran and Gaza.
The armed men of the Jenin refugee camp, who were responsible for the abduction, managed to embarrass the PA officials.
The Shin Bet identified the idea of establishing the Jenin Battalion as early as May 2021. Jamil Al Amori of the Islamic Jihad, gathered around him a double-digit number of armed men to carry out shooting attacks against Israeli civilians while thwarting any intention of the IDF to penetrate the Nin, and this while defining the refugee camp: a fortified destination where no one will enter.
The military wing of Hamas, which in those days was licking its wounds from the IDF's attacks - the destruction of infrastructure, the destruction of its weapons and the killing of its senior operatives in Gaza - decided to promote terrorism in Israel while pledging to Egypt to maintain peace in Gaza.
Yahya Sinuar transferred a lot of money to the Jenin militants, as did the Hamas headquarters in Lebanon, Turkey, and even the Iranians.
The large amount of money was translated very quickly into the purchase of weapons and ammunition, and then for the execution of shooting attacks in exchange for which they received additional money.
Soldiers of the Jenin Battalion (photo: screenshot, documentation on social networks according to Article 27 A of the Copyright Law)
In June 2021, the Shin Bet managed to intercept the vehicle in which al-Amuri and other senior activists were traveling in the Jenin refugee camp. A hostile force of the Israeli Defense Forces ambushed the militants, killing al-Amuri and seriously wounding a senior member of the Jenin battalion.
Two intelligence officers from the Palestinian Authority came to the scene and were accidentally shot and killed. After the targeted counterattack of al-Amuri, it was decided in the Jenin Battalion not to choose a new battalion commander, as he would be the next target of the targeted counterattack
. To gain sympathy on social networks, and to witness, while the six security prisoners, among them Zacharia Zabeidi, escaped from Gilboa Prison, a message spread that members of the Jenin Battalion were calling for the escaped prisoners to come to the Jenin refugee camp to receive shelter.
The commander of the YOS division, Brigadier General Avi Belot, who took office in those months, received an in-depth intelligence review of the Jenin Battalion and the terrorist activity around the refugee camp, but very quickly noticed that they were moving from the camp to other areas in Samaria.
Towards the end of December 2021, infantry and engineering forces went into the mapping of terrorist houses in Alsila Alhartiya and fire was opened at them from several directions on an extremely unusual scale, including the dropping of explosive devices. In this incident the red light came on and Major General Blot realized that he had to expand the initiative against militants The Jenin Battalion, which had already numbered at the time, says that there are close to a hundred terrorists.
Brigadier General Blot gathered around him the commanders of the territorial divisions and emphasized to them that with the exception of the security coordination that improved in those days, and the intelligence superiority of the Shin Bet and Amman, which he defined as "science fiction", the IDF's freedom of action in the heart of the refugee camps in Nin and Nablus is in a gap compared to Hebron and other cities, and the control of the seam line is loose to say the least.
It was an operational gap that began as early as 2013 within the framework of which every morning observers would report on the passage of thousands of Palestinians and Israeli criminal elements from one side to the other without hindrance.
"There is no vacuum anywhere," said Brigadier General Blot to his subordinates, "wherever we do not act, other parties will enter..." In his words he alluded to the Jenin Battalion.
In the Jenin battalion, it was decided not to appoint a replacement for him so that he would not be a target for thwarting.
Right: Al-Amori (photo: screenshot, no)
The Palestinian Authority has been gradually weakening for several years and automatically also the Palestinian security mechanisms, who are very afraid to operate in the Jenin refugee camp which is only 700 square meters in size. He knew her well from his days as a company commander during Operation Protective Wall.
This is against the background of the fear that the created space will lead to a wide escalation in Samaria.
The IDF tried to speed up the security mechanisms to act in Jenin, but every time they dared to arrest armed men on the outskirts of the camp or far from it, they folded very quickly. This was also the case when they arrested armed men from the Jenin refugee camp, among them Muhammad Zabeidi, the son of the senior Tanzim imprisoned in Israel - Zakaria Zabeidi Within a few hours, Muhammad was released, and the PA mechanisms not only apologized, but negotiated to compensate the family for the mental anguish.
Officials in the IDF defined the incident as a "humiliation for the Palestinian Authority".
Already in February, even before the big wave of escalation and the "Wave Breaker" operation, the Shin Bet and the Yosh Division teamed up for targeted operations in Jenin and Nablus.
Later, Brigadier General Blot admitted that he was surprised that the wave of escalation resumed a month later, in March, precisely with the Daesh attacks: a terrorist from Hora in the Negev who carried out attacks in Beer Sheva and terrorists from Wadi Ara who carried out an attack in Hadera. These two attacks inspired terrorists from the Jenin refugee camp, the village of Romana Neighboring and working from Jenin province, who carried out murderous attacks in Elad, Bnei Brak and Tel Aviv.
In the Central Command, they praised the sharpness of Chief of Staff Lt. Col. Aviv Kochavi by not waiting, stopping training and increasing the IOS with an emphasis on the seam line with 11 battalions to close the seam line. "The attacks in Israel were shocking.
I have no doubt that the fear was very great, and what went through the heads of the political echelon and the senior IDF were deadly attacks from the past such as the Dolphinarium and others, so the military response was quick and clear," a senior security official told Walla.
He added, "In the month of May, an army soldier Noam Raz was killed by fire from the operatives of the Jenin Battalion.
The intensity of the shooting was very high - a result of the large amount of money that was transferred from Hamas in Gaza to Jenin in order to restore the ego of Sinouar, who received a strong blow in Operation Wall Guard."
Soldiers of the Jenin Battalion (photo: screenshot, documentation on social networks according to Article 27 A of the Copyright Law)
IDF forces, the Shin Bet and the Israel Defense Forces launched a series of operations in the heart of the Jenin refugee camp in order to harm the security of the armed men and exact a heavy price from them for the shooting attacks. Peace be upon you.
Chief of Staff Lt. Col. Kochavi said in closed conversations that there are plans for a broad operation in Jenin and he will not hesitate to launch them if the targeted operations are ineffective and terrorism increases.
A senior military official commented on the Chief of Staff's words, "What three brigades in Operation Protective Wall would have done in Jenin today, 20 Yams fighters from the Mageb or Dovedvan know how to do.
Sometimes these will be eight fighters in the heart of MP Jenin, because today there is excellent intelligence.
What did we have in a protective wall?
Binoculars 4 x 10 map, and human intelligence?
Today there is a lot of audacity to perform complex operations.
Applying the sentence: Dare wins.
General Yehuda Fox should also be praised for approving such operations in the refugee camp.
These promotions are not deterrents but design.
They are reshaping the reality in IOSH".
The Jenin Battalion, which operates out of the Jenin refugee camp, currently numbers about one hundred and fifty terrorists.
They don't have one clear commander because even those who were appointed after al-Amouri were eliminated by the security forces like Muhammad Qassem two weeks ago.
The battalion benefits from a budget estimated at millions of shekels from a number of terrorist headquarters.
They define themselves as a battalion without organizational affiliation.
That's why they wear a uniform shirt on a regular basis that says: "Bnei Hamahan".
The battalion is divided into squads with different roles.
Last week the commander of the sabotage squad was killed in an incident called a "work accident".
From time to time they hold parades and a show of strength in the "Sahiyat Al Muhaim" square, the prisoners' club in the camp or the main gym.
From the documentation in the field it can be seen that they have long-range radios, a lot of ammunition for rifles of various types, some of which was stolen from the IDF, pistols, and new sights including night vision devices.
Soldiers of the Jenin Battalion (photo: screenshot, documentation on social networks according to Article 27 A of the Copyright Law)
In recent months, Jenin Battalion operatives have placed cameras in the streets of the camp and on the outskirts of the city, which will record the methods of the assistants and regular observers who are on the roofs and in the streets around the clock, this out of fear of undercovers and rapid raids by the IDF for arrests and countermeasures. In addition, in recent weeks, barricades have been set up for vehicles and positions A temporary check to make it difficult for the IDF to reach the refugee camp or withdraw from it.
"In the past, the difficulty was to penetrate the refugee camp - the more difficult challenge today is to get out of it. They exercise a muscle as soon as they recognize us, block roads, shoot at the troops from several directions. But they see that we are stubborn and do not give up. Even against his will, he enters everywhere and stops us. And if there is no choice, we will harm those who plan terrorist attacks against us. Our freedom of action must not be harmed. The Chief of Staff spoke about this: 'There are no cities of refuge in IOSH,'" a senior officer in an elite unit said this week.
The main concern of officials in the security system is not only the support of the people of the refugee camp for the militants, and the reluctance of the PA from their firepower, but the transition from a group of militants to an organized and institutionalized battalion, which is joined by former security prisoners with knowledge, professional experience in terrorism in various fields and influence." They have long since stopped accepting anyone who wants to take up arms and behave in a very orderly manner," explained a security official, adding, "They are in the transition phase from shooting attacks to attacks based on explosives."
In the last year there was a 400% increase in shooting attacks in Samaria.
The IDF, Mageb, Yamm and Shin Bet hit 220 firing squads.
18 Israelis were killed as a result of terrorist acts carried out by terrorists who left Samaria with an emphasis on Jenin.
According to the alert in the hands of the security establishment, the Jenin Battalion is no longer satisfied with shooting attacks in the IOS against IDF positions, and intends to carry out attacks, among other things, using explosive belts deep in Israel.
In recent months, special units thwarted several organizations of the Jenin Battalion that planned to carry out cargo attacks.
Senior officials in the IDF estimate that the existing operating pattern of "fist attacks" into the Jenin refugee camp, despite the increasing risk to the forces, is an efficient and effective response to the institutionalized terrorism that is beginning to raise its head. To the question of why they do not launch a large-scale operation in the refugee camp and are content with quick and targeted operations, an official answered Security, "Every such operation ends with dead and wounded terrorists.
A more extensive entry could lead to a very large number of terrorists who would directly set fire to Iosh, lead to revenge actions, and indirectly set fire to the Gaza Strip. The kind of actions that can both harm and even kill civilians not involved in terrorism. No one wants that."
Soldiers of the Jenin Battalion (photo: screenshot, documentation on social networks according to Article 27 A of the Copyright Law)
The source emphasized that a large number of casualties in the operation would cause a broad escalation that could shake the Palestinian Authority in a way that is contrary to Israel's security interest, "Hamas Day last week passed quietly because the Palestinian Authority's security mechanisms made arrests and presented a clear position on the ground.
On the other hand, wherever we detect a threat, an idea to carry out an attack, we will act.
The policy is very clear."
One of the most prominent examples of the persistent pursuit of senior officers of the Jenin Battalion occurred at the beginning of last month when the Shin Bet brought golden information that Farouk Salama had left his hiding place in the Jenin refugee camp and arrived in Italy to slaughter cattle, two days before his wedding day. The undercover unit of the Bayou Border Guard Sh, was quickly rushed to the scene, led a shootout during which Salama was killed in front of his friends.
Army officials insist, "Most of his friends ran away like mice. Cowards. There was also a case where there was an exchange of fire. The terrorist who carried out the shooting attacks played it dead from the exchange of fire. We also got him. There is no place where we will not act, including in the Jenin refugee camp. Also If it's difficult, very complex and takes time."
If so, the great challenge in the war of minds waged by the IDF and Shin Bet against the Jenin Battalion, is the effort to put together a set of actions that, on the one hand, will severely damage the terrorist infrastructure - and on the other hand, will not bring the entire region into a spiral and security escalation.
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