Lessons from the war in Ukraine: from Putin's weakness to the limits of the West

A Ukrainian soldier fires at Russian positions on the Donetsk front, Ukraine, on December 23. Libkos (AP)

“There are many lessons that flow from the war in Ukraine.

Lessons we are learning.

What do Europeans learn?

What President Xi and the Chinese armed forces are learning”, said General Mark Milley, Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, recently. Political, military and business leaders from all over the planet are scrutinizing the conflict in search of keys to understanding the modern world , of the balances of force, of the future flow of events.

What are these lessons?

It is an abundant, relevant catalogue, full of nuances.

At the military level, of course, because it is the first major confrontation in decades between one of the world's greatest war powers and an adversary with considerable conventional potential.

But not only in the military, but also in the geopolitical sphere, because, as Pol Morillas, director of the CIDOB center for international studies, points out, "the Russian invasion is an ordeal that challenges the current world order", and in this sense it affects and portrays to all.

Here is an attempt to point out some of the great lessons of the Ukrainian war in 2022.

the military plane

The conflict is, from the outset, a reminder of the enormous difficulty of invading a country with an adversary that, although inferior in terms of resources, is determined to defend its independence.

"It's in a sense the same lesson from Vietnam," says William Alberque, director of the Department of Strategy, Technology and Arms Control at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS, for its acronym in English).

Or Afghanistan, among others.

But the case of Ukraine is of special value because it makes it possible to accurately project the calculation of an eventual Chinese attack against Taiwan, the most dangerous zone of tension in the world, based on a very similar scheme: a great power offensive (Russia/China ), against an inferior adversary (Ukraine/Taiwan) but with military support from the greatest power (USA) and a strong sanctioning reaction (from the Western bloc).

"Without a doubt, China is studying the events with growing panic, understanding that a hypothetical attack against Taiwan would be much more difficult and costly than it assumed until recently," says the expert, who was previously director of the NATO Arms Control Center. .

But the dynamics of the war in Ukraine and the Russian setbacks speak volumes, starting with the pre-invasion phase.

The development of events underscores, for example, the critical importance of having adequate intelligence services and analytical capacity.

The Kremlin completely failed to assess the resistance that Ukraine would put up and the reaction of the West.

This analytical short-circuit led to a maximalist attack strategy that went completely wrong.

"Western services, on the other hand, had a remarkable performance, improving a lot compared to past crises," says Cathryn Clüwer Ashbrook, executive vice president of the Bertelsmann Foundation.

The US saw the invasion coming, properly relayed the information to the allies, and this facilitated preparation.

At the tactical operational level, the inability of Russian forces to react quickly to problems encountered on the battlefield has highlighted the importance of having command and control structures that delegate a margin of discretion to well-prepared intermediate officers. operative.

“In Western forces this is

,” says Alberque, but the invasion has demonstrated a disastrous level of rigidity in the Russian chain of command, as many experts, including those at Britain's Royal Institute of United Services, have argued.

On the contrary, the Ukrainian forces have shown extraordinary adaptability and flexibility.

In the first case, learning to use and integrate dozens of different types of weapons;

in the second, reacting intelligently to tactical challenges.

“I think this war will still be studied a lot 50 to 100 years from now, and I think Ukrainian officers will be teaching for decades in Western military academies, largely precisely to explain the extraordinary adaptability and flexibility they have shown,” says Alberque.

The credit for the enormous setbacks suffered by Russia lies largely in those qualities and in the courage of the Ukrainian forces against a much less motivated adversary.

But her resilience in the face of an enemy with greater means also points to the continuing Western military superiority.

No doubt the training and intelligence supplied, as well as of course the weapons, have played an important role.

Even without delivering the most sophisticated systems, Western support has had a fundamental weight, which is a reminder that two decades of supposedly great modernization of the Russian forces on paper have produced a very mediocre result.

Here, China will also be recalculating the real potential of untested modernization investments.

“The war has made us verify many things: that the Russian forces depend more on Western technology than we thought, that the level of internal corruption is higher than we thought, and that the quota of well-equipped and trained troops was small against to a great majority with lower standards”, says Alberque.

“However, to conclude as some do that the Russian military is pathetic would be a serious mistake.

They have suffered severe setbacks, lost a lot of materiel, are not as flexible in command and control as the Europeans, but they do rely on volume, and they are still a pretty formidable force.

There is a risk of overestimating their problems”, continues the analyst.

Clüwer Ashbrook agrees: “They have suffered a lot, but they are not down.

Still there.

They also learn, adapt, moving their arsenals away from the new Ukrainian reach, unleashing a barbaric offensive against civilian structures.

They also have resilience."

Just as the Russian difficulties should not precipitate too radical conclusions, neither is it rational to conclude that all is well for the West.

The Ukrainian conflict demonstrates how ill-prepared many of its arsenals and industry are to sustain prolonged frictional war efforts, Alberque says.

There is a lack of ammunition, sufficient spare parts of certain elements.

"Probably the large concentration of spending on a small number of highly sophisticated weapons programs is also a mistake," says the IISS expert.

The conflict has also highlighted the need to recalibrate anti-aircraft defenses.

Both high-quality systems are needed to intercept ballistic missiles, as well as simpler, widely usable systems to defuse the potential of cheap drone swarms.

As for the cyber domain, the conflict demonstrates that a well-organized defense can disable a potentially deadly tool.

This section, according to Alberque, recalls the need for thorough preparation to adapt to the threats posed by adversaries.

Ukraine's resilience lies in the fact that it has been in combat with Russia since 2014 and since then, albeit with limited means, it has made extraordinary efforts to adapt to risks.

The expert believes that many European countries have not adequately prepared to face serious military challenges.

The geopolitical plane

In geopolitical terms, perhaps the main considerations linked to the invasion are a lesson and a portrait.

The lesson is the risks inherent in excessive dependence on an adversary in a world connected like never before.

The portrait is the photo of the state of force and the positioning of countries and blocks before the will to change the world order that, among other things, the Russian attack represents.

In the first aspect, in addition to the total decoupling of the West and Russia, it is worth noting the movements of the former to reduce its dependence on China.

This covers different areas of supply chains, including strategic raw materials, as demonstrated by the European Commission's plan to promote greater EU resilience in this area.

“The big question is how far this decoupling will go.

The level of interconnection is such that I believe that a selective decoupling is most likely”, says Morillas.

“It is a very complex movement that will generate tensions within countries, within the EU and within the transatlantic community.

China is aware of the enormous strategic asset that this dependency implies, and tries to cultivate it”, observes Clüwer Ashbrook.

Regarding the strength and positioning of countries and blocs, the moment has been revealing.

The West has responded "with a considerable degree of unity" to the invasion, according to Clüwer Ashbrook.

The reaction in terms of sanctions on Russia and military, financial and humanitarian support for Ukraine has been swift and very significant.

The expert highlights how the previous conditions were far from ideal, not only because of the tear between both sides of the Atlantic that occurred during the Trump period, but also because of the friction that surfaced even in Biden's, as evidenced by the withdrawal from Afghanistan or the Aukus pact (the military agreement signed between the US, the UK and Australia).

Both these disagreements and the alleged decline of the West in the early stages of the century, with the economic crisis of 2008, the triumph of populist forces, with the weak reaction to Russian offensives in Georgia (2008), Ukraine (2014) and Syria (2015) were, along with other factors, among Putin's calculation items.

All these elements are being reconsidered on a global scale, with the renewed vigor of NATO – which Macron declared a state of cerebral coma a few years ago.

The West closed ranks, and has acted effectively.

Also, within Europe, “the EU's ability to converge ranks and come up with quick, workable solutions has been quite impressive,” says Ashbrook, sidestepping many problematic elements, such as Hungary's vetoes.

Morillas agrees in appreciating the resilience of the Atlantic bond and of the European reaction and also calls for maintaining significant caution in its long-term projection.

The year of the invasion has made it clear that there is nothing in the world comparable to the degree of unity exhibited by the countries of NATO, the EU and their Asia/Pacific partners such as Japan, South Korea or Australia.

Russia, by contrast, has found no open support for its brutal challenge to the world order.

The invasion is an imperialist movement, to reaffirm power in its environment, but also a brutal manifestation of rejection of the world order embodied around Western values ​​after World War II.

No doubt Moscow yearns to pioneer a broad movement of subversion.

But, for now, this is not materializing.

China, which signed a declaration with Russia in February that precisely presented a vision of an alternative global order and announced a relationship with Russia without limits, has shown that limits exist: it does not want a disruption of the global economic order or to irritate the West to the point of to profoundly disrupt the commercial imbrication from which it derives so much benefit.

Even so, in the geopolitical section as in the military, the central affirmations are full of nuances.

“In short, the reaction of the West has been remarkable;

but no steps have yet been taken to ensure that this reinvigoration will last.

Problems and strategic divergences remain between the western partners”, points out Morillas.

Clüwer Ashbrook warns, in particular, that within the EU it should not be taken for granted that cohesion remains and continues to be effective.

The expert points out the clear cracks in the Franco-German axis, and a shake up of the usual West/East balances of power within the EU, with the credibility of the former touched, while the countries of the latter claim the validity of their historical vision of alert to Russia, as well as bearing an important part of the weight of receiving refugees and aid to Ukraine.

On the other hand, if the nucleus of liberal democracies that brings together some 40 countries in Europe, North America and Asia/Pacific has closed ranks well, the West has not been able to achieve strong support in the global South.

Dozens of these countries voted against the invasion at the UN —a total of 141, compared to the 4 that voted with Russia, 35 abstentions and 12 that did not exercise their right to vote—, but they have not joined the sanctions .

The 35 who abstained in that vote represent half of the world's population.

The non-aligned defend their position vigorously, and cases such as Saudi Arabia —a traditional US ally that has maintained its own course in oil production policy— or India embody this well.

“New Delhi does not like the invasion, let alone the nuclear threats, but it does not yield to the wishes of the West.

He makes it clear that he has his interests, a huge market to supply energy, and as long as Russian crude suits him and the West offers nothing better, he continues on his way”, comments Clüwer Ashbrook.

"In this more complex, multipolar world, the middle powers try to play a weighty role," adds Morillas.

In this context, even with big blows like the asset freeze, sanctions against Russia are limited in scope.

The Russian economy has contracted, no doubt it faces serious production problems due to lack of components, but there has been no slump, the ruble remains stable.

These are some considerations linked to the war in Ukraine.

There are, of course, many more, from the fundamental role of leadership and communication to reflecting on the cost of not vigorously opposing certain trials in time, only to later have to endure a much greater onslaught.

Underlying it all is the eternal lesson, shared by all conflicts, of the enormous suffering of civilians.

Among many other things, the unjustified and illegal Russian aggression will be remembered for the abjection of plunging the non-combatant population into darkness and cold.

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