Ten years after the death of Hugo Chávez and more than six years after that of Fidel Castro, most of the territory of Latin America is governed by the left.
However, the differences between them seem more pronounced than at the beginning of the 20th century, when those two leaders tried to conduct regional politics from premises inherited from the revolutionary and anti-imperialist leftism of the Cold War.
Today, almost all leftist governments come to power through democratic means, do not try to perpetuate themselves, maintain good relations with the United States and do not alter the macroeconomic structures of their countries.
During the first progressive cycle, the differences between the ruling lefts in Latin America were perceptible, but shrewdly managed.
The same in relation to their respective constitutional frameworks as in the policy towards the United States and the rest of the continent.
Very different were the experiences of the governments of Tabaré Vázquez and José Mujica in Uruguay, Ricardo Lagos and Michelle Bachelet in Chile, Néstor and Cristina Kirchner in Argentina, Chávez and Maduro in Venezuela or Correa and Moreno in Ecuador.
Even so, during that cycle, the strong regional integrationism produced geopolitical consensus, in the face of US administrations as dissimilar as those of George W. Bush and Barack Obama.
In the new progressive cycle, more encompassing than the first, the differences are exacerbated by the absence of stable and inclusive regional forums.
Unasur fails to recover from the rout of 2018, as a reaction to the Venezuelan conflict.
Celac, despite the efforts of governments such as those of Andrés Manuel López Obrador in Mexico and Alberto Fernández in Argentina, or the prompt reintegration of Brazil, does not find a solid succession scheme either, like the one that existed in its first stage: when the
pro tempore
presidency
alternated between administrations of very different ideological signs such as Chile, Cuba, Costa Rica and Ecuador.
In recent times, disputes have been reproduced, although the hegemonic left tries to hide or minimize them.
These are disputes whose primary source is the tension between democracies and authoritarianism, which goes beyond the division between left and right, but is projected onto regional geopolitics with obvious costs.
The very different tones of criticism or tolerance of the human rights situation in Venezuela, Nicaragua and Cuba, by presidents of the new left, such as Alberto Fernández, Gabriel Boric and Gustavo Petro, have provoked subtle reprisals from the Bolivarian pole in the Celac summit in Mexico;
in the lack of support for the constituent process in Chile and in the ambivalent support for the peace process in Colombia.
The frictions have in their favor the new diplomatic presidentialism, which reinforces the role of heads of state in foreign policy.
This presidentialism translates into a search for regional support for internal struggles between governments and oppositions, as presidents López Obrador, Arce and Petro have done in favor of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, in the midst of her judicial process, or in favor of former president Pedro Castillo, after his dismissal by the Peruvian congress.
It is also reflected in a greater verbal disinhibition of the leaders when giving their opinion on internal conflicts in countries where their allies do not govern, as has been seen with the questioning by López Obrador and Petro of the Peruvian president Dina Boluarte, recognized by the Puebla Group and the governments of Chile and Brazil.
With everything and their leading role, the positions of López Obrador, Petro and Fernández cannot be assimilated to the activism of Evo Morales or the most ideological sectors of the Bolivarian bloc and its continental bases.
Morales has deployed in recent months a strong proselytism within Peru, especially in Puno, as part of his Runasur project: a new variant of regional alliance, mainly in the Andes, although with growing ties in the bases of unions and social movements of the Southern Cone.
In his recent trips to Argentina and Brazil, Morales has reinforced these ties in a perfect staging of the relativism of respect for national sovereignty and the self-determination of peoples.
The very agenda of the plurinational State, promoted by Morales in South America, lacks constitutional consensus on the left of the subcontinent.
This activism, however, the same as that which is put into practice in favor of the regimes of Venezuela, Nicaragua and Cuba, is not assumed as "intervention" but as "solidarity".
The intervention is denounced when it comes to critical visions of authoritarianism, left or right, or ties with the United States, although López Obrador reiterates that interventionism in Mexico has come to an end.
When referring to the promotion of the Bolivarian axis or the casuistic Latin American diplomacy of the Mexican president, sovereignty or the "Estrada doctrine" are put into question.
The disagreements, not admitted or rhetorically concealed, already have costs for regional integrationism, as could be verified in the last Summit of the Americas in Los Angeles, where there was no common Latin American position.
Or in the postponement of the meeting of the Pacific Alliance, in Mexico, so relevant for its enormous capacity for convocation and its pragmatic commitment, focused on a priority relationship with Southeast Asia.
The worsening of the old political crisis in Peru and the multiplicity of positions it generates also reduce incentives for a relaunch of the Pacific Alliance, frowned upon by the Bolivarian bloc.
Another cost is already beginning to become evident in the different way of handling the migratory crises in Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean.
Given that the Mexican government postulates that integration must include the United States and Canada, which, for most of the left, is a contradiction in terms, its negotiation of the immigration issue with Washington generates tensions with its own Latin American neighbors.
López Obrador and his government tend to compensate for these tensions through a demagogic and paternalistic relationship, more discursive than practical, with Cuba, Venezuela and Nicaragua.
These disputes, and those to come, should convince the ruling left that integration cannot advance or be lasting if it aspires to be based on ideological harmony, within a region that is largely democratic and, therefore, plural, or on friendship between rotating presidents.
Unfortunately, the facts are not enough to convince governments that prioritize the immediacy of the exercise of power and gradually abandon State diplomacy, in the medium and long term, without which real progress in integration will always be impossible.
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