Is a war between the US and China likely in this decade? X-ray of a growing risk

Zhang Youxia (in the center) is sworn in as the new vice president of the Central Military Commission, on the 11th, during the National People's Assembly, in Beijing. POOL (via REUTERS)

The relationship between the world's two great powers, the United States and China, is in a dismal state, and it is getting worse on multiple fronts.

The hope of the beginning of the century that the strengthening of commercial ties would generate a positive dynamic has given way to the confirmation of stark competition, a rivalry with the appearance of moving towards confrontation and that arouses concern.

Is there a real risk that this negative spiral will degenerate into a war?

Is it possible for this to happen even in this decade, as some authoritative voices warn?

The experts consulted for this information and many of the studies and opinions published on the matter agree on an area of ​​consensus that can be summarized as follows: a military conflagration involving the two powers in the short and medium term is not likely, but the risk it exists and is clearly on the rise ―especially due to the possibility of accidental escalation in the midst of so much tension, mistrust and poor communication―.

This concept is almost omnipresent in the analyses, which warn that it would be a serious mistake not to take it adequately into account in all political and economic calculations.

The analysis has two main planes.

One, wide angle, is the overall evolution of the relationship between the two powers.

Another, more focused, is the question of Taiwan, the epicenter in which the friction between the two tectonic plates can turn into war.

Both show troubling dynamics.

In the former, "the most likely development is that the competition, the rivalry, will probably intensify and broaden in scope," says Ben Bland, director of the Asia-Pacific program at Chatham House think tank.

“Before the balloon incident [over US territory], both governments had shown a willingness to contain tensions.

But then things have been happening, and this is symptomatic of a relationship with a lot of friction.

Once certain forces have been unleashed within a society, in the political, economic, and media spheres, it is very difficult to redirect”.

In the other there are also problematic symptoms.

“Peace and stability around Taiwan have been maintained because the three parties [China, Taiwan and the US] accepted a high degree of ambiguity.

The problem is that the room for ambiguity is shrinking everywhere.

With it, the possibility of finding exit ramps shrinks ”, continues Bland.

“The bilateral relationship is at a very low point.

The tension is very high.

This does not mean that either party wants war.

But the higher the tension, the more likely it is that a conflict could break out both intentionally and accidentally,” says Helena Legarda, a lead analyst at the Mercator Institute for China Studies specializing in defense and foreign policy.

"At the moment I do not think it is a very high risk, I do not think it will happen imminently, but the risk exists and it is on the rise as the competition worsens," she concludes, in an opinion that summarizes a broad consensus.

Below is a look at the issue, from how the tension has been rising to the reasons for trusting that containment prevails and the risk elements that can trigger a conflict.

The tension

Faced with the confirmation of the strong rise of China and the conviction that the Beijing regime is in an increasingly authoritarian evolution and determined to alter the world order in its favor, in recent years the US has been hardening its position.

Washington supports its interpretation on various factual elements, from Chinese expansionism by way of facts in disputed waters to closing ranks with regimes like Russia and Iran;

from the increasing internal repression and total surveillance of society to the great military development or the increasingly nationalist tone.

His reaction has been all over the spectrum, from Donald Trump's tariffs to the strengthening of alliances in the region -such as Aukus-, including restrictions on technology exports, especially microchips.

“The US maintains that [the measure of the microchips] is very focused.

But being honest, we must recognize that these products have a dual use [civilian as well as military], so present in various sectors of the Chinese economy, that there is an element of containment of the rise of China, of the Chinese economy as a technological power ” says Meia Nouwens, a senior analyst at the International Institute for Strategic Studies specializing in Chinese defense and security issues.

“The objective of this is not only to maintain the current gap between the two, but to try to widen it.

Obviously, this has provoked a redoubled effort on the part of China to ensure resilience in this area, to overcome dependency.

The set of these actions is enraging Beijing.

The new foreign minister, Qin Gang, has recently warned: "If the United States does not step on the brakes and continues to accelerate on the wrong path, there will not be enough guardrails to prevent derailment, which will turn into conflict and confrontation."

Xi Jinping himself expressed the irritation unusually explicitly recently: "Western countries, led by the United States, are implementing a containment, encirclement and complete suppression of China."

The warnings and resentment of the West's alleged suffocation moves are reminiscent of Putin's many years of grievances before moving on to the most brutal avenues of fact.

The rivalry includes an arms race, a technological one, great efforts to reduce mutual dependence, a struggle to win the support of non-aligned countries, among other areas.

Sparks appear daily.

In the last few days alone, the Aukus alliance has laid out its plans to equip Australia with nuclear-powered submarines;

Beijing conducts military exercises in the Gulf of Oman together with Russia and Iran while announcing that Xi will visit Putin in Moscow next week;

Washington has warned TikTok that it will be prohibited from operating in the US if Chinese shareholders do not sell their share ―for fear of data transmission of US citizens―;

China has appointed a Washington-sanctioned general as defense minister, making channels of dialogue difficult, and Taiwanese manufacturing company Foxconn, famous for being a key supplier to Apple, has announced that it intends to greatly reduce its activity in China.

At the specific level of Taiwan, the dynamics are not reassuring either.

Beijing insists that what he calls "reunification" is an inalienable objective and, although he stresses wanting to achieve it through peaceful means, he does not rule out the use of force.

“The concern is justified, it is evident.

On the one hand, Xi has said that it is a matter that cannot be passed down from generation to generation.

On the other hand, in Taiwanese society, an immense majority recognizes itself in a feeling of local identity and less and less in a Chinese identity.

They clearly evolve in a direction that is far from the interests of the continent,” says Xulio Ríos, emeritus adviser at the China Policy Observatory and author of

(Editorial Popular).

Various gestures or words from the US have also stirred up the situation.

The visit to Taiwan last August by the then Speaker of the House of Representatives - Democrat Nancy Pelosi - sparked the ire of Beijing.

On the other hand, President Joe Biden has departed from traditional positions by repeatedly stating that Washington would come to Taiwan's defense if it came under attack.

The shift from traditional ambiguity to increasing clarity on this issue is one of many metamorphosing elements.

The change in power relations and attitudes destabilizes and produces dangerous tension.

containment

The prospect of a war around Taiwan involving both powers is so frightening that it alone is an element of pause and contention for any rational mind.

The destructive potential of the two armies is practically unimaginable.

The global economic impact would be colossal in scale.

"Studies have been carried out that estimate that just a naval-air blockade could in the first instance subtract two trillion dollars from the world economy, without even taking sanctions into account," says Legarda.

Taiwan is a key producer of microchips, an essential component in a huge range of sectors of the modern economy.

The two parties are also interconnected by a commercial relationship of enormous volume, which does not stop growing despite all the tensions, in what constitutes the main difference with the Cold War, when the two main powers did not share ties of this kind. guy.

Trade in goods between the US and China reached a value of about 690,000 million dollars in 2022 (of which about 536,000 are US imports).

On the other hand, the most alarmist voices must be put in context.

In the US, high-ranking officials have repeatedly pointed to the date of 2027 as a worrying horizon, being the one that Xi points to for the fulfillment of certain objectives of modernization of his armed forces.

The US Navy's chief of operations said last October that dates as early as this year should, however, be considered as possible for a Chinese attack on Taiwan.

“Certain rhetoric partly responds to the attempt to increase pressure so that Congress and the Executive branch invest sufficiently in certain Defense capabilities, or to spur diplomatic conversations on how to react”, comments Nouwens.

Experts point out that there are multiple factors that rationally lead one to think that China has no interest in launching into a conflict now.

“Although they have taken giant steps in recent decades, they still have a long way to go to complete the modernization of the country.

This for them is an absolute priority.

To achieve this, they need stability.

And, of course, a conflict around Taiwan would dynamite that path of development”, says Ríos.

China is now embarking on a campaign to increase its degree of manufacturing and economic self-sufficiency, and it stands to reason that it will want to develop it in the first place before any risky maneuvers.

Where does the US import from?

Chinese 18.4%

Mexico 14.1%

Canada 12.7%

Germany 5.1%

Viet Nam 2.7%

UK 2.5%

Indian 2.3%

France 2.3%

Brazil 1.2%

Russia 0.9%

Where does China export to?

USA 16.8%

Hong Kong 11.2%

Japan 5.7%

Indian 2.9%

UK 2.5%

Russia 2.0%

Mexico 1.8%

Brazil 1.4%

Spain 1.1%

Where does the US import from?

Chinese 18.4%

Mexico 14.1%

Canada 12.7%

Germany 5.1%

Viet Nam 2.7%

UK 2.5%

Indian 2.3%

France 2.3%

Brazil 1.2%

Russia 0.9%

Where does China export to?

USA 16.8%

Hong Kong 11.2%

Japan 5.7%

Indian 2.9%

UK 2.5%

Russia 2.0%

Mexico 1.8%

Brazil 1.4%

Spain 1.1%

Where does the US import from?

Where does China export to?

Chinese 18.4%

USA 16.8%

Hong Kong 11.2%

Mexico 14.1%

Japan 5.7%

Canada 12.7%

Indian 2.9%

Germany 5.1%

UK 2.5%

Viet Nam 2.7%

UK 2.5%

Russia 2.0%

Indian 2.3%

Mexico 1.8%

France 2.3%

Brazil 1.2%

Brazil 1.4%

Russia 0.9%

Spain 1.1%

Where from

import usa

Where to

export china

Chinese 18.4%

USA 16.8%

Hong Kong 11.2%

Mexico 14.1%

Japan 5.7%

Canada 12.7%

Indian 2.9%

Germany 5.1%

UK 2.5%

Viet Nam 2.7%

UK 2.5%

Russia 2.0%

Indian 2.3%

Mexico 1.8%

France 2.3%

Brazil 1.2%

Brazil 1.4%

Russia 0.9%

Spain 1.1%

Nouwens pronounces himself in similar terms with respect to the military dimension.

“It is true that in some areas they are reducing the distance gap with respect to the US, but in others not so much.

This is a factor that leads me to think that a war is not imminent”, says Nouwens.

In a recent interview with this newspaper, the director of the Stockholm International Institute for Peace Studies, Dan Smith, introduced another element that suggests that at least in the short term there will be no movements: the war in Ukraine.

"I think China will be watching the development of that conflict very carefully."

Some of the lessons undoubtedly invite caution: the enormous difficulties that an invasion represents, the distance that can exist between the status of a power with modernized forces and the real effectiveness in the field of combat, the united reaction of the West, among others. .

In this context, Beijing will pay special attention to how durable and solid the unity of the Westerners is.

The risk

But these elements do not allow us to conclude that the risk of conflict in the medium term is negligible.

The dynamics are negative in both principal planes.

In general, Nouwens agrees with Bland in expressing "concern" at the finding that both governments seemed to be seeking to stop the deterioration, which became visible at the Bali summit in November, but the attempt "has not worked".

On the question of Taiwan, everything is moving in the direction indicated by Bland of reducing the margin of ambiguity necessary to preserve balance.

Xi, experts say, is a much more assertive leader than previous ones, and his language on the matter has been sharpening.

He has clearly linked “reunification”, in Beijing parlance, to his grand goal of “rejuvenating” the country.

"Xi is a leader who has shown a willingness to sacrifice economic interests in the name of political-strategic objectives, of ideology," observes Legarda.

The rhetoric in Washington is also becoming sharper, with increasingly thick words, especially from the Republican ranks, but ultimately with some bipartisan consensus.

Meanwhile, Taiwanese society is moving in the opposite direction to the interests of Beijing.

En paralelo, las lecciones de la guerra de Ucrania tampoco son todas negativas para Pekín. “Por un lado, porque suministrar apoyo a Taiwán, una isla, sería mucho más complejo que lo que ocurre con Ucrania. Por otra parte, porque China ha trabajado muchísimo en cuestiones deficitarias clave de la campaña rusa, como aspectos de logística y manutención”, comenta Nouwens.

Y la deriva ideologizada de las relaciones internacionales no ayuda. Cuanto más se afirme el marco democracias frente a autocracias, más se convertirá Taiwán en una cuestión simbólica, emocional, y se alejará del territorio de las gestiones pragmáticas, lo que representa un nuevo obstáculo.

2024 será un año clave, con elecciones presidenciales en Taiwán y EE UU. Una nueva derrota del Kuomintang ―partido que representa para Pekín la mejor opción de solución pacífica― en la isla representaría un mensaje muy contundente para el continente. No es descontado que ocurra. “La dinámica a nivel social es claramente desfavorable para el continente, pero luego está la dinámica partidista, y en esa el Kuomintang sigue teniendo sus opciones”, observa Ríos. Pero sin duda hay claras posibilidades de que sufra un enésimo revés. Por otra parte, una victoria de un halcón republicano en la Casa Blanca tensaría aún más la situación.

La gran pregunta es, ante una creciente evidencia de que alcanzar su objetivo por la vía pacífica es imposible, qué hará Pekín ―y cuándo―. Todos los expertos consultados señalan que no hay ninguna prueba de que China haya tomado una decisión de agredir y que tenga una fecha fijada para ello.

Pero más allá de las decisiones de Pekín, con estos elementos, la principal preocupación es una escalada inintencionada. Un conflicto que brote no de una decisión ponderada, sino de una espiral de acciones y reacciones. El escenario base es el de tensiones y presiones crecientes, con medidas de baja intensidad, intentos de interferencia en el proceso político taiwanés, creciente apoyo de EE UU, etc.

“Un conflicto militar a escala total alrededor de Taiwán sigue siendo improbable. Pero considerando la actividad en la región, el riesgo de errores de cálculo, de incidentes, está creciendo”, apunta Nouwens.

“Sin duda, hay preocupación por una escalada no intencionada”, dice Bland. “Las tensiones están aumentando, no hay confianza, no hay buena comunicación. Hay muchas incertidumbres. Cuando empiezas a tener más ejercicios y actividad militar en la zona, se eleva el riesgo de que las cosas descarrilen por error. Hay cada vez menos rampas de salida. Así que el riesgo está al alza. Sabemos que en el pasado algunas guerras empezaron de forma muy deliberada y explícita. En otras, se entró como en un estado de sonambulismo. Hay sin duda un riesgo de eso”.

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