Russia's arms exports have fallen to levels not seen since the collapse of the Soviet Union.
- Russian arms exports have fallen by 2011 percent since 70. Most recently, only twelve countries ordered.
- Russia continues to lose economic influence and is increasingly dependent on oil and gas exports.
- The development also strengthens states such as China or India - to which Russia has to subordinate itself more and more.
- This article is available in German for the first time – it was first published by Foreign Policy magazine on May 3, 2023.
After peaking in the early 2010s, Russian arms exports have fallen to levels not seen since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Wall Street Journal called the drastic decline in Russian arms exports one of the "casualties of Russia's war in Ukraine."
But the timing is not right: according to the Stockholm Peace Research Institute, Russia's arms exports began to decline seriously in 2019 and were already almost 20 percent lower than in 2011, the peak of the Russian arms industry. In that year, Russian arms exports were almost equivalent to US arms exports and were delivered to 35 different countries. Eleven years later, Russian arms exports had fallen by almost 70 percent and went to only twelve countries.
Since 2011, Russian arms exports have fallen by 70 percent and recently went to only twelve countries. (Archive photo) © Kirill Kudryavtsev/AFP
Russia's arms industry in the Ukraine war: The war is the death knell for exports
Even though the war against Ukraine dealt the death blow to arms exports from Russia, the industry had been at an end for some time.
What do Russia's declining arms sales mean for the country's position in world politics, which already has significant and largely self-inflicted wounds? They point to a further erosion of Russia's international influence – and Russian President Vladimir Putin – and an increasing reliance on oil and gas exports. Back in 2015, in the Washington Post, Maria Snegovaya warned the West to consider Russia "as an ordinary petrostate, and not as an extraordinary superpower." In view of the lull in the Russian arms industry, this assessment is even more true today than it was then.
Ukraine war: Russia's economy must subordinate itself to China and India
Perhaps most importantly, the decline in arms sales is a sign of Moscow's increasing dependence on the interests of India and China – and subordination to them. Russia is now more dependent on arms sales to these two countries than at any time since 2003 – albeit with much lower export volumes and given that both India and China continue to build their own arms industries that compete with imports.
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Russia's arms boom at the beginning of the 21st century was fueled by increased purchases in China, India and Algeria – Russia's three largest export markets – as well as expansion into "new" markets in the former Soviet Union. The former Soviet republics of Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, overwhelmed with oil and gas revenues, began stocking up on Russian weapons and weapon systems, including battle tanks, attack helicopters, and surface-to-air and anti-tank missiles.
However, it was also at this time that Russia began to expand its role as a preferred exporter for revisionist and rogue leaders such as Hugo Chávez in Venezuela and Bashar al-Assad in Syria. Russian arms transfers to Syria skyrocketed from 2010 to 2013 in the run-up to and during the first years (and during the heaviest fighting) of the Syrian civil war, when the United States, the European Union and other countries imposed arms embargoes on Damascus.
Weakening of the economy: This is why Russia's arms sales collapsed even before the war
After a decade of strong Russian arms sales, headwinds emerged in the mid-2010s. Venezuela's economy collapsed in 2014, as did Syria's arms purchases. The rising oil prices of the previous decade were replaced by lower and more volatile prices, which constrained demand from oil-rich neighboring countries. After Russia's annexation of Crimea, the United States and other Western countries began to pressure third countries not to buy Russian weapons.
At the same time, Russia's largest export markets, India and China, began to change. Under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, India's defense industry benefited from India's general focus on local procurement, which led to an increase in domestic production and a decline in imports.
China's economic boom in the 2000s facilitated the development and modernization of its military-industrial complex, causing Russian imports to decline and Russia to compete as an arms exporter, especially to developing and middle-income countries. Although China remains a major destination for Russian exports, China's imports from Russia have declined overall since the late 2000s. As Ukrainian fighters report more and more Chinese components in captured or destroyed Russian weapons, the war appears to be reversing the previous flow of trade, at least temporarily.
Russia's influence in global affairs is waning: bulk of exports to four countries
The decline in arms sales is both a symptom and a cause of Russia's waning influence in global affairs. Arms sales and military in-kind contributions are among the most powerful levers used by the major powers to exert influence on foreign governments. They are useful for developing strategic partnerships and serve as carrots or sticks in explicit quid pro quo diplomacy, such as US military support for Israel and Egypt as a lure for signing the Camp David Accords.
In 2010, Russia exported weapons to 37 countries, including EU members Cyprus and Slovenia, as well as Western Hemisphere countries Brazil and Mexico. These arms exports reflect Moscow's resurgence as a world power under Putin after more than a decade of political and economic instability. In 2022, Russian arms exports reflect its increasing isolation: 91 percent of exports went to just four countries: India, China, Belarus and Myanmar – two rising powers, a vassal state and a global pariah. The headwinds of the mid-2010s have grown into a veritable hurricane.
Russia's weakening position as an arms exporter also increases its dependence on exports of oil, natural gas and other raw materials, as well as comparatively low value-added exports such as fertilizers and steel. Although Russia is a major player in the food and fuel markets, its assets rise and fall with commodity prices like those of other exporters. Moreover, Russia's tendency to arm its food and fuel exports – both demonstrated in the Ukraine war – has reduced its credibility as a trading partner.
Growing dependence on India and China: Russia's economy has problems
In the short term, war-induced market instability led to bubbling coffers and stabilized the Russian economy, which is suffering from sanctions and rising war costs. However, as world prices weaken, Russian export and government revenues are declining. Europe is learning to live without – or at least significantly less – Russian oil and gas, which brings us to perhaps the most important impact of Russia's declining arms sales: its growing dependence on India and China.
India and China have been Russia's economic lifelines during the Ukraine war and the resulting Western sanctions. As of mid-April, more than 90 percent of Russia's crude oil exports went to these two countries by sea, and China alone doubled its purchases of Russian liquefied natural gas in 2022. As other export markets for Russian weapons have also dried up, India and China now have larger market shares in the sector than at any time in the last two decades.
And one or both markets can change rapidly. Russian arms exports to India are currently stalled because New Delhi fears it will run afoul of Western sanctions and because the Kremlin needs to divert weapons for its own military. The US Department of Defense does not miss the opportunity offered by the sanctions to wean countries off Russian military technology.
Russia's economy in the Ukraine war: Less trade with traditional partners
With fewer weapons flowing to traditional trading partners and fewer export destinations available for its products, Russia is losing one of its best – and most vulnerable – sources of diplomatic influence over other countries, especially those where it might otherwise compete with the West for influence. Indeed, the United States has increased intelligence sharing, military support, and exports to India in order to reduce its dependence on Russian weapons and as part of Washington's strategy to balance China in Asia.
In the longer term, China will become Russia's most important trading partner, as Chinese imports of cars, industrial machinery and semiconductors have replaced imports from Europe. But the more Russia depends on China for exports and imports, the more the strategic autonomy that arms exports are supposed to offer dwindles.
The war in Ukraine makes a quick reversal of Russia's fate extremely unlikely for several reasons. The first and most obvious reason is that the Russian defense industry cannot even keep up with domestic demand, as Russia depletes its weapons stockpiles and reintroduces long-mothballed Khrushchev-era tanks. The purpose of a military-industrial complex is to supply the war machine with domestic production; Arms exports take a back seat to supply the war effort.
About the author
Cullen Hendrix is a Senior Fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, a Non-Resident Senior Research Fellow at the Center for Climate and Security, and a Professor at the University of Denver. Twitter: @cullenhendrix
Western sanctions in the Ukraine war restrict supply chains that are important for Russia
Second, Western sanctions are restricting the supply chains on which the Russian defense industry depends. According to a recent report by the Center for International and Strategic Studies, Western sanctions have led to massive procurement problems for Moscow, especially in the fields of semiconductors, night vision technology and avionics. Even if demand were to rise again, it is not clear whether Russia would be able to satisfy it.
And finally, the war was a humiliating showcase for Russian military technology. Images of "headless" tanks and reports of high failure rates of Russian missiles may be part war propaganda, part reality. Focusing on the technical shortcomings of Russian weapons systems could unduly diminish the ingenuity and effectiveness of the Ukrainian armed forces. Whatever the reasons, the war in Ukraine has not been a particularly convincing advertisement for Russia's state-of-the-art military technology.
As the war in Ukraine drags on, Russia is – by some standards – less isolated than it was immediately after the invasion. In addition to trade relations with China and India, Russia's trade with countries from Costa Rica to Indonesia and Turkey has increased. But its arms exports, a key tool used by countries to form coalitions and expand and protect their interests, have declined dramatically. The war in Ukraine and subsequent sanctions have put the spotlight on Russia's declining arms exports, but the problems had been piling up for nearly a decade – and there is no clear path to reversing the trend. (Cullen Hendrix)
Cullen Hendrix is a Senior Fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, a Non-Resident Senior Research Fellow at the Center for Climate and Security, and a Professor at the University of Denver. Twitter: @cullenhendrix
We are currently testing machine translations. This article has been automatically translated from English into German.
This article was first published in English in the magazine "ForeignPolicy.com" on May 3, 2023 - in the course of a cooperation, it is now also available in translation to the readers of IPPEN. MEDIA portals.
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