The long-awaited Ukrainian counteroffensive, which could be in its early stages, may be as fruitless as the Russian winter offensive.
Defenders often have advantages over attackers in trench warfare, and the Russian military has had months to dig in.
But it is also possible that Ukrainians will make progress that will give a glimpse of the end of the war this year.
And then? How should it end?
Masks of Russian President Vladimir Putin, Wagner owner Yeugeny Prigozhin, Chechen regional leader Ramzan Kadyrov and Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko. EFE/EPA/ANATOLY MALTSEV
We can start by listing the ways it shouldn't.
The first is the one suggested last year by French President Emmanuel Macron.
"We must not humiliate Russia," he argued, "so that on the day the fighting ceases we can build an exit ramp by diplomatic means."
At the time, "do not humiliate Russia" was code for allowing Russia to keep its ill-gotten gains while on the offensive.
Error.
A crushing and unequivocal defeat is precisely what is needed to put an end to Russia's imperialist ambition.
It is easy to forget now that last year's invasion wasthe third time Vladimir Putin launched a war of conquest, intimidation and annexation against his neighbors, following the invasion of Georgia in 2008 and the seizure of Ukrainian soil in 2014.
And that's not counting the cyberwar against Estonia, the murders on British soil, the downing of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 or the annihilation of Grozny.
Each act of aggression went virtually unpunished, tempting Russia to commit the next.
If the war in Ukraine ends with Putin having achieved at least some of his goals and without suffering irreparable consequences for his regime, the only "exit ramp" the West will have found is Putin's on-ramp to his next outrage.
Similarly, if Ukrainian forces cross Russian lines in ways that prompt Putin to seek an agreement – probably through Chinese mediation – some will argue that a ceasefire and armistice on the Korean model is preferable to the risks of dramatic escalation.
It is possible that the Kremlin will try to encourage this line of thinking by rattling its nuclear saber again, this time even louder.
But while the nuclear threat should never be ruled out, it seems hollow if examined closely.
The reason Putin has not used tactical nuclear weapons in this war so far is not because of moral scruples that could vanish if he feels cornered.
It's because those weapons, which were originally designed to destroy large concentrations of armor, make little sense on a sprawling battlefield.
And because the Biden administration has threatened unspecified "catastrophic consequences" if Russia uses those weapons, perhaps with the sinking of Russia's Black Sea fleet or some otherNATO's kinetic but non-nuclear response.
The biggest problem with the armistice model is that it freezes the conflict in a way that would allow Russia to resume it once it has licked its wounds and regained its strength.
As for Ukraine, it would have to become a garrison state even when its economy has been crippled by war.
Those who make the analogy with South Korea overlook two things.
First, Russia is inherently a more powerful state than North Korea.
Second, peace on the Korean peninsula has been maintained by a large and continuous U.S. military presence for 70 years, a presence that relatively few Americans would be willing to duplicate in Ukraine.
The alternative is to win.
It is what Ukrainians deserve, what the vast majority want and what they demand from their political leaders.
This goal has been both hampered and aided by President Joe Biden's fluctuating willingness to provide Kiev with the tools it needs to win.
He has also been hampered by his own ambivalence about the outcome he really wants, other than not letting Russia win and not blowing up the world in the process.
There are two types of victory.
The first, and riskiest, is to provide Kiev with the weapons it needs – mainly long-range guided missiles, more tanks, Predator drones and F-16s – not only to drive Russia out of the territories it seized in this war, but to regain Crimea and the breakaway "republics" of the east.
This is what Ukrainians want, and what they are morally and legally entitled to.
But reconquering Crimea will be difficult, and even success will have costs, mainly in the form of populations that are not necessarily eager to be liberated by Kiev.
Hence the second option:
Help Ukraine restore its pre-February 2022 borders, but no beyond, with compensation in the form of accession to the European Union and a U.S.-Ukraine bilateral security treaty inspired by U.S. security cooperation with Israel.
Would this increase U.S. exposure to Russian aggression?
No, he would lower it, for the same reason that Putin did not dare to attack the Baltic NATO member states, but attacked Ukraine twice:
Dictators prey on the weak, not the strong.
Would it satisfy Ukraine's need for security?
Yes, both in guaranteed access to European markets and to American arms.
And would it humiliate Putin?
In the best possible way, by demonstrating to him and other despots, inside and outside Russia, that aggression against democracies is never profitable.
c.2023 The New York Times Company
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