Video: Israeli naval cover attacks in Gaza and the encounter with Golani forces/Photo: IDF Spokesperson
On 7 October 10, on the morning of Black Saturday, Gaza Division Commander Brig. Gen. Avi Rosenfeld updated the commander of the Ashdod naval base, Col. Eitan Paz, with intelligence information about what was happening on the Palestinian side, and asked him to remain vigilant in the area. According to military sources, a message was also conveyed in the spirit of the instructions of the senior military echelon: not to carry out unusual actions.
Sources within the defense establishment claim that this instruction was passed "downstairs" in order not to create escalation vis-à-vis Hamas, which would think the IDF was headed for an attack. During those minutes, an unusual network was identified on the Palestinian side, but no one assessed in any way that Hamas was facing an attack by thousands of terrorists at dozens of points along the border, including the maritime border.
However, during those minutes, Col. Paz made several fateful decisions contrary to recommendations. He bounced a platoon commander from vacation at home, urged the commander of the Bee Patrol to reach the base, raised the alert level of a force aboard a bee, and sent a crew from a fin unit aboard a wasp-type vessel out to sea. Military naval officials said after the initial investigation that the base commander's decisions advanced the transition from routine to emergency. "The decisions made by the base commander prevented more killings," says a military source, "He cocked the bee first in the sea and then everything else."
A bee boat patrols the coast of the Gaza Strip, this week/Amir Bohbot
And yet, even on this front, the attack struck Israel. At 06:29, the first attack of rockets and anti-tank missiles began. At the anchorage in the northern Palestinian port, dozens of Palestinian fishing boats were at the time. The commander of the Ashdod base instructed all the security vessels to go out to sea and defend the maritime border. These included, among other things, four bees, kingfisher vessels and wasps, and while firing was activated by means of an "attacking collector" system on a small mast to the border. According to Israeli naval sources, until those rocket barrages, the commander of the navy, Maj. Gen. David (Sa'ar) Salameh, had not been alerted on the border with Hamas.
It should be noted that unlike the direct attack on Camp Reim, where the Gaza Division headquarters is located, the Ashdod base was not attacked by terrorists and therefore the naval base's attention was focused only on defending the border line, and after the line was penetrated - preventing a raid on the beach.
Indeed, during those minutes, according to the Israeli navy's observers, four speedboats belonging to the naval commandos of Hamas' military wing, carrying 35 Nukhba naval fighters, broke out. At the same time, Hamas terrorists fire anti-tank missiles at Israeli naval observations and blow up part of the border fence. Colonel Paz conveyed to the forces at sea over the radio the order: "Destroy in your sector." The first to open fire and hit - two female fighters and two fighters from a fin unit on top of a wasp. Three boats were destroyed. In some cases, the fighters had to charge at the boats at close range.
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A fateful decision that prevented fatalities. Eitan Paz/IDF Spokesperson
But one boat carrying 11 terrorists who evaded the fire reached Zikim Beach, and the terrorists raided the beach. Apparently, two or three of them were killed by Israeli naval fire, and the remaining eight opened fire on civilians on the beach, stormed the toilets and murdered civilians who were hiding. The Erez Human Resources base is attacked, a Golani Brigade soldier is killed and another is wounded.
The terrorist squad reached Kibbutz Zikim and tried to penetrate it, but the alert squad bravely repelled the attack. Kills about six terrorists, and the remaining two or three return to shore. Only after searching the Magellan fighters a few days later were they also killed after encountering at close range. Later, harsh criticism would be raised: Why were searches not carried out in the field, including the rescue of the bodies from the toilets at Zikim Beach, until two days later?
In the days that followed, Hamas naval commandos tried to carry out a number of diver squads, but failed. Navy fighters managed to repel the attacks and kill the terrorists, two of them on the very shoreline. The IAF continued to assist in other areas: Shayetet 13 fighters mopped up settlements and outposts, and today the navy backs the ground maneuver in attacks on terrorist targets by firing directly at Hamas terrorists.
This is where the murder spree began. Zikim Beach/Official Website, Photo - Ashkelon Beach Spokesperson's Office
On this front, too, there is a fierce debate over the intelligence information in the IAF's possession before the attack, with accusing fingers pointed in all directions. Sources within the navy strongly criticized the IAF's intelligence shipyard for not providing advance warning and, accordingly, no preparations for such a reference scenario were built, and the alert level was not raised at a time when the forces could be reinforced to repel a broad attack. On the other hand, military sources claim that over the past year the shipyard has conveyed professional opinions and assessments several times on Hamas' training for a broad attack on Israeli communities, their capabilities, and their level of preparedness – but IDF intelligence sources claimed that they were deterred and aimed at deepening the arrangement.
Col. Paz assumed command of the Ashdod naval base in August and brought an offensive spirit to the sector. Already upon taking office, a fisherman who exceeded the permitted Palestinian movement zone was killed on suspicion of smuggling. The force was forced to fire at the end of a chase after the fisherman did not respond to their calls. Despite the criticism voiced in the IDF over the operation that complied with the orders, the commander of the navy, Maj. Gen. Salma, gave Paz complete backing for the attacks and the initiative to repel provocations and infiltrations by Palestinian fishermen operating under Hamas' aegis. But this is an isolated incident. Now, there are those who argue that the force did not do enough to draw red lines.
"The writing was on the wall. The navy allowed Hamas' naval commando force to train openly off the coast of Gaza, thereby accumulating knowledge, combat experience and strengthening," said military sources, who strongly criticized the force. "It was a clear danger. Be alerted to it. After all, who promised you that while training at a distance of 2 kilometers from the maritime border, they are not in a hurry to raid the shores of Israel? Protection against divers is very, very complex. The IDF created a great weakness for itself by permitting this activity. Moreover, they did not create deterrence vis-à-vis the fishermen, including those in disguise, and employed the navy in pursuit along the Egyptian and Israeli borders instead of establishing a clear position on what is permitted and what is forbidden. The open-fire regulations made things easier for the fishermen. In the ratio of forces between the navy and a terrorist organization like Hamas, terrorists were not supposed to infiltrate Israel and certainly not go ashore. There must be end-to-end systemic change. The blow is very painful and there is much more to investigate."
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