“In the Tula hype, football and Peronism coexist harmoniously.
In history, at the end of the 1940s,
a crisis arose between these two popular passions
,” writes journalist Ariel Borenstein in the introduction to his book
The Soccer Boys
(Aguilar).
The subtitle is forceful:
the union struggle of the players and the Argentine absence from the 1950 and 1954 World Cups
.
In times where the third World Cup star obtained in Qatar 2022 still shines, this journalist and researcher was interested in investigating
what was happening with the round
during the heyday of Perón and Evita.
A golden era for many that, at the same time, did not include the participation of the Argentine National Team in the World Cup.
A rarity for local sports.
At the same time, a strong conflict arose due to the birth of Argentine Soccer Players.
Borenstein wrote the unauthorized biography
Don Julio Grondona, the owner of the ball
, published in 2001. Together with the filmmaker Damián Finvarb he made the documentary films
In Work
(2013);
Journey to the center of production
(2014),
Between cats universally brown
(2018) and
Player of the world
(2022), about youth export soccer in Rosario.
“I was interested in investigating the peculiarity that one of the most important union conflicts of the time was
carried out by soccer players
,” he tells
Clarín Cultura
.
Assembly of footballers.
Photo: archive
–In your book, dilemmas are narrated around the professionalization of football and the drifts that Perón had in this regard. Why was this debate generated?
–Professionalization at that time had at its center the demand of the players to be able to make a living from football, which they could not do during amateurism, in which they had to have a separate job.
In 1948, when the footballers launched a strike, football had already been professional for 17 years.
However, the leaders and the Peronist AFA respond with the announcement of a return to amateurism.
If it had been implemented, it would have been to implement an elitist criterion of sport, in which only those who do not have to work, those who have free time to train, can be competitive.
But the players had the support of the fans and the AFA did not move forward in that regard.
There was no turning back in professionalization.
–This also speaks a little about how the link between football and politics comes almost from time immemorial. Where do you think the interest lies between these areas?
–To the extent that soccer in Argentina moved from English schools to the pastures, since its practice became popular, politics paid attention to the social impact that soccer generated.
In all eras and with all types of governments he got into football.
Paradoxically, football successes do not solve the political problems of governments.
The operation of political use of the 78 World Cup did not prevent strikes against the dictatorship from taking place in 1979;
In the election following the 1986 world championship, Alfonsín lost the legislative elections in 1987 and now after winning in Qatar, the same phenomenon occurred.
On the other hand, the profile of “representative of the clubs”, of “football man” was what allowed Julio Grondona to be the most powerful leader in history.
Obviously, he was able to do it by knowing how to relate to politics at different times, but at the same time defend his corporation.
"The soccer boys", by Ariel Borenstein.
Value: $16,599
"To the extent that soccer in Argentina moved from English schools to the pastures, since its practice became popular, politics paid attention."
–Returning to Peronism, why do you think it had so much connection with sports such as boxing, basketball and motorsports and not so much with football?
–He had a hierarchical bond with football.
In fact, the presidents of the AFA were people who responded to Evita.
But still, in Maradonian terms, Peronism lost its way with football.
He could not reconcile the interests of the players with those of the leaders, he could not help solve the conflict and a six-month struggle broke out.
To make matters worse, a pirate league outside of FIFA, like the Colombian one, comes with a lot of money and takes the best players of the time en masse, which opened a very big crisis.
"Peronism lost its way with football. It could not reconcile the interests of the players with those of the leaders"
–Regarding this, it is a topic that you touch on quite a bit in the book. What was happening with Colombian soccer in those years?
–Colombia in some way advanced the problem that Argentine soccer is inserted into the framework of world soccer.
He took the best players, something that Europe later began to do when it began to rebuild itself in the post-war period.
When stars like Pedernera, Di Stéfano and Pipo Rossi, among dozens of figures, left, it was done in a proportion that had never happened before.
–Another of the central axes is the non-participation of the Argentine National Team in the 1950 and 1954 World Cups. Why do you think this happened?
–In 1950, this exodus to Colombia that I mentioned before was growing and the players at that time did not play for the national team when they were in another country.
So, the government, which gave a lot of importance to sports results, was afraid of not doing a good job in the return to the World Cup.
Above it was in Brazil, which until then Argentina had historically dominated but which had been growing.
Finally, the champion was Uruguay, which in the 1940s Argentina vastly surpassed.
In 1954, despite the famous matches against England and other international friendlies, there were still doubts about the team's competitiveness.
–You will narrate several strikes and forceful measures of soccer players, as well as the emergence of Unionized Argentine Soccer Players. Do you find a relationship between these combative and committed footballers and current footballers?
–"The Soccer Boys" made history on the field and as workers.
They formed the guild and the leaders were the players themselves.
They held massive assemblies.
They sustained a union struggle against a government that was prestigious in the eyes of all workers.
They never broke with Peronism.
But they did not understand why Perón did not legalize Unionized Argentine Soccer Players while he promoted the unionization of other workers.
Today, conditions are very different.
The stars, the Pedernera and Di Stéfano of this era, were formed with the aim of going to Europe.
Although their identification with the football country occurs through the national team, they are oblivious to day-to-day life.
However, already in these globalized conditions Maradona attempted a global grouping of players.
Once, together with Valdano, they raised their voices at a World Cup against FIFA.
In this group you don't see that vocation to be subjects on and off the field.
"They never broke with Peronism. But they did not understand why Perón did not legalize Unionized Argentine Soccer Players"
–How would you describe the footballer of that time?
–He was a player committed to the game, to the show and to his rights.
He was an actor who played with all his might to join the working class with his particularities.
But at the same time he related to the tango artists of the time, who was not afraid of film sets since they were called upon for many films of that mass cinema flourishing in those years.
–Before you mentioned Alfredo Di Stéfano, the star of the time. What could you say about what he represented?
–Di Stéfano was the emerging figure who was also part of that movement.
In his case, he eventually became one of the first global players.
First in Colombia and then in Real Madrid, which he turned into a multi-time European champion.
In his memoirs, he showed the personality of those soccer boys.
In the chapter on the strike he is lucid enough to affirm that Perón played against them in the strike but at the same time highlight that it was a government that in general gave things to the workers.
That is to say, he did not go back even a millimeter in relation to his experience of that conflict, but he could see the whole field and have a more nuanced vision of the phenomenon of Peronism.
–You also mentioned Adolfo Pedernera, to whom you dedicated the book. Why do you highlight it?
–He was a star of the time.
When Guardiola was asked about his decision to play Messi as a false 9, he cited Pedernera in La Maquina, River Plate's historic forward.
From that position of figure he committed himself to his companions and his time.
He was a leader in the fight.
At the same time, he was clear about the specificity of the player as an “artist.”
He explained that he combined the status of a star with that of a worker.
He was a dialectician.
–What could you point out about the AFA bosses that you analyze in the period contained in the book (Oscar Nicolini, Valentín Suárez)?
–As in all previous governments, for example those of the infamous decade, they were presidents of the AFA linked to the government in power.
Nicolini, who was an important official in the Peronist government, was the state representative in football.
Valentín Suárez worked in the legendary Ministry of Labor and Welfare.
After the strike, the government needed a person who knew how to deal with the players as workers.
But in the case of Suárez he never left football again and in the 60s he returned to the presidency of the AFA as a fully fledged leader.
–What do you think about the idea that clubs can become sports corporations?
-I am against.
In the documentary that we presented this year together with the filmmaker Damián Finvarb (Pelotero del mundo) we question the place of Argentine soccer as a supplier of players to the economic center.
The bottom line of the debate is whether Argentina should be naturalized as a supplier of “raw materials” and passively subordinated to the peripheral place it occupies today.
In that context, the proposal to move towards a football of investment funds is a step backwards that, I understand, there is awareness in many sectors of football to reject.
MS/JS