Since the peace agreement between Israel and Egypt was signed in March 1979, relations between the parties have seen a few ups and downs.
Terrorist attacks based on nationalistic Israelis (including diplomats) on the one hand, and disputes regarding policy towards Lebanon and the Palestinians on the other, have often led to the return of ambassadors home.
But despite everything, the agreement is defined by the Egyptians as one of the "pillars of Egyptian national security".
Or as President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi said: "Egypt has adopted peace as a strategic trend."
The agreement gives Egypt peace on the front that occupied it for three decades in five wars, a peace that allows it to free up budgets for channels other than the army.
Peace fosters its regional and international status, among other things as a mediating factor between Israel and the Palestinians or other Arab countries, and gives it an image of a peace-seeking country in an extreme and hostile Arab space.
The peace also enables Egypt to cooperate closely with Israel as part of the war on terror in the Sinai arena.
But despite the variety of advantages, Egypt has not yet internalized the essence of peace with Israel.
A "cold peace" prevails between the two, with no attempt on the part of the authorities in Cairo to warm the relations between the peoples or to act to change the opinion of the Egyptian public and its perception of the citizens of Israel in particular and the Jews in general.
Establishment Egypt, let alone the masses of the people, still see Israel as a potential adversary with whom strategic equality must be achieved.
These things were reflected in a long and comprehensive modernization process, mainly military, which began in the early 80s of the last century.
Egypt itself has allowed the smuggling industry, especially of weapons, to reach monstrous proportions, and now denies the existence of the tunnels and is offended by the very accusations against it
This point leads us to the issue of the Philadelphia axis, which has made headlines in recent weeks.
After the Israeli withdrawal from the Strip in 2005, Israel and Egypt reached an understanding, under which a force of 750 Egyptian border guards will occupy the 12-kilometer axis and work to prevent terrorism and smuggling from Sinai to Gaza.
However, Egypt itself turned a blind eye and allowed the smuggling industry - mainly of weapons - to reach monstrous proportions, and now denies the existence of the tunnels and is offended by the accusations against it.
Therefore, only an Israeli occupation of the Philadelphia axis and control of it will lead to the closing of the loopholes from Sinai, will cut off Hamas from the supply pipes of its weapons and will contribute significantly to the collapse of the terrorist organization.
However, the Sisi regime is not interested in this.
Despite the hostility to the Muslim Brotherhood in general and Hamas in particular, the Egyptians maintained a close relationship with the leadership in Gaza.
From Cairo's point of view, the terrorist organization is a deterrent to Israel whose elimination will reduce the degree of Egyptian influence on the Palestinians.
This is why Egyptian consent to an Israeli return to the Philadelphia axis means giving a green light to the overthrow of Hamas and aid to Israel in its war on the Palestinians - a step that Egyptian public opinion will not tolerate, and as a result the leadership will not accept.
Another point concerns Egypt's fear of the transfer of responsibility for Gaza to its doorstep, and of a wave of refugees that will wash over the Philadelphia axis and breach the border towards the Egyptian and Sinai Rafah.
In the eyes of the Egyptians, such a move would be the result of a deliberate Israeli effort, and therefore al-Sisi announced that any Israeli attempt to uproot Palestinians from Gaza in order to settle them in Sinai would be grounds for war.
So how do you settle the dispute and achieve the goals of the war without jeopardizing relations with "Umm al-Dunya" (Mother of the World) and without harming them?
It should be remembered that the Israeli activity in Gaza reflects on our enemies, but also on the countries with which we signed a peace agreement.
Revealing a weakness, or God forbid ending the campaign in what might be perceived as a loss, will encourage everyone to challenge Israel and squeeze profits from it.
Therefore, alongside the necessary need to take control of the Philadelphia axis in order to collapse Hamas, positions must be coordinated with Egypt, the importance of the mutual security interest in the action must be explained, and above all, Cairo must be reassured that Israel has no intention of settling the Gazans in Sinai.
Presenting a preliminary outline of the "day after" plan may help.
Dr. Yehuda Belanga is an expert on the Arab world in the Department of Jewish Studies at Bar-Ilan University
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