The pretensions of relegitimization for the uninterrupted exercise of power by appealing to war – offensive or defensive – as an instrumental factor, nourishes a large part of human history.
The “reason of State” subsumes rights, guarantees, mobilizes society, and, mainly, crystallizes all internal dissidence in pursuit of the common objective such as the defense of the nation, territory, and inhabitants.
Therefore, it is not new that this situation is reproduced in the current circumstances where different conflicts configure scenarios of tension that involve both state and non-state actors.
In its worst facet, relegitimization seeks to be a direct result of the generation (by action or omission) of an external crisis, this action being not only the heritage of totalitarian regimes, but also of nations considered democratic.
In the latter, democracy is put “on pause”, in the former, rigid political control aims to inhibit internal criticism and challenges to leadership that must be averted for the sake of internal governance.
An approach that we could apply to the case of China as the year 2027 approaches, the intended date for reunification with Taiwan and the end of the third term of President Xi whose leadership is already being tested.
Therefore, internal factors play an increasingly determining role in final decisions about military conflict or not.
Underlying and not always visible intra-elite and intra-Party political tensions emerge and update internal debates about the “country model” to which China aspires;
The shift from liberalizing practices to others of greater state control in the economy manifests these tensions.
The negative combination between “centralization of political power”, greater state control over technology companies and the harassment to which foreign capital and national business are subjected seem to stifle expectations about economic recovery.
Internal criticism of presidential “deviationism” with respect to the original reformist spirit has emerged, not only coming from foreign governments and transnational economic actors but, mainly, from relevant political figures whose representativeness has been historically recognized, such as Party elders or old political leaders, among others. , the highest-ranking living general Song Ping (106 years old) belonging to the “revolutionary old guard.”
Mentor and promoter of former President Hu Jintao, his words would have resonated strongly: in October 2022 he would attend the expulsion of his protégé from the sessions during the 20th Congress.
However, in 2023 during the closed sessions held in the Beidahe resort, former Vice President Zeng Qinghong would have raised similar arguments
Other criticisms would come from retired PLA officers (Gen. Li Yazhou), critics of China's belligerent stance towards Taiwan and opposed to the “partisanship” of the Armed Forces.
In line with these events followed the dismissal of former Chancellor Qin Gang, a former Minister of Defense, and purges of senior military leaders, including commanders of the strategic missile force accused of corruption.
Another factor to consider are the internal tensions motivated by the attempt to stifle alternation options in the face of a not-too-distant leadership transition where “Dedism” (à la Mao) would not work as a method of selection and legitimation of a leader belonging to the “sixth.” generation".
However, despite the growing challenges as Minxin Pei (Claremont McKenna College) poses regarding Xi's position, "...his control of the levers of power remains unassailable...", even when he does not appear to act "... .by force, but by insecurity….”
Given this situation, external factors but, above all, internal factors in the face of growing challenges to the authority of the top leader, could increase the risk of a military confrontation in the Taiwan Strait which, it is presumed, would silence the escalation of intra-party dissent. .
If this situation occurs, countries like Argentina must adopt positions that are far from ideological prejudices, which not only prioritize economic variables, but arise as a result of a tight strategic evaluation of the probable evolution of the global, regional and, in particular, the dichotomous situation. Sino-American relationship in the face of a possible change of scenario in the hegemonic power.
For all that has been said, in 2024 we have just entered a three-year period of greater uncertainty.
Approach to India and ASEAN
Fernando Pedrosa
/ Political scientist.
Professor in Contemporary Political Processes, UBA
The change of Government opened debates on topics that seemed closed, such as ties with Asia and, especially, with China.
In this framework, the decision not to join the BRICS and gestures with the representation of Taiwan generated political noise, especially among analysts, diplomats and experts.
What was seen was a somewhat hysterical reaction: “how are we going to offend China, on whom we depend so much for its contribution to the national economy?”
This originated – and it must be remembered for its absurdity – because a deputy had accepted 300 sweet breads from the Taiwanese to distribute during the Christmas holidays.
Then it was accentuated by the aforementioned events.
What stands out when discussing Asia is our lack of knowledge.
The idea that an ideological rift separates two countries over the benefits produced by trade is typical of the blinders of our domestic policy, rather than the foreign policy of Asian countries.
Asia in general, and China in particular, maintain foreign relations based on a pragmatism that, above all, separates politics from business.
In fact, China is Taiwan's main trading partner and signed a free trade agreement with Australia, Japan and South Korea, countries aligned against it.
At the same time, it integrates the BRICS together with India, with whom it maintains war on their common border.
Ignorance also hides that the relationship between Argentina and China must be reevaluated.
Although China is a large buyer of agro-industrial products, at the same time, the trade balance is unbalanced in its favor.
That is, we buy much more from them than they buy from us.
Just the opposite of what happens between China and Brazil (with Lula and before with Bolsonaro).
Each country, of course, does what suits it.
The Chinese seem more interested in increasing loans in the form of debt and adding Argentina to their forums of geopolitical challenge to the United States, rather than discussing the trade imbalance.
To avoid dependence and asymmetry, we must see Asia beyond China's borders.
In fact, the sum of Argentine exports to India, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia and South Korea exceed those to China.
Another little-disseminated fact is that in 2023 the main destination for Argentine grain and by-product exports was Vietnam and this has happened for the second consecutive year.
Focusing exclusively on China prevents us from seeing countries like India, with renewed geopolitical prominence and an immense market.
Trade with India has not stopped growing and, unlike China, with a surplus for Argentina.
India has become Santa Fe's main customer and the first destination for vegetable oils produced in the country.
Southeast Asia is another region where progress must be made, especially with Indonesia, Vietnam, and Malaysia, which are important trading partners of Argentina.
Furthermore, these countries, along with the Philippines, Thailand, Brunei, Singapore, Laos, Myanmar and Cambodia, make up the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), from which there is much to learn.
As Mercosur languishes, and the European Union is the unattainable yardstick to measure whether regional integration is successful or not, ASEAN presents an alternative model.
Joint action in ASEAN allows small and medium-sized countries to maximize their geopolitical power in a region full of nuclear-armed giants.
At the same time, it has strengthened the business climate, improving its economies and security at its borders.
Asia is more than China.
But in Argentina there are politicians and academics who insist on a Sinocentric vision of Asia, sustained by fantasies of investments that never arrive or assimilating the Chinese model to a kind of Soviet Union 2.0.
But none of that is the responsibility of the Chinese.
We Argentines continue to be the ones who have difficulty leaving the strict ideological frameworks that we use to understand how reality works, although, time and time again, reality works in another way that we do not want to see.