As of: February 11, 2024, 7:36 p.m
From: Foreign Policy
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Donald Trump could become President of the USA again.
Europe must prepare for this eventuality – and focus on its own defense.
Authors Doug Klain and James Batchik analyze how Europe should react to a possible US President Trump.
A risk factor: The EU could not hope for military support if Trump is re-elected.
The experts Klain and Batchik recommend that Europe increase its own defense capabilities.
This article is available for the first time in German - it was first published by
Foreign Policy
magazine on January 31, 2024 .
Washington, DC – When US President Joe Biden declared that “America is back” after Donald Trump was voted out in the 2020 US presidential election, many European capitals were relieved.
Now that relief is being replaced by a bitter realization: America may be back, but perhaps not for long.
After winning the New Hampshire primary on Jan. 23, Trump will almost certainly face Biden in the November election.
In some polls, Trump is ahead of Biden - and there is a real chance he will win the presidency.
Even with Biden at the helm, Europe has had to temper its expectations about the limits of US involvement and the nature of US policy.
As Russia's war against Ukraine enters its third year, Washington's support for Kiev is faltering.
Right-wing Republican lawmakers are blocking Congress from aiding Ukraine.
If an isolationist like Trump were to return to the White House, this could have serious consequences for European security.
Without sustained U.S. support, Russian President Vladimir Putin could be emboldened to pursue his maximalist goals and destroy the security order as we know it.
Trump's closeness to Putin is putting Europe in trouble
European leaders are waking up to this fact and it is time for them to make serious preparations to strengthen their defenses in the event of a second Trump term.
Russia's war in Ukraine and its plans for other European countries have only made the situation worse.
Regardless of whether the United States can provide aid to Ukraine, the way Europe prepares for a possible Putin-friendly U.S. leader could determine whether Kiev is able to survive — let alone — Moscow's ongoing onslaught because, to achieve a breakthrough on the battlefield next year.
The Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has highlighted Europe's security vulnerabilities and dependence on the United States.
The war revealed the poor state of European munitions supplies, the inability to produce the quantities of material required for modern combat operations, and the disturbingly low combat readiness of the armed forces.
Russia's invasion highlighted the importance of U.S. military support to Ukraine's survival and the importance of U.S. commitment to maintaining the deterrent effect of NATO's collective defense mechanism.
The raised fist can be a greeting, a symbol of resistance - or simply a threat.
© AFP
Trump's antipathy toward U.S. allies in Europe and his affection for rulers like Putin are well documented.
In the last year alone, he has bragged on the campaign trail about his ties to the Russian leader, boasted about Putin's embrace of Trump's promise to end the war within 24 hours - and worked to end ongoing congressional negotiations over further aid to Ukraine to sabotage.
Trump has also previously stated that he would undermine NATO: “If Europe is attacked, we will not come to help you,” he reportedly told European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen in 2020.
For their own security, European leaders should spend this year improving their security capabilities and defense readiness and production.
The defense of Ukraine is the defense of Europe.
Putin has made it clear that his ambitions extend beyond Kiev.
When the Russian leader accuses Eastern NATO members of Nazism, this reflects his characterization of the modern Ukrainian state, which served as a pretext for the Russian invasion.
His comments are so worrying that some European leaders are warning that Russia could attack a NATO member state in the coming years.
The Eastern European frontline states, which are among Ukraine's strongest supporters, are increasing their defense spending.
Eastern European leaders have urged their counterparts in other countries to commit billions to Ukraine's defense, now exceeding even the United States' contributions.
US support in the Ukraine war far exceeds that of its NATO partners
The threat that Russia poses to Europe has worried Sweden and Finland so much that they have abandoned their long-standing neutrality and want to join NATO.
(Sweden's accession process now only needs to be ratified by Hungary.) The European Union has also rightly recognized its role in Europe's long-term security, such as the revival of the EU accession process for Ukraine and other candidates, as well as the pace of inter-EU initiatives Members and Ukraine, including the provision of military assistance.
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Despite these advances, the United States remains the primary source of military assistance to Ukraine.
At $44.2 billion, U.S. military aid commitments exceed those of Germany, which ranks second (more than $17 billion), and the United Kingdom, which ranks third (more than $6.6 billion), for a variety of reasons related to the history and scope of assistance.
The EU itself made a groundbreaking commitment to send one million artillery shells to Kiev by spring this year, and EU officials announced that they had finally reached the capacity to produce one million shells.
However, only 300,000 units have been delivered so far.
North Korea, meanwhile, has reportedly sent more than a million of its own shells to Russia.
As the war drags on, Washington's resolve has weakened.
The United States is approaching the sixth month of congressional debate over continued aid to Ukraine, in return for which Republicans are demanding reforms to the U.S. immigration system.
Trump's interventions fuel the idea that no agreement should be reached to prevent a Biden political victory in the election year.
The dwindling support is already leading to tough battlefield decisions for Ukrainian troops, who are rationing ammunition and struggling with less effective air defenses.
Trump's new cabinet could completely end support for Ukraine
During Trump's presidency, Europe was fortunate that Russia had not yet followed through on its threats to wage an all-out war against Ukraine.
Trump, on the other hand, was held back by some of his own officials who advocated a hard line on Russia despite the president's preferences.
European leaders will not be so lucky in a second Trump administration.
The former president's allies are already vetting potential appointees to Trump's Cabinet, guided more by personal loyalty than public service.
During Trump's time in office, it was clear that the vast machinery of the US government prevented him from making rapid, radical policy changes.
Trump and his allies have also learned this lesson and are trying to overcome it.
No European head of state can claim that he was not warned.
Now is the time for them to prepare for Trump's possible return.
European leaders must be ready to meaningfully engage on the issue of European defense at the February European Council, and their priority should be supporting Ukraine's victory.
That means they must agree to a 50 billion euro payment for Ukraine's financial stability, reconstruction and technical assistance.
Passage of the package would give Ukraine much-needed planning certainty over the next four years, as the war continues and Ukraine works toward its long-term integration with Europe, while U.S. support remains questionable.
Only Poland votes against EU aid to Ukraine
Von der Leyen has said the financial aid package must be approved regardless of whether Hungary - whose leader is Putin's closest ally in the EU and NATO - tries to veto it.
“We are ready for an agreement of 26 [countries], but I support and prefer an agreement of 27,” von der Leyen said this month.
Under normal procedures, the unanimous consent of all Member States is required for the package to be adopted, unless creative workarounds are found.
Also important is an agreement on increasing and reforming the European Peace Facility (EPF), which provides military support to Ukraine with a modest 5.5 billion euros, with the EU reimbursing member states' military contributions to Ukraine.
EU members are currently divided over the EPF's internal methods.
But the EU's diplomatic service has called on members to recognize the importance of the package, arguing that decisions taken now "will either allow Ukraine to make decisive progress or seriously undermine its ability to resist the Russian invasion."
Ursula von der Leyen wants to strengthen Ukraine.
© Hannes P. Albert/dpa
While these two packages are a priority, more support is needed - and quickly.
There have already been some commendable efforts.
Finland began stockpiling immediately after the Russian invasion in 2022, and its production of artillery ammunition has already increased fivefold.
German Chancellor Olaf Scholz has encouraged the European External Action Service to examine European states' military aid to Ukraine to determine whether governments are sending as much as they can.
The audit will make it easier to put pressure on EU members that don't send enough.
But there are too few serious efforts to boost European defense production to produce enough weapons or material to meet Ukraine's current needs - let alone Europe's needs if it cannot count on the United States to defend it .
Increasing defense production is a slow process, and the EU faces structural obstacles to providing defense companies with the long-term contracts needed to make a difference in Ukraine.
Nonetheless, the European Council should seriously consider existing ideas for strengthening European defense at its upcoming meeting.
Such as joint borrowing - which was advocated by France and Estonia - or a proposal for long-term financing of EU military projects.
Ukraine's NATO accession should not overshadow important defense issues
In addition, Europe should come to the NATO summit in Washington this summer with a proactive agenda and proposals to improve the Alliance's preparedness and collective defense.
At last year's summit in Vilnius, Lithuania, members had to defer to the United States on most issues, particularly Biden's preference for delaying an invitation to Kiev's NATO membership, even as some members support such a move with growing enthusiasm.
While Ukraine's integration into NATO remains an important issue, it should not prevent the 2024 summit from making real progress on other collective defense issues.
Instead, European leaders must present concrete plans to increase domestic defense spending and work with the United States to make meaningful progress in improving capabilities.
However, adhering to the “2 percent rule” for defense contributions, which experts increasingly see as an arbitrary standard, is of little use.
A European diplomat recently told
Politico
that the United States' toxic domestic politics prevents it from being a guarantor of European security.
Republican politicians who undermine U.S. interests through partisan infighting continue to pose a significant threat to the security of both the U.S. and Europe. However, ongoing instability in the United States should also undermine Europe's efforts to gain greater ownership of its inspire your own security.
Even if Trump does not return to the White House, Europe cannot afford to wait and see whether it would be wise to strengthen its own defense capabilities.
Significant investments in European defense capabilities are critical to meeting the security needs of a modern Europe and should not undermine NATO.
They will only strengthen the transatlantic alliance - and improve Europe's ability to face the greatest military threat it has faced in 75 years.
To the authors
Doug Klain
is a policy analyst at Razom for Ukraine, a nonprofit aid and advocacy organization, and a non-resident fellow at the Atlantic Council's Eurasia Center.
Twitter (X): @DougKlain
James Batchik
is deputy director at the Atlantic Council's Europe Center.
We are currently testing machine translations. This article was automatically translated from English into German.
This article was first published in English in the magazine “ForeignPolicy.com” on January 31, 2024 - as part of a cooperation, it is now also available in translation to readers of the IPPEN.MEDIA portals.