For decades the nuclear issue constituted one of the most sensitive aspects of the relationship between Argentina and Brazil, which improved significantly with the democratic recovery in both countries in the '80s.
The Agreement between Argentina and Brazil for the Exclusively Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy of 1991 closed that rift with the mutual renunciation of nuclear weapons, the deepening of cooperation and the creation of a system of bilateral controls and inspections by the Agency Brazilian Argentina Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) to verify compliance with the obligations assumed by both countries.
Subsequently, this mutual bilateral system was framed within the global safeguards system administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) through the “Agreement between Argentina, Brazil, the Brazilian-Argentine Accounting and Control Agency (ABACC) and the IAEA to the application of safeguards”, known as the Quadripartite Agreement (CA).
In this way, the nuclear facilities of both countries are subject to a double inspection system, one bilateral mutual and the other global.
Both the bilateral nuclear agreement with Brazil and the Quadripartite Agreement were approved by the National Congress.
Since then, these mechanisms on nuclear matters with Brazil constitute a strategic pillar of the relationship with that country.
As part of that process, the understanding was developed to consult each other on global nuclear issues, especially on the Additional Protocol.
Argentina and Brazil are periodically subject to efforts by countries, mainly NATO, to incorporate into the aforementioned control mechanisms the so-called Additional Protocol of the IAEA, promoted since the late 1990s, which offers that Organization the possibility to inspect all types of public or private, civil or military, industrial, scientific or academic facilities, whether nuclear or not.
To date, Argentina and Brazil have not incorporated the controls of the Additional Protocol, which would affect the existing architecture that combines bilateral mutual inspections with those of the IAEA.
A solid tradition in Argentine foreign policy has considered that the Additional Protocol is neither convenient nor necessary for our country, neither technically nor politically.
For its part, Brazil has consistently maintained a negative public stance toward the Additional Protocol.
In the event that efforts are repeated by different countries for Argentina to move towards signing and ratifying the Additional Protocol, the need to articulate with Brazil a joint analysis on the convenience and impact of the Additional Protocol must be taken into account. about the common system that we have built with that country.
Any unilateral step by our country in this matter would in fact entail the repeal of the unified control tool built with Brazil, and would damage a strategic pillar of the bilateral relationship.
Jorge Taiana is former Chancellor and former Minister of Defense