The third year of large-scale war begins in Ukraine after the Russian invasion.
Balance time.
The EU countries have reacted with appreciable unity—except for Hungary's constant annoyance—and vigor to Putin's aggression.
They have supported Ukraine financially and militarily in a joint amount greater than the United States, they have offered Kiev status as a candidate country to join the EU, and they have cut off imports of Russian gas through pipelines.
It was a mistake—Washington's too—the slowness with which certain decisions were made, such as the deliveries of certain air defense systems, tanks or combat aircraft, which were denied at first and then decided to send them after having lost precious time.
What has been done so far is not enough: much more will be needed.
But what has been done is no small thing.
In parallel to this joint balance, runs that of the individual actions of the countries.
In this section, of course, the strength of the geographical factor influences: the closer it is to Russia, the more intense the reaction.
But in a world as dangerous as the current one, the only defense guarantee for Europeans is to jointly increase deterrent capabilities and close ranks.
From this perspective, this column urges Italy and Spain to take a leap in Defense.
The governments of both countries have been impeccably supportive of Ukraine and have facilitated common EU actions in this regard.
They have made political gestures and provided military aid.
But its national contribution is not satisfactory in proportion to its economic capacity.
This is largely due to decades of underinvestment in the sector, which left them with limited capabilities when Putin's invasion broke out.
The past cannot be altered.
The problem is that future plans are not adequate either.
Italy and Spain plan to meet the objective of spending 2% of GDP on Defense towards the end of this decade.
It is an inadequate trajectory for the times we live in.
Both countries should accelerate, and a lot.
Already at the NATO summit in Wales – held in 2014, after Putin annexed Crimea – the allies that did not meet the 2% objective committed to converging towards it within a decade.
Today, 10 years later—and a massive invasion of Ukraine later—both Italy and Spain are very far from there.
Italy, by 1.46%;
Spain, by 1.26%, according to NATO estimates from mid-2023. Other sources point to somewhat different figures, but all far from the objectives.
Both countries have taken steps forward in recent years.
In 2014, Italy spent 1.14%;
Spain, 0.92%, always according to NATO data.
The transalpine country will soon launch a new aircraft carrier, the
Trieste
.
Under the Sánchez Government, Spain is promoting an important series of new material acquisitions.
Their position is not exactly the same.
Italy has a superior set of capabilities, due to a greater economic weight and an investment that, although low, was somewhat higher than that of Spain for a long time.
But both share a history of little or very little attention to Defense and a present of too lukewarm reaction to extraordinary circumstances.
Europe faces a huge challenge.
Ukraine is in difficulty due to a shortage of weapons supplies.
It is not clear that the US remains a backer for kyiv.
It is also not clear that Washington will continue to be the guarantor of European security in the future as in past decades.
Meanwhile, Putin, well supported militarily by Iran and North Korea, and economically by China, is going all out.
Europe must, therefore, change its mentality to guarantee its security.
Some countries have already done so.
Of course, the Baltic countries, Poland or the Nordic countries, very close to the Russian threat.
But also Germany, breaking a deep-rooted culture of renunciation of military force.
Berlin will reach the 2% target this year.
In 2022 it was at 1.5%.
His defense minister says he is aware that it may be necessary to go further.
Indeed, 2% is probably insufficient for the world we are heading towards.
France could have done more in deliveries to kyiv, but, on the other hand, it is the most solvent military power in the EU, with a superior investment record than the other major countries in the group.
Outside the EU, the UK is very active.
Italy and Spain should take a leap similar to that of Germany, with the same decision.
They must do so because Europe needs the capabilities to prevent kyiv from being overwhelmed, and to deter future bad ideas from Putin;
and they must do it quickly because in this sector investments take years to bear concrete results.
This is not a militaristic adventure, it is an investment to protect our security, our freedom, our way of life.
Saving that expense today could be very expensive tomorrow.
To achieve this, it is essential and fair that two countries with 110 million inhabitants and a combined GDP that is double that of Russia contribute vigorously.
The logic that the threat is far away is not valid.
We share a union of destinies.
We must be there in solidarity, not only when it is convenient.
Spain, in particular, should remember that it has benefited enormously from its membership of the EU.
First, with enormous structural funds.
Then, with the strong help after the pandemic.
Now is the time to return a great solidarity action, by creating Defense capabilities that can be put at the service of a common interest.
In Spain there is usually a lot of rapidity in criticizing Germany.
There are reasons for this, especially due to the mistaken
austericide
that Berlin imposed after the 2008 crisis. But Germany paid for the structural funds, endorsed the pandemic funds, and now assumes its responsibility with large investments in Defense.
Spain must now also assume its responsibilities, and that is why it would be very useful if it had new budgets that contemplate this issue.
Italy, although with a different history – founding country of the EU and net contributor – must also take a step forward.
This cannot be just a Franco-German engine thing.
The third and fourth countries of the EU must contribute vigorously.
The current path is insufficient.
The challenge is so great that fear of how public opinion will receive it or of friction in a coalition cannot be a brake.
We must try, explaining well the existential risk we face, the duty of solidarity, and that social progress cannot ignore security.
Act decisively.
We risk everything.
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