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Eight thinkers shed light on the state of the war in Ukraine.
The theses range from a “Second Cold War” to “Putin’s bluff”.
The Ukraine war is entering its third year.
The look into the future seems very open: What will happen next?
In this article, eight prominent thinkers comment on the topic - including ex-NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, retired US general David Petraeus and defense expert Kristi Raik.
Opinions and priorities vary widely.
Is Vladimir Putin bluffing about a “Second Cold War”?
Are the sanctions working?
At least it seems clear: Europe and the West are at a crossroads.
This article is available for the first time in German - it was first published by
Foreign Policy
magazine on February 19, 2024 .
Washington, DC - Russia's war in Ukraine is entering its third year - and the apparent stalemate on the battlefield hides crucial changes.
Russian President Vladimir Putin is betting that the West's divisions and hesitation will give him the victory he was unable to win on the ground.
Fearful of the consequences for their continent's security if the United States withdraws and Ukraine falls, European governments have increased their aid in recent months.
Overall, they have now delivered or promised more weapons to Kiev than Washington - and more than twice as much if economic aid is taken into account.
That's a marked difference from the early days of the war, but it wasn't enough to turn the tide for Ukraine.
When and how will this war end?
The Kremlin has made it abundantly clear that it accepts Ukraine's surrender as the only outcome of the negotiations - while Ukrainians have also made it clear that they will continue to resist being absorbed into Moscow's empire.
Two years later, peace in Europe is not in sight.
To shed light on these and other changes in the war,
Foreign Policy
asked eight prominent thinkers what comes next.
Preparing for a long war
Russia's war in Ukraine is entering its third year, and it looks like the current stalemate will continue.
Neither side wins or loses.
The Russians are making gradual territorial gains at the cost of huge losses and lost equipment.
The Ukrainians have not achieved the objectives of their 2023 counteroffensive, are on the defensive and are also suffering significant losses.
This war of attrition is taking its toll in Ukraine, where President Volodymyr Zelensky recently parted ways with his top military commander, General Valerii Zalushny.
Differences of opinion between the two had previously become known.
Both countries need to mobilize more troops, but there will be no Russian mobilization before Russian President Vladimir Putin's sham re-election next month.
Ukraine, whose population is less than a third the size of Russia, will find it even more difficult to mobilize the forces it needs.
This war is not just about troops, but also about the continued supply of weapons.
Russia is buying drones from Iran and increasing quantities of artillery ammunition and some missiles from North Korea.
Ukraine relies on arms supplies and financial support from Europe and the United States.
The 50 billion euros in financial aid recently approved by the European Union will allow the Ukrainian state to continue functioning, and European NATO members will supply some additional weapons.
There is no prospect of negotiations to end the war in 2024, nor can either side win a decisive victory.
Angela Stent
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However, the United States remains central: it is the main supplier of modern weapons, and its dysfunctional domestic policies could threaten Ukraine's ability to continue fighting Russia.
If Congress does not approve the requested $60 billion in aid to Ukraine and the U.S. government does not accelerate the delivery of advanced weapons, the prospects for Ukraine's ability to defend itself against Russia in 2024 will be much worse.
There is no prospect of negotiations to end the war in 2024, nor can either side win a decisive victory.
The Kremlin has made it clear that it has no interest in negotiations that do not lead to Ukraine's surrender, including the permanent loss of the four territories illegally annexed by Russia in 2022.
The declared Russian goal remains the so-called “denazification” – Russian jargon for regime change – and demilitarization of Ukraine.
No Ukrainian head of state would ever agree to such conditions.
Putin is waiting for the result of the 2024 US elections and hopes that the next US president will stop supporting Ukraine and return to usual relations with Russia.
In this case, Ukraine's ability to survive as an independent, sovereign state would be called into question, with all the implications for security in Europe and beyond.
Proposals for how the war might end - including the Korean model that calls for a ceasefire, no peace treaty and Western security guarantees for Ukraine - assume that Russia would ever accept an independent Ukraine.
As long as Putin or a successor who shares his worldview is in power, this is unlikely.
Whether we like it or not, we are now in the Second Cold War
By Jo Inge Bekkevold, Senior China Fellow at the Norwegian Institute for Defense Studies
When Russian troops invaded Ukraine in February 2022, it was immediately clear that this invasion would accelerate the geopolitical divide between the United States and its allies on the one hand and the emerging Sino-Russian axis on the other.
In 2024, we are significantly closer to a Cold War-like bipolar global divide than we were two years ago.
For one thing, the war has fostered the Sino-Russian embrace by strengthening Beijing's influence over Moscow.
Moscow, largely isolated from the West as a result of the war, now increasingly depends on China as a market for its oil and gas exports, as a supplier of a wide range of consumer goods and as a partner in the development of new technologies.
Beijing's support for Russia's war effort has also deepened rifts between China and Europe.
This is evident in Europe's rejection of China's so-called peace plan for Ukraine, Beijing's notable loss of influence in Central and Eastern Europe (the much-publicized 16+1 dialogue is largely dead and buried), and China's inclusion in NATO's latest Strategic Concept.
Europe's prewar dependence on Russian energy supplies was the kind of vulnerability the West now wants to avoid vis-à-vis China.
Washington and Brussels are taking steps to ease their close economic ties with China;
Beijing, for its part, is increasing its own self-sufficiency.
Finally, Russia's aggression has strengthened transatlantic unity, prompted European NATO members to increase their defense budgets, driven Finland and Sweden into NATO's arms, and forced the United States to re-increase its military presence in Europe.
Russia's war has thus revealed the increasing weakness of the Western bloc.
Europe still suffers from its post-Cold War dreams and illusions.
Jo Inge Bekkevold
Nonetheless, the current situation is different from the original Cold War.
Today, the Sino-Russian partnership rests on a stronger geopolitical foundation than the Sino-Soviet one.
At the same time, the transatlantic unity created by Russia's attack on Ukraine is fragile.
Some European states are delaying defense spending, delaying Sweden's entry into NATO, advocating for autonomy from the United States or disagreeing with efforts to reduce risk vis-à-vis China.
Each case individually may not pose a threat to Western unity, but taken together they are significant.
However, the most visible and important sign of the West's disunity is that former US President Donald Trump questioned the role of NATO and the US's security guarantee to its allies during his presidential campaign.
Russia's war has thus revealed the increasing weakness of the Western bloc.
Europe still suffers from its post-Cold War dreams and illusions.
Accustomed to three decades of peace and globalization, many European politicians appear unwilling to face the realities of war, whether in the form of an ongoing Russian invasion or a new Cold War.
Russian aggression also highlights the rise of nationalism, populism and polarization in the United States and a number of European countries.
During the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union, Washington was able to exploit differences between Beijing and Moscow, while today Beijing and Moscow are in a stronger position to exploit differences within the Western bloc.
Can Europe dare to go it alone?
If Georgia in 2008 and Crimea in 2014 were a wake-up call reminding the West of Russia's aggressive great power ambitions, the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 was an electric shock to Europe's continually deteriorating defenses.
As if that weren't enough, presumptive Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump has now openly called on Russia to attack European NATO members.
Now, as Ukraine enters the third year of a massive land, sea, air and information war, there is a real danger that Russia will gain the upper hand on the battlefield.
US military aid to Ukraine has already dwindled to a trickle, and the prospect of Trump's election victory in November means European leaders face the biggest strategic challenge for their continent in generations.
If Europe fails this test, Moscow would be emboldened to further expand its sphere of influence and undermine its main enemy, NATO, as it has clearly stated.
European leaders openly admit that they must prepare for Europe to be abandoned by the United States, but the big words of French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz have yet to be followed by action.
The actual steps Europe has taken to increase defense spending, boost defense production and help Ukraine win the war are inadequate.
Western debates about Russia repeatedly reveal a lack of strategic clarity and determination.
A Russian defeat is so feared that many in the West would rather have it both ways: Russia shouldn't win and neither should Ukraine.
For Russia, such hesitation is an invitation to fight on until victory.
As we have heard many times, Russian President Vladimir Putin believes that time is on his side.
There is a lot at stake for both the United States and Europe.
A Ukraine defeat would probably do more damage to Washington's credibility in the world than a US withdrawal from Afghanistan.
It would mean losing a conflict that could have been won but that Washington did not choose or dare to win.
If Russia wins in Ukraine, there is a chance that this would finally be the effective shock that forces Europe and the United States to seriously halt Russian expansion.
I would rather avoid this test.
Kristi Raik
2024 is a crucial year to prove Putin wrong and pave the way for a Ukrainian victory.
According to Estonian Defense Ministry calculations, Western countries would need to invest only 0.25 percent of their GDP in military support for Ukraine to enable the country to continue defending itself in 2024 and prepare for a new counteroffensive in 2025.
This investment would be crucial to changing Russia's calculus not only regarding Ukraine, but the European security architecture as a whole.
Long-term Western engagement would force the Kremlin to conclude that it cannot achieve its goals in Ukraine through war.
It would also send the message that Europe has an obligation to defend itself - and that Russia has no chance of gaining anything by attacking its neighbors.
Beyond 2024, Ukraine can win the war if the West increases its support and makes the costs of war prohibitive for Russia.
Moscow can win if the West fails to mobilize the necessary resources and, above all, the will.
If Russia wins in Ukraine, there is a chance that this would finally be the effective shock that forces Europe and the United States to seriously halt Russian expansion.
I would rather avoid this test.
Time to see through Putin's bluff
After two years of war, a dangerous narrative has emerged in Western debates: the conflict is at a stalemate and Ukraine has reached the limit of what it can achieve on the battlefield.
This assessment is wrong – the means for a Ukrainian victory remain firmly in the hands of the West.
But leaders in Europe and the United States must muster the political courage to deliver this victory.
A Ukrainian victory depends on two principles: first, ensuring that Ukraine has everything it needs to defeat Russia on the battlefield, and second, having a viable plan for a secure and prosperous Ukraine after the war.
Russia – backed by impoverished North Korea and heavily sanctioned Iran – is now superior to the combined might of the democratic world.
This is unforgivable.
Different Fogh Rasmussen
The Western leadership has acted far too slowly to provide the Ukrainian armed forces with what they need to win.
The long delay in deploying tanks and armored vehicles allowed Russia to dig in and strengthen its defenses, making it much more difficult for Ukraine to retake its territory.
Similarly, the failure to prepare the Western defense industry for a long war means that Russia – backed by impoverished North Korea and heavily sanctioned Iran – is now superior to the combined might of the democratic world.
This is unforgivable.
The West must put its industries on a war footing to make it clear to Russian President Vladimir Putin that his strategy to outflank the West will fail.
2024 must also be the year in which Ukraine's supporters lay out a clear plan for the country's future.
This should be based on three pillars: long-term security guarantees, accession to the European Union and NATO membership.
In this context, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky asked me last month to chair a new working group to develop proposals on Ukraine's security and Euro-Atlantic integration.
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Significant progress has already been made on security guarantees.
Last summer in Vilnius, Lithuania, the G7 agreed to develop a series of bilateral security arrangements with Ukraine.
Today, more than 30 countries are negotiating with the Ukrainian government;
Britain concluded the first security agreement in January, followed by Germany and France last week.
The prospect of EU membership offers Ukraine a framework for post-war reconstruction and may provide additional security guarantees through the bloc's mutual defense pact.
Ultimately, however, NATO membership remains the only surefire way to ensure Ukraine's long-term security.
There is still too much hesitation in Western capitals in this regard.
NATO leaders must recognize that continued restraint by Ukraine will only lead to further conflict and instability.
As Sweden and Finland have recognized – and as Russia's invasions of Ukraine since 2014 have made abundantly clear – gray zones are danger zones when it comes to Russia.
At this year's NATO summit in Washington, leaders should see through Putin's bluff and extend an invitation to Ukraine to join the alliance.
Accession would not happen overnight, but it would send an unmistakable message to Putin that he cannot stop the process and that his war is hopeless.
In this way, an invitation to Ukraine's membership can help pave the way to peace.
The sanctions against Russia need time to take effect
By Agathe Demarais, columnist at Foreign Policy and senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations
What have we learned from the two years of Western financial and economic sanctions against Russia?
Three topics will determine the way forward.
First, Moscow is winning the information war over sanctions because the prevailing opinion is that these measures are ineffective.
It is difficult to argue otherwise: the Kremlin and its supporters are doing a great job of intimidating anyone who dares to point out the successes of sanctions.
(A real question: If sanctions are truly useless, why is the Kremlin so concerned with discrediting them?)
The fact that the public debate in the West seems to be focused more on the failures of the sanctions does not help either.
Newspaper headlines tend to focus on evasion strategies that support Russia's efforts to acquire semiconductors.
Smuggling certainly exists, but the reality is more complex than the headlines suggest.
Overall, Russian imports of high technology have fallen by about 40 percent compared to the pre-war period - at a time when Russian demand for high technology has probably never been higher.
This is not enough to stop Moscow's war machine, and more must be done to tighten export controls.
Nevertheless, a 40 percent decline is a significant, if unspeakable, success of the sanctions.
There will likely be more such cases in 2024, highlighting the important fact that sanctions are a marathon, not a sprint.
Agathe Demarais
Second, the impact of sanctions on the Russian economy is becoming increasingly clear, especially in sectors that have been deprived of Western equipment and know-how, such as aerospace and energy.
Given gradual attrition and lack of access to US and European technology, Russian companies face growing maintenance problems.
S7, a Siberian airline, was forced to ground its Airbus jets and reduce the number of employees in January because it had no access to engine parts.
That same month, Lukoil, a major Russian oil refinery, was forced to shut down a cracking plant after a Western-design compressor failed.
There will likely be more such cases in 2024, highlighting the important fact that sanctions are a marathon, not a sprint.
Their cumulative impact will be large, underscoring the fact that, despite grandiose claims about unlimited Sino-Russian friendship, Chinese products cannot fully meet Russian high-tech needs.
At least not at this stage.
Third, the Western debate over the future of Russia's central bank reserves will remain heated and dominate discussions among like-minded allies.
On the one hand, the United States and Britain are pushing for Western countries to confiscate Russia's foreign exchange reserves and transfer them to Ukraine.
Your argument is a moral one: the aggressor must pay.
On the other hand, several European Union countries - including Belgium, France and Germany - oppose this plan, saying it would undermine confidence in Western financial infrastructure and currencies.
The European Central Bank (and, more interestingly, the International Monetary Fund) has joined this cautious camp.
Since the majority of the frozen Russian assets are in Belgium, nothing can be done without the EU states being brought on board.
But Brussels, Paris and Berlin are unlikely to budge, especially as transatlantic relations shift to a wait-and-see approach ahead of the US presidential election in November.
A seizure of Russian reserves in 2024 therefore appears unlikely.
Considering the potential unintended consequences of such a move, this may not be bad news.
How Ukraine can help itself in war
By Franz-Stefan Gady, consulting senior fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies
To reduce its dependence on Western arms supplies, Ukraine is increasingly focusing on producing more of its own weapons.
The result can be seen, for example, in the Black Sea, where maritime drones developed and produced in Ukraine have decimated the Russian fleet, and in Russia itself, where the number of reported explosions at defense-related facilities and infrastructure such as refineries and fuel depots has increased sharply.
While Kiev rarely comments on these attacks, they are widely believed to be carried out by Ukrainian drones.
These Ukrainian successes are important, but turning the tide of the war requires a decisive advantage in battlefield firepower, particularly in artillery ammunition and combat drones.
This, in turn, requires a significant increase in military production not only in Europe and the United States, but also in Ukraine itself. The challenge for Kiev is great: before the Russian invasion in 2022, Ukrainian defense companies were focused on producing Soviet-era equipment specialized and struggled to meet the Ukrainian military's demand for modern weapons.
For this reason, Ukraine's 2024 defense budget allocates the bulk of procurement funds - about $6.8 billion - to the purchase of foreign equipment.
Ukraine receives help from Western governments, defense companies and private initiatives to retool and expand its defense industry under wartime conditions.
The German company Rheinmetall, for example, wants to start producing armored vehicles in Ukraine this year.
The Kyiv Alliance of Defense Industries has recruited more than 60 companies, including dozens of foreign firms, to facilitate investment in Ukraine's defense sector and localize production.
Baykar, the Turkish manufacturer of the Bayraktar drone, announced this month that it had started building a drone factory in Ukraine.
Ukraine is also becoming a laboratory for new ways of developing and producing weapons.
Franz Stefan Gady
The West's interest in the Ukrainian defense sector - particularly in domestic drone technology - is great.
However, Russian attacks still deter many American and European defense companies from investing in the country, as a single Russian missile or drone could wipe out a multi-million dollar investment.
The Ukrainians have tried to avoid this risk by dispersing production to smaller, more dispersed facilities that are harder for Russian intelligence to detect and collectively wipe out.
Ukraine is also becoming a laboratory for new ways of developing and producing weapons.
Without much government mandate, private and citizen-led initiatives have created a decentralized innovation ecosystem for collaboration in electronic warfare, cybersecurity, combat drones, naval drones, cluster munitions, battle management technology and more.
Kyiv has established coordination platforms that have generated hundreds of project proposals from these initiatives, which in turn have led to dozens of defense contracts.
The Ukrainian Defense Ministry has also reformed and accelerated its certification process, with new weapons being tested directly on the battlefield.
The challenge is not innovation, but increasing production in the face of skills shortages, supply chain bottlenecks, corruption and Russian attacks.
One possible path is the expansion of Ukraine's military-industrial base into NATO territory through joint ventures with Western companies backed by a special investment fund.
Not only would this provide Ukraine with a steady supply of NATO-standard weapons immune to the West's political whims, but it would also send a clear signal to Moscow that time - and the West's fickleness - may not be there after all. has on his side.
How will the Ukraine war continue?
It depends on.
Any answer to the question about the future of Russia's war in Ukraine must begin with one sentence: It depends.
Indeed, the course of the war will depend on a number of crucial developments.
First and foremost is the level of support that the US Congress will ultimately agree on.
This is extremely important because Washington has so far provided almost as much military aid as all of Europe put together.
In addition, the US has often paved the way for other countries with its decisions about the supply of certain types of weapons, such as Western tanks and aircraft.
Equally important - since Europe has provided twice as much aid to Ukraine as the United States when non-military aid is included - will be the level of support from the European Union and its members, as well as other Western countries.
Russia's war in Ukraine has been going on for two years.
What's next?
© Montage: Imago/dts News Agency/Tass/Sergej Bobylev/Pond 5 Images/fn
Also crucial are U.S.-led efforts to tighten sanctions and export controls against Russia and eliminate opportunities to circumvent them.
Despite the significant successes to date, evasion strategies continue to evolve, so we must continue to focus on them.
Several points will be particularly important in the context of security assistance.
In the short term, this includes systems that allow Ukraine to identify, track and destroy incoming drones, missiles, missiles and aircraft.
Ukraine's critical needs also include longer-range precision missiles, Western aircraft, artillery ammunition and additional cluster munitions, which have proven particularly important in deterring Russian attacks.
Of course, the course of the war will also depend heavily on the resolve of the Ukrainians and Russians – and their respective ability to recruit, train, equip and deploy additional forces and capabilities.
As much as Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to be in control, one should not assume that the Russian people will continue to go along with his war as casualties rise and quality of life declines.
This year promises to be another very difficult year, both for both countries' militaries on the ground and for their home fronts.
David Petraeus
Much also depends on both sides' ability to develop new unmanned capabilities, such as the formidable naval drones that Ukraine has deployed to force Russia to withdraw most of the surviving Black Sea Fleet from Sevastopol in Crimea, where they are more than... was stationed for two centuries.
Ukraine's campaign in the western Black Sea - using naval drones and missiles - has largely displaced Russian warships and allowed Ukraine to resume large grain exports that are crucial to Egypt and other countries.
Supplying Ukraine with the almost $300 billion in Russian reserves that are currently frozen in Western countries would also be of enormous importance.
This long-overdue initiative would also be an important signal to the Kremlin that Ukraine is capable of repairing the damage caused by Russia and building its own military-industrial complex.
Ultimately, the course of the war will depend on the ability of both sides to learn and adapt as the battlefield evolves, to develop, produce and deploy new weapons systems and other technologies, and to improve the capabilities of leaders, staffs, individual soldiers and units improve.
This year promises to be another very difficult year, both for both countries' militaries on the ground and for their home fronts.
After two years, there seems to be no end to the war in sight.
Western division decides how to proceed
By C. Raja Mohan, Foreign Policy columnist and visiting professor at the National University of Singapore
The lack of decisive military successes for Ukraine in 2023 has led to deep divisions within the West.
These divisions may be unexpected, but they are not surprising.
All major wars have a strong impact on the domestic politics of the countries involved;
military setbacks can often exacerbate domestic political crises.
The unity in Europe and the West sparked by the Russian invasion in February 2022 has now given way to serious differences over key issues regarding the continuation of the war and the terms of peace.
These differences are acute within the US political class, between the United States and its European allies, between Western and Eastern Europe, and within Central Europe.
Even Ukraine, which paid a huge price to defend itself against the Russian invasion, is not immune to differences over the conduct of the war.
All of these open disagreements contrast with the apparent unity in Russia, where President Vladimir Putin has consolidated his position following the astonishing Wagner mercenary army mutiny and march on Moscow last June.
For Europe, the war in Ukraine offers two different possibilities.
C.Raja Mohan
In 2024 it will become clear whether all sides are able to maintain internal cohesion in the face of the rapidly increasing costs of the war.
While Russia's authoritarian system may help quell its own internal divisions, it is hard to believe that the massive economic and human costs of Putin's war of choice will not have a political impact.
For now, however, the question remains whether the West can prevent the numerous fault lines in Ukraine policy from leading to division.
At first glance, the West's massive economic superiority over Russia should easily allow Ukraine to prevail in a prolonged war with Moscow.
The West has been slow to respond to this need, and 2024 will show whether the West can develop a strategy to support and supply Kiev to maintain the current line of contact with Russian forces in the short term and prevail in a war against Putin that will probably take longer than many initially expected.
Für Europa bietet der Krieg in der Ukraine zwei verschiedene Möglichkeiten. Der eine ist die rasche strategische Schwächung des Kontinents im Verhältnis zu den Vereinigten Staaten und Asien als Ergebnis der anhaltenden Zurückhaltung Europas, sich zu verteidigen. Der andere ist ein Weg der geopolitischen Verjüngung, indem Europa seine Verteidigungskapazitäten stärkt, eine strategischere Sicht auf seine Rolle in der Welt entwickelt und dadurch ein Mitspracherecht bei der Gestaltung des langfristigen Kräftegleichgewichts in Eurasien behält. Wenn Europa bereit ist, die Sicherheitsfrage ernsthaft anzugehen, wird es leichter sein, die Amerikaner bei der Stange zu halten und ein künftiges russisches Regime davon zu überzeugen, seinen territorialen Expansionismus zugunsten von Sicherheitsgarantien und einer regionalen Ordnung aufzugeben, in der Moskau eine legitime Rolle spielen kann. Alternativ dazu sollten die Europäer erwarten, dass ein künftiger US-Präsident die Perspektiven für ihren Kontinent in direkten Verhandlungen mit Moskau – und übrigens auch mit Peking – definiert.
Zu den Autoren
Angela Stent ist Non-Resident Senior Fellow an der Brookings Institution und Autorin von Putin‘s World: Russia Against the West and With the Rest. Twitter (X): @AngelaStent
Jo Inge Bekkevold ist Senior China Fellow am Norwegischen Institut für Verteidigungsstudien und ehemaliger norwegischer Diplomat.
Kristi Raik ist stellvertretende Direktorin des International Centre for Defence and Security in Tallinn, Estland. Twitter (X): @KristiRaik
Anders Fogh Rasmussen ist der Gründer der Alliance of Democracies, Vorsitzender von Rasmussen Global und ehemaliger NATO-Generalsekretär. Twitter (X): @AndersFoghR
Agathe Demarais ist Kolumnistin bei Foreign Policy, Senior Policy Fellow für Geo-Ökonomie beim European Council on Foreign Relations und Autorin von Backfire: How Sanctions Reshape the World Against U.S. Interests. Twitter (X): @AgatheDemarais
Franz-Stefan Gady ist beratender Senior Fellow für Cyber Power und zukünftige Konflikte am International Institute for Strategic Studies und Adjunct Senior Fellow für Verteidigung am Center for a New American Security. Twitter (X): @hoanssolo
David Petraeus ist Vorsitzender des KKR Global Institute und ein pensionierter Vier-Sterne-General der US-Armee und ehemaliger Direktor der CIA.
C. Raja Mohan ist Kolumnist bei Foreign Policy, Gastprofessor am Institut für Südasienstudien der Nationalen Universität von Singapur und ehemaliges Mitglied des Nationalen Sicherheitsbeirats Indiens. Twitter (X): @MohanCRaja
Stefan Theil ist stellvertretender Redakteur bei Foreign Policy.
Wir testen zurzeit maschinelle Übersetzungen. Dieser Artikel wurde aus dem Englischen automatisiert ins Deutsche übersetzt.
This article was first published in English in the magazine “ForeignPolicy.com” on February 19, 2024 - as part of a cooperation, it is now also available in translation to readers of the IPPEN.MEDIA portals.