Will the departures from ECOWAS worsen the migration crisis in West Africa?

The decision by Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso to withdraw from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has raised questions about how these three countries will approach regional mobility in the future.

ECOWAS covers various sectors, but migration is one of the main ones.

The protocols signed by the bloc since 1979 have long been considered a shining example of free movement on the continent.

These protocols granted citizens the right to move from one country to another in the region without the need for a visa, as well as a potential right of residence and business establishment.

Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso have much to lose if their departure from ECOWAS restricts the mobility of their citizens.

However, informal mobility is very likely to continue in any case.

Solidarity in the face of insecurity

In September 2023, the three countries created a mutual defense pact called the Alliance of Sahel States.

This pact highlighted their solidarity in confronting insecurity.

However, Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso also depend on neighboring countries, which puts them in a difficult situation.

The three countries are connected by a mobility network.

In particular, Niger, considered a key transit country for refugees and other migrants to Europe, received significant funding and assistance from the EU to prevent migration to Libya and other countries.

An important measure was Law 2015-36, which punished those who transported migrants with fines and prison sentences.

This law was created primarily by outside agents and had detrimental effects on the local economy.

It also made migratory journeys through the Sahara Desert even more dangerous.

This regulation, which could constitute a violation of the ECOWAS principles of free movement, was repealed in November 2023 by the Nigerian coup plotters.

Mali, another major West African transit point, has a complicated history of migration cooperation with Europe.

Less relevant for Europe, but more important for regional dynamics, Burkina Faso is the center of regional migration, which is usually seasonal.

Labor migration sustains the cocoa industry in Côte d'Ivoire.

After its withdrawal from ECOWAS, this labor migration could become more complicated, unless the population increasingly resorts to irregular transits.

As other previous research demonstrates, informal mobility has always existed.

In many cases, official border crossings are not used, despite the legal obligation to do so.

Leaving ECOWAS could therefore increase corruption and harassment issues at legal border crossings, as well as the use of mobility facilitators or

passeurs

.

The latter are people who negotiate passage through formal border crossings and organize trips along other alternative routes.

The legal loopholes created by the current situation could be very costly for companies and individuals.

It is likely that people will need visas in the near future.

And for those who have emigrated regionally, their right to remain in the country where they reside could soon be threatened.

An immediate exit

Days after announcing their withdrawal from ECOWAS, Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger insisted that they were not obliged to respect the regulations that stipulate a one-year notice period before their final departure.

The announcement of the departure from ECOWAS was drastic, but not unexpected.

All three countries are led by military governments that seized power through a series of coups in August 2020 and May 2021 in Mali;

September 2022 in Burkina Faso;

and July 2023 in Niger.

ECOWAS has put political and economic pressure on the three countries through sanctions and the threat of military intervention to return them to constitutional order.

In Niger, for example, ECOWAS closed official border crossings, cut off more than 70% of electricity and suspended financial transactions with other countries in the region.

International assets were blocked and international aid ceased.

Even before the coup, 3.3 million people were suffering from serious food insecurity in Niger.

The ECOWAS sanctions made daily life even worse and probably contributed to the coup plotters' popularity.

Similar sanctions were applied in Mali.

The consequences have been disastrous for the population and the effectiveness of the sanctions is questionable.

Sanctions on Burkina Faso included a travel ban on members of the military government.

For Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso, several questions arise regarding regional mobility following their withdrawal from ECOWAS.

These may include analyzing the provisions of the West African Economic and Monetary Union, returning to bilateral agreements with each of the neighboring countries or resorting to the African Union Protocol on Free Movement.

The regional monetary union

The three countries remain part of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), a union around a common currency, the CFA franc.

The regional monetary union also provides for the free movement of people and goods between its member countries.

With this option, access to seaports – a major problem for these three landlocked countries – is guaranteed through other members of the monetary union, such as Senegal.

The drawback, in this case, is that one of the main arguments for leaving ECOWAS was the perception of outside influence on the regional bloc.

The strong anti-imperialist discourse of the military governments does not bode well for the regional monetary union either.

This union is the institutional framework for regional monetary policy over which France continues to exert great influence.

Burkina Faso has already announced its intention to also leave the Monetary Union.

The West African Economic and Monetary Union also excludes large trading partners such as Nigeria, very important for the supply of food to a landlocked country like Niger.

Exchange and trade between Nigeria and Niger is vital and represents one of the most intense cross-border activities in West Africa.

For these reasons, the option of regional monetary union seems an unlikely alternative.

Another option for the three countries could be to return to bilateral agreements with each country to facilitate free movement.

This could be similar to what Mauritania, a former ECOWAS member, did, which withdrew in 2000. However, given the sanctions, this option is currently ruled out and could take many years to come to fruition.

On a continental scale, the African Union's Protocol on Free Movement could open a possible way forward.

So far, only 32 countries have signed it and four have ratified it, including Mali and Niger (Burkina Faso is a signatory).

In order to move forward, countries should accelerate the ratification of this document, so that cooperation on free movement can continue no matter what happens with ECOWAS.

Without a doubt, other ECOWAS countries could also unilaterally open themselves to visa-free entry, as Rwanda or Kenya have done, without forgetting that such a process has had its difficulties.

It is also unlikely that such visa arrangements could include the residence and establishment rights guaranteed by the ECOWAS framework.

Given the current political context, it seems unlikely that there will be an institutionalized option in the short term.

Most likely, migration will continue (informally).

Franzisca Zanker

is Principal Investigator at the Arnold Bergstraesser Institute,

Amanda Bisong

is a PhD candidate at the Free University of Amsterdam and

Leonie Jegen

is a PhD candidate at the University of Amsterdam. 

This article was previously published in

The Conversation

with the collaboration of Casa África. 

Translation: Inmaculada Ortiz.

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