On video: the "uniting for the release of the abductees" march - from Gaza to Jerusalem of the families of the abductees 02.28.24/courtesy of the families
"Hope is not lost from the heart. We are holding on to every glimmer of hope. A large group of families is on the borderline between fear and certainty, between hope and grief," Yair Stern reported in "Maariv" from the basement of the House of the Committee for the Soldier on Ibn Gvirol Street in Tel Aviv, where they gathered Families of missing soldiers in the Yom Kippur War.
Almost three weeks have passed since the war broke out and Israel had almost no information about the fate of the IDF soldiers who were captured. In the soldier's house, the IDF personnel department established a center where photos of the IDF prisoners, which were published in the world press, as well as films they took Foreign news crews. The films were projected on a wall in the hall and the family members tried to identify their loved ones in them.
Hundreds of IDF soldiers were defined as "missing" and it was clear that many of them were prisoners.
Along with the concern, the lack of knowledge about their fate provoked severe reactions in the public and added to the loss of trust in the establishment, which arose as a result of the war.
The Syrians, and in the first stage also the Egyptians, refused to act according to the Geneva Convention which defines the rights of prisoners of war.
The Syrians used the captives for political purposes, as a bargaining chip.
Some of the captives were murdered, and Israel filed a complaint about this with the United Nations and the International Red Cross, which is entrusted with the treatment of captives according to the treaty. Israel, for its part, did hand over a list of the names of the captives in its possession and allowed visits by representatives of the Red Cross. On October 22, the government decided that it would not agree to a ceasefire No exchange of prisoners.
Prisoner exchange after the war, November 1973/Official website, "in the camp" (photographer: Avi Shimhouni), courtesy of the IDF Archives at the Ministry of Defense
The agitation and indignation among the Israeli public intensified after it became known that Israel agreed under pressure from the United States to transfer supplies to the so-called Egyptian Third Army.
On October 29, at a meeting held at kilometer 101 on the Suez-Cairo road, the Egyptians handed over a list of prisoners and wounded.
An agreement was signed between the parties that established the framework for discussions between the parties and laid the groundwork for the ceasefire.
Later, in November 1973, all the captives who were in Egypt were returned to Israel.
Now the families of the missing on the Syrian front have become the main pressure group that greatly influenced the government ministers, and especially the prime minister, Golda Meir.
According to the information that Israel had at the time, there were about 131 missing people on the Syrian front, who were considered prisoners.
Rumors spread that many of them had been murdered by the Syrians, and a report based on Red Cross sources was published in the press, according to which 100 prisoners had been murdered.
Although the Red Cross denied this, Israel announced that it would not open negotiations with Syria before handing over the list.
In the war, the IDF captured an enclave inside Syria and the IDF soldiers were less than forty kilometers from the outskirts of Damascus.
In November 1973, Israel linked the POW issue to the offer to withdraw from territory captured during the war.
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Henry Kissinger, Golda Meir, December 16, 1973/Government Press Office, Sa'ar Yaakov
In December 1973, the American Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, organized a peace conference in Geneva.
Israel has decided not to enter into talks with Syria, unless the captives problem is resolved.
In a telegram sent on November 26 to Simcha Dinitz, Israel's ambassador in Washington, the Director General of the Prime Minister's Office, Mordechai Gazit, said that there is great public pressure on the government not to participate at all in the conference before the captives are released. On December 16, the Prime Minister said that the government had decided not to participate In talks with the Syrians in Geneva until the list of captives is handed over. In the memorandum of understanding they made with Israel, the Americans promised to make every effort to influence the Soviets and the Syrians to hand over the list and uphold the Geneva Convention, and noted that if they fail, and Israel refuses to enter into discussions with the Syrians, the United States will find out Understanding for this position.
In the end, the Syrians decided not to come to Geneva. In view of their refusal, rumors spread that the real reason was that all the captives had been murdered. The families' protest continued, along with appeals to Syrian embassies abroad and international bodies by their representatives.
Government representatives also contacted all possible parties.
For example, in Meir's letter to the families of the pilots held in Syria, she describes an appeal and attempt by Kissinger, and by President Nixon himself, to contact the Soviets so that they would influence the Syrians on the matter, but without success.
In January 1974, most of the government's attention was focused on drafting the separation agreement with Egypt.
At a cabinet meeting held on January 13, Deputy Prime Minister Yigal Alon said that Kissinger would also travel to Damascus during his hopping trip between Israel and Cairo because he had been told that the Syrians were ready to negotiate a separation of forces.
Alon claimed that Israel had a special interest in his trip because of the captives, and the government decided to inform Kissinger that Israel was ready to negotiate with Syria regarding the separation of forces, on the condition that the lists of the captives and more would be handed over to the Red Cross for inspection.
Israel was also interested in stabilizing the ceasefire, which was not kept by the Syrians.
They regularly shelled Israeli positions and settlements in the Golan Heights, set ambushes and started firefights.
Letter from Prime Minister Golda Meir to the families of the captives/official website, no
Document from Gazit to Dinitz/official website, State Archives
Israel's position regarding the prisoners was an obstacle to Kissinger's plans.
According to Alon, the Secretary of State asked to call a special government meeting on January 20th, where it will be decided to open negotiations with Syria.
Alon and Evan refused and made it clear that no representative would be sent to the talks in Washington until they received the list.
On February 5, Kissinger suggested to Assad that he would first receive the number of captives from Syria, and then the list of names would be forwarded to the Syrian embassy in Washington.
After the Red Cross visit, Israel will present a concrete proposal for separation.
However, at the same time, Kissinger wrapped up the negotiations with Israel by lifting the oil embargo, after he learned from the Saudis that Syria was working to maintain the embargo, until there was progress in the separation of forces.
He announced that he will not continue his efforts until the embargo is lifted.
The American pressure took its toll and the Syrians accepted his proposal to transfer the list, at the same time as an Israeli answer to their proposal to separate forces.
On February 7, Kissinger received word from the Syrians that they were holding 65 prisoners.
The number was given to the prime minister by Dinitz and kept secret.
Ahead of Kissinger's arrival with the list of prisoners in Syria, on February 24, a first government meeting was held regarding Israel's withdrawal plan.
At the meeting, the Chief of Staff presented the IDF's maximum plan for withdrawal within the enclave, according to which there would be no withdrawal beyond the 1967 cease-fire line. The proposal included a plan to dilute forces, similar to the arrangements established in the agreement with Egypt.
It was also determined that there would be no surface-to-air missiles at a distance of 30-40 kilometers.
For the full protocol of the cabinet meeting
following pressure on President Assad from the United States and Arab countries, mainly Saudi Arabia and Egypt, President Assad authorized Kissinger to deliver the list of names to Israel.
Receiving the list brought great relief and the government decided that the exchange of prisoners would be the first clause in any separation agreement.
Exactly 50 years from today, on March 1, 1974, representatives of the Red Cross visited the prisoners.
Prisoner exchange after the war, November 1973/Official website, "in the camp" (photographer: Avi Shimhouni), courtesy of the IDF Archives at the Ministry of Defense
At the government meeting on March 3, Golda Meir admitted to the government that she knew that the list of prisoners was in Kissinger's hands "a few days" before his arrival.
Ibn pointed out that there are unrealistic expectations in the public that the separation of forces with Syria will be similar to the agreement with Egypt.
He quoted Kissinger as saying that the difference is that Sadat wants to prevent war and Assad wants to destroy Israel, and without American and Egyptian pressure he would not have handed over the list of prisoners.
Despite the ministers' complaints about the stage the media gave to the parents of the captives and their claims against the government, Alon stated that receiving the names is a great achievement, which enables resilience in the fight against Syria.
Now it was possible to start talks with Syria on a separation of forces agreement.
The State Archives in the Prime Minister's Office is releasing another publication today summarizing the Yom Kippur War: "The Government of Golda Meir and the Negotiations for the Separation of Forces Agreement with Syria, January - May 1974".
The publication is accompanied by approximately 40 documents from the archive's collections, including transcripts of government meetings from the negotiation period, which were recently opened for review.
The transcripts of the government discussions give expression to the controversy regarding withdrawal from the Golan Heights beyond the purple line, the armistice line after the Six Day War.
The government also discussed the security implications of withdrawing from the Syrian enclave and the concern for the security of the Golan settlements.
Defense Minister Moshe Dayan expressed his fear of a renewed flare-up of the war if Israel continues to hold to the current line.
The prime minister initially opposed any retreat beyond the purple line, but was finally forced to agree to the ceding of the town of Cuneitra.
At the cabinet meeting on May 17, she said: "What to do? By God, I didn't want to give Quneitra, not because Quneitra is like Jerusalem. But...I didn't want us to move from the purple line."
Alongside this, in those days the prime minister also faced a difficult political challenge - the formation of a new coalition.
On the eve of the talks with Syria, Prime Minister Meir was still working on the task of establishing the coalition.
In the elections that were postponed for two months and held at the end of December 1973, the largest party formation remained, but it lost its power and fell by five mandates to 51 seats.
The Likud, on the other hand, strengthened its power and increased to 39 seats, until it was a real alternative to the alignment.
And in the background, Captain Moti Ashkenazi's solo protest began to grow and intensify and formed a heavy weight on the Prime Minister's neck.
The agreement with Syria was unanimously approved by the government and then by the Knesset and on May 31 it was signed in Geneva.
That same day the ceasefire came into effect.
The wounded prisoners were returned to Israel the next day.
At the same time, the public protest and publication of the Agrant Committee's interim report led to the resignation of Golda Meir's government.
On June 1, a new government was sworn in, headed by Yitzhak Rabin.
On June 3, Rabin presented his government.
On June 6, the rest of the captives were returned and received with an enthusiastic and moving reception at the airport by Yitzhak Rabin and Golda Meir together.
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prisoner exchange
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