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Shafts, anti-tank missiles and terrorists: the 72 hours that changed the face of the war in Gaza - voila! News

2024-03-02T09:14:02.590Z

Highlights: Lt. Col. Yitzhak (Itzik) Cohen took command of Division 162, the powerful decisive division of the IDF. A few days after the outbreak of the war in Gaza, the commander of the Southern Command, Major General Yaron Finkelman, chose the 162nd Division to lead the IDF's ground maneuver to the Gaza Strip. All the brigades and units of the division took a substantial part in the battles in the first 24 hours to liberate the settlements and outposts on the Gaza border.


The critical discussions, the secret moves, the trickery and the deception and the execution: with the top political echelons and the General Staff as well as the eyes of the Israeli public on them, the commander of the 162nd Division Brigadier General Itzik Cohen led the ground maneuver into the Gaza Strip. wrote Woah! Reveals what went on behind the scenes


In video: Commander of Division 162 Lt. Col. Itzik Cohen and his fighters in the heart of Gaza City 05.02.24/dec

While the political echelon and the heads of the security establishment finished conducting situational assessments of what is happening in all the arenas and circles in preparation for the holidays and found no hint of the possibility of a huge war breaking out, at the end of last September Lt. Col. Yitzhak (Itzik) Cohen took command of Division 162, the powerful decisive division of the IDF. L. A few days after the outbreak of the war in Gaza, the commander of the Southern Command, Major General Yaron Finkelman, chose, with the full support of Chief of Staff Harzi Halevi, the 162nd Division to lead the IDF's ground maneuver to the Gaza Strip. The decision was made mainly because of the level of preparedness and experience from previous operations .

Commander of Division 162 Brigadier General Itzik Cohen (left)/IDF Spokesman

Five days after accepting responsibility for the division, Cohen hosted the head of the division's headquarters, Brigadier General Moshe Mayo - an armorer, a veteran battle fox, who his officers say has a "sense of smell for chaos" and who is a very successful manager in the capital market at his home in a kibbutz in the southern coastal plain The two talked about competence and readiness and the work plan for the coming year, but something in the conversation was unbalanced. Both felt that the developments in the Palestinian arena did not bode well. To remove concerns, they decided to carry out a series of tests with an emphasis on the division's headquarters and the military forces.



Within two days, despite the holiday atmosphere in Israel, arrangements were made that indicated a high readiness to go from routine to emergency.

4 days later, at 06:29 on the 7th of October, the war broke out.

Cohen and Mayo didn't need too much explanation to train the system and assign tasks.

All the brigades and units of the division took a substantial part in the battles in the first 24 hours to liberate the settlements and outposts on the Gaza border.

The Nahal Brigade paid the heaviest price then: 22 of its fighters were killed, led by Brigadier General Yonathan Steinberg who fell in a shootout.

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IDF forces in the Gaza Strip/IDF spokesman

Cohen began his military career in 1995 as a soldier in the Rotem Battalion of the Givati ​​Brigade, but spent most of his years fighting in the Gaza Strip in the days when the Purple Brigade "bought" its name at the IDF General Headquarters as the number 1 expert on Palestinian terrorism in Gaza. Cohen was appointed commander of the sabotage company and transferred Long days along the Gaza Strip fighting against the nests of terror in the days when Hamas raised its head with all its might against the IDF and the Israeli rear.

Cohen lost fighters and killed terrorists.

In the heart of the streets of Gaza, Khan Yunis, and Rafih, his soul was scratched and his image shaped as a field commander who understands the mind of the Palestinian terrorist in the refugee camps.



Then came the maneuver phase.

Little by little, the heavy responsibility began to be divided between the political echelon, the General Staff, towards the headquarters of Division 162 and the commanders of the regular brigades: Givati, 401, Nahal and 460, including the fire units, while in the background there was a very great fear of a first ground maneuver into the heart of the Palestinian territory.

Commanding General Finkelman, himself a former Givati ​​Brigadier General, told the commanders: "You will determine the continuation, scope and intensity of the maneuver.

The battle is upon you.

There is no lack of resources.

Everything is at your disposal." And so it was: all the planning and attack bodies of the Southern Command were made available to the division in addition to the Intelligence Division, the Air Force, the Navy, the ICT Division, and special units. While two companies are securing the division's headquarters for fear of terrorist groups still infesting Israeli territory, "Le Cohen convened the headquarters of the division and the brigades and made it clear: "Gaza City does not have a master key. There are several keys and we will reach them in a clever, cunning way with deception. It will have to be creative."



The number one threat in the Gaza Strip to the forces in the first phase of the ground maneuver were the explosive charges and the anti-tank missiles. The 401st Brigade Col. Bani Aharon reported that in preparation for the maneuver they are conducting tests in the sea to test how deep the tank can travel in salt water. In Givat We trained on creating traffic lanes using the engineering forces within the built-up areas. The soldiers called it the "Pacman method". The fear of problems with the tanks and the APCs and explosive charges led Brigadier General Mayo to call the engineering officer of the Southern Command, Col. Avshalom Dadon , and asked to prepare to pave a new 7 km long road inside the Palestinian territory to prevent explosive devices from being planted. "You are crazy but it will be done," said Col. Dadon across the line, but within 24 hours construction materials were piled up to pave roads at the entrance to the border.

The Chief of Staff, Chief of Staff Major General Oded Basiuk, and the commander of the Southern Command went over the operational ideas devised by the brigade commanders and approved them after going down to the small details. Brigadier General Cohen informed Major General Finkelman a few days later: "Preparations in the medical, intelligence, engineering, naval fields have been completed, ICT, the sets of operations and the synchronization between them."

The M.O.G. Cohen with the veteran Mayo officer/IDF spokesman

Finkelman decided to wear out Hamas by conducting spot operations before the big maneuver while in the background the division was accumulating ammunition of various types, the artillery batteries were deployed, and all the elements began to unite in one clear language for action.

"We wanted a week before the maneuver to knock out their anti-tank systems, the collection and the command and control centers even before a single tank crosses the border," said a senior officer in the 162nd division. "And that's what happened.

We attacked everything that was fired at us and beyond that.

Once these were the fighters of the 401st Brigade, later Givati.

Everyone's sense of competence and confidence rose.

On the other hand, this created confusion in Hamas.

They didn't know when we really start to manipulate in depth and whether this is another stimulus and response operation."

The maneuver started

After a week came the moment of truth of the ground maneuver.

In the afternoon, the artillery batteries began to launch thousands of shells towards the areas of terror after the Palestinian population moved south.

At 22:00, all the forces of the division that were prepared for the attack stood not far from the border and listened to the communication network at the sound of the voice of the commander of Division 162. "The Hoshan stations are here at the top," said Brigadier General Cohen. The vile enemy in a murderous and heinous terrorist attack against children, women, men and the elderly.

We did not choose this battle, the enemy wanted it, the enemy started it.

The eyes of the whole world are on us, the people of Israel trust us and stand behind us."



In those minutes, the top of the political echelon and the top of the Israel Defense Forces were sitting in the "Bor" in Keriya in Tel Aviv and were following every second the movements of the division.

Brigadier General Cohen continued in a picturesque way to order the beginning of the ground maneuver. "Tonight, many forces of Division 162 and the Southern Command went out to get and destroy the hand that was sent to strangle our necks.

Crippling our enemies with the strength of steel like a clenched fist, there is no task we cannot do, there is no terrorist we will not cripple.

I pledge to be by your side on the battlefield, shoulder to shoulder, we will not return home until we complete the task assigned to us in full." One by one, the brigade commanders came online to confirm the historic order that had just been given to them, and began reading the order to the battalions themselves.

Lt. Col. Daniel Ella/IDF Spokesman

"Three weeks after thousands of Hamas terrorists crossed the border and stormed the rear of the State of Israel, the 52nd Battalion, under the command of Lt. Col. Daniel Ella, crossed the border in the opposite direction with the entire IDF by its side and above it," said one of the division's officers, adding: "Every barrel that was raised toward The 52nd Battalion received a precise fire strike either from the sea, from the air or from the land. The curtain of fire that unfolded in front of them was dramatic. The 401st Brigade Combat Team and then Givati ​​began maneuvering deep into the area. Then gradually the Nahal Brigade maneuvered to the Al Attra neighborhood and Beit Lahia and in the final stage the 460th Brigade followed them ".



In the heart of the divisional headquarters sat Brigadier General Cohen listening to the communication networks and hearing the conduct of the brigade commanders and the progress of the battalions towards the northern gate of Gaza City under the enormous fear of explosive devices and short and long-range anti-tank fire.

All this on the way to the "security square" (the central base of the military wing of Hamas) and then "outpost 17".

In the subsequent investigation, the intelligence hold presented by AMN and the Shin Bet was at a high level and any Hamas cadre that tried to carry out an attack was exposed and attacked accordingly.



The fire plan that was ordered by the division commander Cohen with the combat managers in the division went into effect very close to the maneuver.

"You can argue for hours in the workshops and seminars with the Air Force about the availability of targets and attacks, but at the moment of truth they asked what was needed and carried out with perfect precision. Hundreds of attacks in a short time. In the timing that the brigade commanders requested, they created an unstoppable manipulative offensive force and very quickly everyone understood this including in Hamas. The secret was the connection between the various elements of the fire and the rate of progress," explained a senior reserve officer who was present at the division headquarters.

Commander of Division 162 Brigadier General Itzik Cohen/IDF Spokesman

The forces that were required to maneuver in an area of ​​dunes and agricultural areas encountered problems with the tanks and the APCs crossing because of the quicksand and the wintry weather that contributed to this. But less than 24 hours since the maneuver began, the company commanders rubbed their eyes and did not believe: bulldozers and ditchers of the Southern Command despite the tangible threat of anti-tank missiles, began to pave a road deep into Palestinian territory.

Col. Dadon kept his commitment and paved a 2.5 km long road for the initial logistics axis.

The engineering officer of the 162nd Division emphasized that his forces did not exceed one charge for 30 days.



The first hours of the maneuver were accompanied by enormous apprehension on the part of the political echelon mainly because of the horror scenarios of a "land of explosive devices and anti-tank missiles", an extreme scenario of thousands of deaths and reluctance to enter built-up areas, and threats mainly from the international community against a humanitarian disaster. The progress of the 401 Brigade and the Givati ​​Brigade In the first 48 hours, it was slow and continuous. With the exception of one truck that was delayed, a shell that fell on a soldier's leg, and a soldier who felt a heart attack, but turned out to be suffering from an anxiety attack, no unusual events were recorded in the first stages. "The first reports told of terrorists coming out of dozens of shafts and aiming missiles at "They were shooting with small arms," ​​said a senior reserve officer from Division 162. "Most of them ran away because of the intensity of the fire that was directed at their heads. In some places they returned to the tunnels."



"Obviously there was great concern," added the senior officer.

"That the intelligence will be focused, that the fire will not cross coordination lines, that no targets will be missed, that everything will work and be synchronized. When we saw the supply of food and ammunition in less than 48 hours, people felt satisfied. There are military men here who have been responsible for five months in a row that this machine will work."

The activity of the forces in the Gaza Strip, January 28, 2024/IDF spokesperson

Division of labor

American generals began to arrive at the headquarters of Division 162. It is unlikely that they will be impressed by the military capabilities. It is unlikely that they will closely monitor the wide and deep ground maneuver.

In response to questions in English and looking at the computer screens, one of the officers in the 162nd Division flashed and said: "Our brigade combat teams operate like a phalanx (a dense tactical formation in which a fighter protects a fighter and moves slowly towards the target) .

The representative of the American 'army' came to Division 162 several times.

He was interested in the aspects of the profession, the data, the achievements, and at one point he said: 'I fought in Afghanistan, Iraq and other places.

There is no anti-guerrilla machine like yours in the history of the world.

I have never seen such effective work in my life.'

The training of the division in recent years has proven itself.

How did the chief of staff of the division say: 'Headquarters?

Their job is not to spoil the fight.

And the generals? Their job is to win the battle."



In the competition between the brigades, the Givati ​​Brigade arrived first at the predetermined point in the "Slatin" area at the entrance to Gaza City.

This was also the first time that Hamas was able to stabilize against the IDF a defense line based on tunnels, fortifications and a very large volume of anti-tank missiles, mortar squads, sniping, and the placement of explosive charges.

At one point, there is at least one officer who is willing to swear that he heard 401st Brigade Col. Aaron respond over the communications network to calls from the higher command: 'Guys, in your mother.

I have a wall of anti-tank weapons in front of me here. Can I have two more hours?"



In less than two hours under a combination of fire from the sea, the air and the ground, the resistance of Hamas was eliminated and the Givati ​​Brigade began to maneuver towards the next challenge: "Outpost 17" defined as a symbol of resistance and infested with terrorists and tunnels.

That's where the real, hard battles actually began.

"We encountered a group of terrorists coming out of shafts hidden in the ground. They go out, pull out an anti-tank missile, and within 8 seconds they disappear," said an officer from Division 162. "Only in the first phase did the brigades encounter hundreds of shafts.

Until you see it, you don't understand the event and its effect on the battlefield.

The forces did not stop and advanced, otherwise there would be no end to it and we would be playing into the hands of Hamas, which is exactly what he wanted.

This is an excellent point to emphasize that the performance was in accordance with planning and training."

Division 162 activity - completed the encirclement of Jabalia and is prepared for the continuation of the attack / IDF spokesman

Another challenge was the psychology of the battle.

While Division 162 was getting closer to the heart of Hamas terrorism, he was having trouble dealing with the scenes of horror that were broadcast in the media.

Images from the October 7 massacre caused officers, resisters and soldiers in the rear to break down and cry.

"It's fine," said Brigadier General Mayo, the 57-year-old veteran commander in the division. "Guys.

We came to fix it.

We build and run a machine and nothing will stand against that machine.

Even if you lose the first battle, we have to put everything aside and win and let nothing stop us."



The head of the division's headquarters was asked if there is romance in war after decades of experience in fighting and managing a battle and he smiled. "Of course.

Imagine how a MP feels who 24 hours ago entered Gaza with a tank and suddenly he sees a truck driver in the Palestinian territory who signals him to come and take food for the fighters. They looked at us like we were drunk when we decided to establish a logistics space in the Palestinian territory. ".



Brigadier General Cohen did not hold back and hurried to enter the depths of the Palestinian territory in order to feel the space and talk to the generals and generals. "He sees the Palestinian territory only as an opportunity and not a disadvantage.

That's how he creates the next steps," said one of the senior officers in the division and laughed. "He's cunning and cunning.

What was beautiful at the beginning of the ground maneuver was to see how department commanders, company commanders and battalion commanders understood the essence of the battle that he cast from top to bottom.

Itzik came to the field a lot.

He understood that the wisdom of the generals up to the department commanders will become tomorrow's plans. One of the challenges is technology. The digital makes the transfer of orders more precise, synchronizing, but there are quite a few details that cannot be understood without the presence of the feet in the field and conversations with junior ranks. To combine real openness and not only A report in the military app. I think it started with Finkelman. Give the commanders of the brigades and battalions a lot of space to make decisions otherwise the intelligence that reaches them becomes irrelevant."

Division 162 activity - completed the encirclement of Jabalia and is prepared for the continuation of the attack / IDF spokesman

At the end of 72 very tense hours, when quite a few senior government officials are breathing a sigh of relief, trusting in the IDF's performance and the ground maneuver deep into the Gaza Strip, Division 162 went out to attack the strategic positions of Hamas and fought thousands of terrorists above and below the ground. At the beginning of November, the attack on Hamas's Kariya - the security square and Al Attara, the encirclement of the Shatti refugee camp, and Jabaliya, Darj al-Tufah, in the Gaza Strip, and a raid on five hospitals that were centers of terrorism. The fighters of the division killed more than 5,000 terrorists, returned 9 kidnapped bodies, used tons of explosives to destroy terrorist infrastructure, transferred 900 prisoners for interrogation in Israel including the participants in the massacre on October 7, located and destroyed 52 munitions production sites and 367 shafts, and defeated 12 Hamas battalions. At the time of



writing, Division 162 completed the The occupation of the north of the Zeytun neighborhood and the possibility of occupation of the central camp, Rafah and even going up to the northern border. "Lebanon?

This is not a different story.

A generation has developed here that knows war.

What does it matter if it is called the neighborhood of Zeytun or Al-Khyam (a village in southern Lebanon - AB). The Majd who fights here - will have a different anti-tank threat in Lebanon. There will be different ambushes. He will make an adjustment in techniques. But the Majd understands war.

Today we arrive much stronger in the northern arena," concluded a senior officer in the 162nd Division.

  • More on the same topic:

  • Gaza war

  • War of Iron Swords

  • 162nd Division

  • IDF

  • Gaza Strip

Source: walla

All news articles on 2024-03-02

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