"No one can know what Vladimir Putin
's exact intentions are
, but if he won in Ukraine he would surely be tempted
to go further
in the coming years," says in an interview with
Clarín
,
Bruno Tertrais
, deputy director of the Parisian 'Foundation for the Strategic Research' and one of the great
European experts in nuclear deterrence and proliferation
, as well as in military strategy.
Tertrais previously worked for the French Ministry of Defense and for NATO.
For two decades he has been dedicated to research.
Next, his dialogue with
Clarín.
-Some European leaders speak of a Russian military threat against Europe in the coming years. Can we expect an attack as they warn?
-No one can know what Vladimir Putin's exact intentions are, but if he won in Ukraine he would surely be tempted to go further in the coming years.
In any case, I don't think there is a risk of a Russian military attack against a NATO country today.
If there is a risk, it is for example against Moldova, which is not a member of NATO or the EU.
Part of its territory, Transnitria, is de facto independent and Russia could be tempted to send troops.
Bruno Tertrais, expert in nuclear deterrence.
Photo: Courtesy
-In the event of an attack in the future, which countries would be most at risk?
-In the case of a classic military attack, surely the Baltic countries and Poland would be the ones that would be in the greatest danger.
But all Western democracies are vulnerable to an unconventional attack, of a cyber type, for example.
And to misinformation.
-The hypothesis of Donald Trump's return to the White House puts NATO under pressure. If the US showed Russia that it would not help an attacked European country, would the Europeans be able to defend themselves against a conventional attack?
-The question is whether we could dissuade Russia from attacking us.
If that is not the situation, and if all American forces left Europe - an extreme hypothesis - we could only defend ourselves with classical means from a limited attack.
-Putin (and Medvedev) sometimes talked about nuclear weapons. Is the threat credible? Could you use them to win in Ukraine if you were losing?
-What Medvedev says has no importance.
The only officials authorized to talk about nuclear weapons are Putin, Lavrov (chancellor), Shoigu (defense minister) and Patrushev (secretary of the Russian Security Council).
Their statements are less “threats” than “deterrent reminders.”
I don't find them particularly disturbing.
Furthermore, I note that there has been no movement of nuclear weapons, no placing on high alert or any maneuver that is out of the ordinary since February 24, 2022 (start date of the attack on Ukraine).
-But should we be afraid of the use of nuclear weapons by Russia?
-The risk always seems too overestimated to me.
What the Kremlin has said since February 24, 2022 is in accordance with official Russian nuclear doctrine.
And the conditions for the use of nuclear weapons, in that doctrine, are very strict.
-Putin can't think that using nuclear weapons could end the war under the conditions Russia would like?
I'm not in his head.
And I note that even China told her that she would see it very badly.
But in extreme conditions she might think so.
If he did so it would probably not be on the Ukrainian theater of operations, because those weapons would require visible and long manipulations.
We would have time to react.
It could be a missile launched into the Black Sea, without military effect, just as a political signal.
-President Macron talked about sending European troops to Ukraine, even if it was in non-combat roles. Would he go to war against Russia?
-No.
It would strictly be assistance to Ukraine.
Nobody seriously thinks that Western combat forces will fight against the Russian Army.
In any case, Moscow estimates that it is already “at war against NATO.”
-Are there already Western troops in Ukraine, such as intelligence or experts in some type of weapons transferred to kyiv?
-Surely not (combat) troops.
Intelligence agents, surely.
Also advisors or trainers for the Ukrainian troops.
-Could the French nuclear weapon be the nuclear umbrella of the European Union, even with a larger arsenal financed by the Union itself, even if it is under French control or could it be shared?
“Europe”, not “the European Union”.
Above all, the EU must not be involved in matters of nuclear deterrence.
Also because the United Kingdom (already outside the EU) should have a role.
Furthermore, the financing of the French deterrent force would not be shared: that would not be in the interest of anyone, especially not France, which would not want to see its nuclear budget partly dependent on foreign parliaments.
And Paris would neither more nor less share the decision to use (the nuclear weapon) than Washington does today with its allies.
In other words: you can consult, but there can only be one decider.
This is how it works in NATO and I don't imagine it could work any other way in a European framework.
-Should the European Union begin to develop its own Defense capacity outside of NATO?
-Not outside NATO as long as it is not necessary.
What matters today is to increase our combat capabilities nationally, which would benefit all of Europe in all scenarios.