A Putin defeat in Ukraine will give the other Russia more opportunities

Next Monday, Vladimir Putin will have been “re-elected” president of Russia.

In reality, Russian voters have no genuine choice, since Putin has killed his most formidable rival, Alexei Navalny, and ordered the disqualification of any other candidate who might have even the slightest chance of being a genuine competitor.

This plebiscitary legitimation procedure – already well known by other historical dictatorships – will also be carried out in some parts of eastern Ukraine, which official Russian sources call the New Territories.

It is foreseeable that there will be large percentages of both participation and votes in favor of Putin, which will be as lax as his historical essays on Russian-Ukrainian relations.

Buoyed by signs of Western weakness, such as German Chancellor Olaf Scholz's refusal to send Taurus missiles to Ukraine and Pope Francis' recommendation that Ukraine fly the white flag, the brutal Russian dictator will continue to try to conquer more Ukrainian territory.

Not only is Putin convinced that Ukraine historically belongs to a Russia whose manifest destiny is to be a great imperial power, but, unlike Western governments, his regime has committed itself politically and economically to pursuing this war. It dedicates no less than 40% of the budget to military, intelligence, disinformation and internal security expenses, and has imposed a war economy from which it is not easy to return to peacetime criteria.

However, these last few weeks have shown us that there is still another Russia, just as there was another Germany even at the height of Adolf Hitler's power in the Third Reich.

Tens of thousands of Russians of all classes and conditions risked reprisals for paying tribute to Navalny and created that unforgettable image of his grave covered by an immense mountain of flowers.

At the funeral they chanted “Navalni!

Navalni!”, “Stop the war!”

and “Ukrainians are good people!”

Other brave defenders of a better Russia, such as Vladimir Kara-Murza and Oleg Orlov, are in prison, and we have no choice but to fear for their lives.

Outside the country, Yulia Navalnaya continues her husband's fight with extraordinary courage and dignity and she also makes it clear that she condemns Putin's war in Ukraine.

To give an example of this “innovative” policy that he recently advocated before the European Parliament, he has asked Navalny's supporters to go to the polling stations this Sunday, at noon, to create a visible image of the other Russia without directly endangering to any citizen.

Some have said that they will write Navalni's name on the ballot.

Meanwhile, many hundreds of thousands of Russians who abhor Putin's regime and ardently want Russia to join Europe and the West have resettled abroad.

It is impossible to know how much support this other Russia truly has within the country.

An estimated 20,000 protesters have been detained since the start of the invasion of Ukraine just over two years ago.

Increased repression provokes more fear, including the fear of answering truthfully to pollsters, journalists or diplomats.

Added to this is how difficult it is psychologically for a person to recognize that his country, which is considered a historical victim of invaders from Napoleon to Hitler, is committing criminal aggression against its closest neighbor.

And, as many other nations can attest, the loss of an empire is always difficult to accept.

The impression that a veteran observer who continues to live in Russia conveys to me is that 20% of the population strongly supports Putin, 20% strongly opposes him and 60% accepts the situation passively, without enthusiasm, but without believing that change can come from below.

Now this cannot be more than a guess.

We can only be sure of one thing: if the other Russia ends up triumphing, the number of those who supported it all along will multiply like the relics of the cross of Jesus, just as

the members of the resistance in France and Russia multiplied

later

. Germany after 1945.

Whatever happens this weekend, it would be clearly naïve to expect regime change or even an immediate major political shift in the Kremlin.

“Political risk” consultants may earn large fees for making predictions about Russian domestic politics, but in reality the only thing that can be said with certainty about Russia's future is that no one knows when or how political change will occur. , nor if this change will be for the worse or for the better or, most likely, first one thing and then the other.

In these circumstances, how to develop a policy towards Russia?

An intelligent observer of Russian affairs has commented that, until 2022, the West had a policy for Russia, but not for Ukraine;

and now it has a policy for Ukraine, but not for Russia.

I would say that our Ukrainian policy is our Russian policy and that it is the only effective one at the moment.

Among other things, because Putin's policy towards Ukraine is his policy towards Russia.

Former Russian president and Putin's main speaker, Dmitri Medvedev, recently stood in front of a giant map that included all of Ukraine within Russia except a small part around kyiv and declared: "Ukraine is resolutely Russia."

Note the colonial formula par excellence: Ukraine does not “belong” to Russia, but is Russia.

It is the same as Ireland is Great Britain (1916), Poland is Germany (1939), Algeria is France (1954).

A Russia that incorporates Ukraine remains an empire.

A Russia without Ukraine must undertake the long and painful path taken by other former colonial powers, the transition from empire to something resembling a more “normal” nation state.

This process usually lasts decades and is accompanied by instability and conflict.

In the short term, however, a victory for Ukraine—which, despite recent siren calls to the contrary, requires it to regain most of its territory in the coming years—would be a major defeat for Putin and would have more more likely to accelerate political change in Russia than any other situation.

In the immediate future, the consequence will be a greater risk that Putin will react even stronger and leave more instability in his wake.

Therefore, in any realistic policy towards Russia, all possible lines of information about and communication with the country must remain open, detailed plans for any contingency, for the worst and the best, and clear messages to the Kremlin about the cost that would have further escalation on his part.

Likewise, the West must make more efforts to help the other Russia in every way possible, which, for the moment, means acting primarily outside of Russia and through virtual channels.

We are at the beginning of a new period in European history and the consequences of what we do this year will be felt for decades.

Helping Ukraine win this war is the way not only to ensure a democratic and peaceful future for Ukraine itself, but also to increase the chances of a better Russia in the long run.

Timothy Garton Ash

is Professor of European Studies at the University of Oxford and Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University.

His latest book is

Europa: A Personal History

(Taurus).

Translation by

María Luisa Rodríguez Tapia.

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