In his war against Ukraine and his brutal challenge to the world order, Vladimir Putin has a wide network of international support.
It is a network that involves several countries with different levels of complicity, from explicit political support for the invasion (such as North Korea, Belarus or Syria) to an implicit desire that it not fail or a mere willingness to take advantage. of the situation in a way that benefits the Kremlin.
Altogether, this framework has breathed indispensable economic and military oxygen into Moscow.
China provides essential commercial support, with a notable increase in both the sale of products to Russia and the purchase of Russian hydrocarbons, helping the Kremlin overcome the difficulties created by Western sanctions.
Iran and North Korea deliver essential weapons to sustain the offensive in Ukraine.
Belarus grants the Kremlin strategic depth, allowing it to use its territory for multiple purposes.
This core of cooperation has a political intention and relevance that places it on a preeminent level with respect to other dynamics that favor Putin.
Time will tell if these countries that converge in a fight with the West without a formal alliance will manage to configure a highly cohesive pole.
At the moment, they all offer important help to Russia.
On another level, we can highlight the role of countries that, without a political intention comparable to that of the previous ones, with different degrees of empathy or simple disinterest in Russian abuses, give oxygen to the Kremlin through their markets, allowing it to overcome the Western sanctions.
“The Western sanctions policy has failed to deter Russia and is currently showing difficulty in containing it.
The main gaps in its effectiveness center on the successful circumvention of the oil price cap and the re-export of critical items, which allow Russia to defy the restrictions.
In both cases, the role of third countries is fundamental,” says Maria Shagina, an expert on the subject at the International Institute for Strategic Studies.
Beyond China's fundamental role, several Central Asian and Caucasian countries that are emerging as useful black markets for the Kremlin are a symbol of this reality, in which many other nations play important roles.
Shagina summarizes the map like this: “China, India and Turkey buy 90% of Russian crude oil.
China and Hong Kong are the main supply centers for dual-use products, such as semiconductors.
“The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has become a critical node in Russia’s circumvention strategy, whether as a transshipment hub or as a financial center.”
There is also another level, of political significance but limited real impact.
Countries like Syria or Eritrea support the Kremlin's cause;
There are others that are very empathetic, like Venezuela, several African states that receive security aid from Moscow, or like Hungary, which has proposed conspicuous obstructionism in the EU, with little success, to successive sanctions packages.
There are also parties that, within many Western societies, hold empathetic positions towards Putin and his approaches.
A separate and fundamental case is that of Donald Trump who, without even having achieved a return to the White House, has already managed to get the Republicans to paralyze US aid to Ukraine for months.
It remains to be seen what he will do if he wins the presidency again.
It is therefore a broad, complex picture, full of nuances.
Below, a look at some of its fundamental features.
China
Beijing has refused to provide military support to Moscow, but the significant growth in bilateral trade is the main lifeline that has kept Russia's economy and its ability to sustain the war effort in Ukraine.
In 2023, there were exchanges worth $240 billion, 26% more than the previous year, a figure that is equivalent to what trade between the EU and Russia was in 2021.
In addition to the aforementioned microchips, perhaps the most essential element, smartphones, computers, industrial and construction machinery, cars, are some of the main Chinese products that have allowed the Russian economy to continue functioning with a certain normality despite Western sanctions. .
Conversely, China has purchased large quantities of oil, but also coal, copper and nickel, guaranteeing important sources of income for the Kremlin.
Half of Russian oil exports will go to China in 2023, according to Alexander Novak, Russian deputy prime minister.
Beijing cultivates the most strategic of all its international relations with Moscow.
Under these circumstances, China has a clear interest in preventing a Ukrainian victory that would strengthen the West and increase the risk of Putin's fall.
Beijing does not want a collapse of the Russian regime that could open even minimal opportunities for democratization of Russia.
This would entail the risk of a Kremlin on better terms with the West and approaching a scenario that Beijing considers nightmarish, a kind of siege by unfriendly countries—India, South Korea, Japan...—.
“What we are seeing is basically a realignment of Russia that, after breaking with Europe, embraces the Eurasian vocation.
It promotes the relationship with China, but not only, also with India or Iran, for example with the project to relaunch a railway connection from Saint Petersburg to Iran,” says Jorge Heine, professor at the Pardee School of Global Studies at the University of Boston and former Chilean ambassador to China and India.
“Although publicly there is talk of a relationship without limits, that is something rhetorical, of course it has limits.
China does not deliver weapons and negotiates hard with Russian gas.
There is some rivalry between the two in the Central Asian space.
This is not based on charity, but on interests.
But both show signs of wanting to manage the rivalry, that it is in their best interest to reach an agreement and face together what they understand as the challenge of the West and NATO,” continues Heine, who is the author of
Xi-na in the Century of the Dragon.
.
The two countries have announced plans to double Russia's pipeline gas supply capacity to China.
The implementation, however, takes time, and experts agree that China exercises the full weight of its superiority seeking to bring Russia to its knees and obtain extremely advantageous prices.
China's limited support is also reflected on a purely political level.
Beijing has never weakened Moscow's position with criticism, but it has also never expressed explicit support for the invasion and has instead issued clear warnings against the use of nuclear weapons when Putin raised the threat.
China does not want Russia to lose and that is why it supports it, but at the same time it fears that excesses by Russia—or North Korea—will end up closing the ranks of the West and galvanizing its strategic preparation.
Beijing provides indispensable support to Russia, so much so that it now sees itself in a position of absolute inferiority and dependence with respect to the partner, which cultivates the relationship within a millimeter calculation of its interests, which do not coincide because its enormous economy extracts a benefit. much greater stability of the global system.
“China and Russia have always had some convergent and some divergent interests.
But now, unlike in the not-distant past, the former predominate,” concludes Heine.
Iran
The Iranian regime provides Putin with critical support with military supplies.
It is notorious that he delivers drones that have boosted Russian air attack capabilities against Ukraine.
The Reuters agency has recently published information that also points to the supply of hundreds of Iranian ballistic missiles to the Kremlin.
“Although relations between Iran and Russia deepened significantly due to the support that both gave to [Syrian President Bashar el] Assad, it has been paradoxically the sanctions that the West has imposed on the two that have brought them much closer,” explains Luciano Zaccara, a professor at Qatar University specialized in Persian Gulf studies.
"The Iranian political class has always been divided on the level of closeness it wants to have with Moscow, with conservatives more interested in using the Russian card given the impossibility of restoring ties with European countries, especially after the arrival of [Ebrahim] Raisí to the presidency,” Zaccara continues.
The mutual interest is evident.
Moscow urgently needs the war material that Tehran, a strong producer of drones and missiles, can supply.
There is speculation that Iran has even helped launch new drone production lines in Russia.
Swarms of cheap drones wear down Ukraine's expensive air defenses.
In turn, Iran has multiple interests, especially in terms of supplying advanced technologies available to Russia.
Zaccara points to Iranian interest, for example, in Su-35 fighter jets to upgrade the aging air fleet.
On the other hand, Iran also has interest in greater commercial integration.
Tehran “has been trying for years to enter the automobile market in Russia with its Iran Khodro and Saipa factories, whose options improved following the sanctions of European companies,” says Zaccara.
In late 2023, Iran sealed a free trade agreement with the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union.
“Needing weighty allies, moving between the two emerging powers (Russia and China) seems to be the most pragmatic and effective non-exclusive strategic option that Tehran could take,” says Zaccara.
North Korea
Pyongyang is another important military support for Putin.
The North Korean regime is supplying huge quantities of ammunition, an essential element in a friction war in a context with serious difficulties in producing sufficient material.
Ukrainian authorities denounce that Russia has fired at least 50 North Korean-produced missiles into its territory.
The rapprochement between both countries has been staged with a summit between Kim Jong-un and Putin, in which the former promised the latter to “always be together” in the “sacred war” against the West.
Like Iran, North Korea has an interest in certain Russian technological capabilities.
Although diminished by war, sanctions and brain drain, Russian society obviously has technical-scientific knowledge of great interest in strategic areas.
In the case of North Korea, an impoverished country, food exports under favorable conditions are also of interest.
Pyongyang, extremely dependent on China, undoubtedly also calculates that it is interested in gaining credits with Russia, which allows for a useful strategic triangulation.
The supply of weapons for use in Ukraine, on the other hand, allows their quality to be tested on the battlefield.
Central Asian and Caucasian countries
Several Central Asian and Caucasian former Soviet republics have seen significant increases in trade with Russia following the adoption of sanctions.
“Many former Soviet countries have taken the opportunity to take advantage of Moscow's isolation and have become intermediaries between the West and Russia.
The laxity of regulatory policy and the lack of training allowed evasion to flourish,” observes expert Maria Shagina.
These are a handful of countries with different circumstances, some in tune with Moscow, others not.
Together, not necessarily with enormous strategic calculation, they function as black markets that help the Russian economy circumvent restrictions.
Belarus
It is a quasi-vassal state of Russia, and provides significant support to Putin's plans, giving it strategic depth by the mere fact of offering its territory for multiple uses.
Part of the February 2022 invasion was launched from Belarus, which today hosts Russian nuclear warheads and whose leader, Aleksandr Lukashenko, functioned as a mediator between Putin and Yevgeny Prigozhin, and accepted that Wagner mercenaries be relocated to Belarus.
Other countries
There are, of course, other countries that, in different ways, have injected oxygen into Putin's Russia in the midst of its aggression against Ukraine.
India stands out for the sharp increase in purchases of Russian crude oil, which went from practically zero before the February 2022 invasion to two million barrels per day in July 2023. New Delhi took advantage of the cheap price.
This figure has dropped, hovering around 1.3 million at the beginning of the year, probably due to improvements in the design of Western restrictions.
In this same sector, those who have collaborated in transportation have been important for Russia, among them Greek shipowners, or in providing storage and refining services such as Singapore.
In political terms, the role of groups such as that of Marine Le Pen can be highlighted, which spreads ideas in French society that suit Putin.
But Donald Trump is the fundamental actor in this panorama.
He has already warned that, as far as he is concerned, Putin can “do whatever the hell he wants” with NATO countries that do not spend 2% on Defense.
Among them are, for example, Italy and Spain.
The Russian leader recently said he would prefer a second Biden term.
One suspects this is as true as his claims that he had no intention of invading Ukraine.
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